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“uŵŵarǇ 
The Water Futures and Solutions Initiative (WFaS) is a cross-sector, collaborative global water project. 
Its objective is to apply systems analysis, develop scientific evidence and identify water-related 
policies and management practices, working together consistently across scales and sectors to 
improve human well-being through water security. The approach is a stakeholder-informed, scenario-
based assessment of water resources and water demand that employs ensembles of state-of-the-art 
socio-economic and hydrological models, examines possible futures and tests the feasibility, 
sustainability and robustness of options that can be implemented today and can be sustainable and 
robust across a range of possible futures and associated uncertainties. This report aims at assessing 
the global current and future water situation. 
 
Possible Water Futures 
 
WFaS has developed a set of scenarios of global water futures, which have been quantified and 
assessed with a multi-model approach. These water-relevant future scenarios are based on water use 
narratives that extend the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) and Representative Concentration 
Pathways (RCPs); a set of pathways developed by a large global community over several years for the 
assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The advantage of using these 
multi-disciplinary scenarios is to ensure the consistency among the different sectoral scenarios. The 
scenarios assume different paths of socioeconomic change and varying degrees of climatic change. 
These scenarios are: Sustainability scenario (resulting in low challenges with respect to sustainability, 
mitigation and adaptation), Middle of the Road scenario (intermediate challenges) and Regional 
Rivalry scenario (high challenges). The main findings of this analysis are summarized as follows: 
 PopulatioŶ aŶd GDP: Gloďal total populatioŶ is estiŵated at ϲ.ϳ ďillioŶ iŶ ϮϬϭϬ. Futuƌe pƌojeĐtioŶs 
iŶdiĐate that Gloďal populatioŶ is eǆpeĐted to uŶdeƌgo ĐoŶsideƌaďle ĐhaŶges iŶ the ĐoŵiŶg deĐades. 
It ǁill ƌaŶge ďetǁeeŶ ϴ.ϰ aŶd ϵ.ϴ ďillioŶ iŶ the ϮϬϱϬs aŶd it ǁill ƌaŶge ďetǁeeŶ ϳ aŶd ϭϮ ďillioŶ iŶ the 
ϮϭϬϬs depeŶdiŶg oŶ the sĐeŶaƌio. “peĐifiĐallǇ, total populatioŶ ǁill ĐoŶtiŶue to iŶĐƌease thƌough ϮϭϬϬ 
uŶdeƌ the Middle of the ‘oad sĐeŶaƌio, ǁhile it ǁill peak at ϮϬϱϬ aŶd ϮϬϳϬ iŶ the SustainaďilitǇ aŶd 
the Middle of the ‘oad sĐeŶaƌios, ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ. Gloďal GDP leǀels at the eŶd of this ĐeŶtuƌǇ aƌe loǁest 
iŶ the ͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛ sĐeŶaƌio ;ǁith loǁest leǀels of iŶteƌŶatioŶal Đo-opeƌatioŶ aŶd tƌadeͿ aŵouŶtiŶg to 
aƌouŶd ϮϴϬ tƌillioŶ U“D. IŶ the ͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛ aŶd ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ sĐeŶaƌio this iŶĐƌeases to ϱϲϬ 
aŶd ϱϰϬ tƌillioŶ U“D. OǁiŶg to its laƌge populatioŶ Asia aŶd AfƌiĐa aƌe the ŵaiŶ dƌiǀeƌs foƌ diffeƌeŶĐes 
aĐƌoss sĐeŶaƌios, espeĐiallǇ iŶ the seĐoŶd half of this ĐeŶtuƌǇ. 
 Food: GloďallǇ, aǀeƌage food eŶeƌgǇ iŶtake iŶ the Woƌld Food “Ǉsteŵ ŵodel is estiŵated at ϮϴϲϬ 
kCal/Đap/daǇ iŶ ϮϬϭϬ, ǁith ƌegioŶs ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ less thaŶ ϮϯϬϬ kCal/Đap/daǇ iŶ AfƌiĐa to ŵoƌe thaŶ 
ϯϱϬϬ kCal/Đap/daǇ iŶ NoƌtheƌŶ AŵeƌiĐa, Euƌope aŶd OĐeaŶia. The pƌojeĐted peƌ Đapita food eŶeƌgǇ 
iŶtake iŶ ϮϬϱϬ ƌaŶges leǀels ďetǁeeŶ ϮϵϱϬ to ϯϯϲϬ kCal/Đap/daǇ depeŶdiŶg oŶ the sĐeŶaƌio. The 
Ŷuŵďeƌ of people at ƌisk of huŶgeƌ estiŵated foƌ ϮϬϭϬ aŵouŶts to ϵϮϬ MillioŶ, soŵe ϭϯ.ϱ% of gloďal 
populatioŶ. This Ŷuŵďeƌ is ƌapidlǇ deĐƌeasiŶg iŶ tǁo deǀelopŵeŶt pathǁaǇs aŶd the shaƌe of people 
at ƌisk of huŶgeƌ is ďeloǁ Ϯ% of gloďal populatioŶ ďǇ ϮϬϴϬ. OŶlǇ iŶ the ‘egional ‘iǀalrǇ sĐeŶaƌio the 
estiŵated Ŷuŵďeƌ of people at ƌisk of huŶgeƌ stagŶates at aďout ϴϬϬ MillioŶ oƌ soŵe ϴ.ϱ% of the 
gloďal populatioŶ iŶ ϮϬϴϬ. 
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 EŶergǇ: Gloďal eŶeƌgǇ deŵaŶd is eǆpeĐted to fuƌtheƌ iŶĐƌease iŶ the Ŷeǆt deĐades, fƌoŵ ϭϯϲϬϬ ŵillioŶ 
toŶs of oil eƋuiǀaleŶt ;MtoeͿ iŶ ϮϬϭϬ to ϭϱϮϬϬ - ϭϵϳϬϬ Mtoe iŶ ϮϬϰϬ depeŶdiŶg oŶ the sĐeŶaƌio of the 
ϮϬϭϱ Woƌld EŶeƌgǇ Outlook. This iŶĐƌease ǁill ďe dƌiǀeŶ ŵaiŶlǇ ďǇ deŵaŶd gƌoǁth iŶ IŶdia, ChiŶa, 
AfƌiĐa, the Middle East, aŶd “outheast Asia. The gƌoǁiŶg deŵaŶd foƌ poǁeƌ eŶgeŶdeƌs gloďal eleĐtƌiĐitǇ 
geŶeƌatioŶ to iŶĐƌease. Gloďal eleĐtƌiĐitǇ geŶeƌatioŶ is eǆpeĐted to iŶĐƌease sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ fƌoŵ Ϯϯϯϭϴ 
TWh iŶ ϮϬϭϬ to ďetǁeeŶ ϯϯϵϬϬ aŶd ϰϯϭϬϬ TWh iŶ ϮϬϰϬ. The ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ of fossil fuels to total 
eleĐtƌiĐitǇ geŶeƌatioŶ ǁill deĐƌease fƌoŵ ϳϳ% iŶ ϮϬϭϬ to ďetǁeeŶ Ϯϵ% aŶd ϲϰ% iŶ ϮϬϰϬ. GeŶeƌatioŶ 
fƌoŵ ƌeŶeǁaďles gƌoǁs the fastest, as theiƌ Đosts fall aŶd goǀeƌŶŵeŶt suppoƌt ĐoŶtiŶues, aŶd it 
iŶĐƌeases tǁo to thƌee aŶd a half tiŵes, to ƌeaĐh ďetǁeeŶ ϭϭϱϬϬ aŶd ϭϳϴϬϬ TWh ďǇ ϮϬϰϬ. HǇdƌopoǁeƌ 
ƌeŵaiŶs the laƌgest souƌĐe of ƌeŶeǁaďles geŶeƌatioŶ, ǁhile ǁiŶd poǁeƌ aŶd solaƌ PV eǆpaŶd ƌapidlǇ, 
ďut fƌoŵ a ŵuĐh loǁeƌ ďase. Output fƌoŵ ŶuĐleaƌ poǁeƌ plaŶts iŶĐƌeases up to ϭϱϬ%.  Aǀailaďle surfaĐe ǁater resourĐes per Đapita: CouŶtƌies oŶ the AƌaďiĐ peŶiŶsula shoǁ the loǁest ǁateƌ 
aǀailaďilitǇ peƌ Đapita iŶ the ϮϬϭϬs folloǁed ďǇ Noƌth AfƌiĐaŶ ĐouŶtƌies. PakistaŶ, ChiŶa ďut also Belgiuŵ 
haǀe loǁ ǁateƌ aǀailaďilitǇ peƌ Đapita. Due to deŵogƌaphiĐ ĐhaŶges, diffeƌeŶĐes iŶ ǁateƌ aǀailaďilitǇ 
peƌ Đapita aŵoŶg sĐeŶaƌios ďeĐoŵe eǀideŶt ďǇ the ϮϬϱϬs. Wateƌ aǀailaďilitǇ peƌ Đapita is eǆpeĐted to 
deĐƌease iŶ a ďelt aƌouŶd ϭϬ to ϰϬ ŶoƌtheƌŶ latitude fƌoŵ MoƌoĐĐo to IŶdia duƌiŶg the eaƌlǇ half of 
the Ϯϭst ĐeŶtuƌǇ uŶdeƌ all sĐeŶaƌios ĐoŶsideƌed. OŶlǇ a feǁ ĐouŶtƌies shoǁ the opposite tƌeŶd like 
PolaŶd ǁhiĐh goes fƌoŵ ǀulŶeƌaďle iŶ the ϮϬϭϬs to Ŷo stƌess iŶ the ϮϬϱϬs aŶd ChiŶa ǁhiĐh is uŶdeƌ 
ǁateƌ stƌess Ŷoǁ ďut ǁill ďe iŶ the ĐategoƌǇ aďoǀe ϭϳϬϬ ŵϯ/Ǉeaƌ/Đap iŶ tǁo out of thƌee sĐeŶaƌios iŶ 
the ϮϬϱϬs.  GrouŶdǁater resourĐe: GƌouŶdǁateƌ use gloďallǇ aŵouŶts to ϴϬϬ kŵϯ/Ǉeaƌ iŶ the ϮϬϭϬs. The laƌgest 
aďstƌaĐtioŶs aƌe takiŶg plaĐe iŶ IŶdia, U“A, ChiŶa, IƌaŶ aŶd PakistaŶ. AďstƌaĐtioŶs these ĐouŶtƌies 
aĐĐouŶt foƌ ϲϳ% of total aďstƌaĐtioŶs ǁoƌldǁide. IŶ ŵaŶǇ ĐouŶtƌies, gƌouŶdǁateƌ aďstƌaĐtioŶ has 
alƌeadǇ eǆĐeeded ƌeĐhaƌge, leadiŶg to the oǀeƌeǆploitatioŶ aŶd degƌadatioŶ of iŵpoƌtaŶt aƋuifeƌ 
sǇsteŵs. A ǁoƌƌǇiŶg issue iŶ the ϮϬϱϬs ǁill ďe the eǆpeĐted laƌge suƌge iŶ gƌouŶdǁateƌ aďstƌaĐtioŶs, 
ƌeƋuiƌed to satisfǇ the iŶĐƌease of ǁateƌ deŵaŶds, aŵouŶtiŶg to ϭϭϬϬ kŵϯ/Ǉeaƌ, a ϯϵ% iŶĐƌease 
Đoŵpaƌed to ĐuƌƌeŶt leǀel.  Water deŵaŶd: It is estiŵated that gloďal total ǁateƌ deŵaŶd iŶ the ϮϬϭϬs is aďout ϰϲϬϬ kŵϯ/Ǉeaƌ aŶd 
pƌojeĐted that it ǁill ďe ďetǁeeŶ ϱϱϬϬ to ϲϬϬϬ kŵϯ/Ǉeaƌ uŶdeƌ the thƌee sĐeŶaƌios ĐoŶsideƌed, ǁith 
iŶdustƌial aŶd doŵestiĐ deŵaŶd gƌoǁiŶg ŵuĐh fasteƌ thaŶ agƌiĐultuƌal deŵaŶd. UŶdeƌ Middle of the 
‘oad sĐeŶaƌio, the shaƌe of agƌiĐultuƌal deŵaŶd ǁill deĐƌease fƌoŵ ϳϮ% iŶ the ϮϬϭϬs to ϱϵ% iŶ the 
ϮϬϱϬs, ǁhile the shaƌe of iŶdustƌial aŶd doŵestiĐ deŵaŶd ǁill iŶĐƌease fƌoŵ ϭϴ% iŶ the ϮϬϭϬs to Ϯϰ% 
iŶ the ϮϬϱϬs. At ĐoŶtiŶeŶtal sĐale, Asia ƌeŵaiŶs the laƌgest ǁateƌ useƌ iŶ the ǁoƌld iŶ all seĐtoƌs 
espeĐiallǇ foƌ agƌiĐultuƌal ǁateƌ use. “igŶifiĐaŶt ƌises iŶ total ǁateƌ deŵaŶd aƌe eǆpeĐted to oĐĐuƌ iŶ 
WesteƌŶ, EasteƌŶ aŶd “outheƌŶ AfƌiĐa, as ǁell as iŶ “outheƌŶ aŶd EasteƌŶ Asia. At ĐouŶtƌǇ leǀel, IŶdia 
aŶd ChiŶa haǀe the laƌgest deŵaŶd, folloǁed ďǇ U“A, PakistaŶ aŶd ‘ussia. DoŵestiĐ deŵaŶds aƌe 
ƌapidlǇ iŶĐƌeasiŶg iŶ suď “ahaƌaŶ CouŶtƌies, dƌiǀeŶ ďǇ theiƌ iŶteŶse soĐio-eĐoŶoŵiĐ gƌoǁth. These 
ĐhaŶges iŶ ǁateƌ use patteƌŶs Đoŵe togetheƌ ǁith the poteŶtial iŶĐƌease of feƌtilizeƌs utilizatioŶ, due 
to the Ŷeed to iŵpƌoǀe agƌiĐultuƌal pƌoduĐtiǀitǇ. All of this ǁill likelǇ iŵpaiƌ ǁateƌ ƋualitǇ aŶd daŵage 
ǀaluaďle ǁateƌ-depeŶdeŶt eĐosǇsteŵs, if Ŷo adeƋuate aďateŵeŶt ŵeasuƌes aƌe desigŶed aŶd 
iŵpleŵeŶted.  Water sĐarĐitǇ: MaŶǇ ĐouŶtƌies iŶĐludiŶg the ĐouŶtƌies oŶ the AƌaďiĐ peŶiŶsula, Noƌth AfƌiĐa, CǇpƌus, 
AƌŵeŶia, UzďekistaŶ, AfghaŶistaŶ aŶd PakistaŶ aƌe alƌeadǇ uŶdeƌgoiŶg peƌǀasiǀe ǁateƌ sĐaƌĐitǇ 
ĐoŶditioŶs. At pƌeseŶt alŵost all ĐouŶtƌies iŶ ďelt aƌouŶd ϭϬ to ϰϬ ŶoƌtheƌŶ latitude fƌoŵ MeǆiĐo to 
ChiŶa aŶd WesteƌŶ “outh AŵeƌiĐa, “outh AfƌiĐa, “outh Euƌope aƌe affeĐted ďǇ ǁateƌ sĐaƌĐitǇ. AŶ 
iŶĐƌeasiŶg Ŷuŵďeƌ of people ǁill ďe eǆposed to ĐoŶditioŶs of seǀeƌe ǁateƌ sĐaƌĐitǇ uŶtil ϮϬϱϬ. IŶ the 
ϮϬϭϬs oŶ aŶŶual ďasis ϭ.ϵ ďillioŶ people ;Ϯϳ% of the total gloďal populatioŶͿ liǀe iŶ poteŶtial seǀeƌe 
ǁateƌ sĐaƌĐe aƌeas aŶd iŶ ϮϬϱϬ it ǁill ďe Ϯ.ϳ to ϯ.Ϯ ďillioŶ depeŶdiŶg oŶ the sĐeŶaƌio. If ŵoŶthlǇ 
ǀaƌiaďilitǇ is takeŶ iŶto aĐĐouŶt alƌeadǇ Ŷoǁ ϯ.ϲ ďillioŶ people ǁoƌldǁide ;ϱϭ%Ϳ aƌe liǀiŶg iŶ poteŶtial 
seǀeƌe ǁateƌ sĐaƌĐitǇ aƌeas at least foƌ oŶe ŵoŶth peƌ Ǉeaƌ aŶd it ǁill ďe ϰ.ϴ to ϱ.ϳ ďillioŶ iŶ ϮϬϱϬ. ϳϯ% 
of the affeĐted people liǀe iŶ Asia ;ϲϵ% iŶ ϮϬϱϬͿ. 
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 HǇdro-EĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶalǇsis: ϮϮ ĐouŶtƌies ǁith ĐoŵďiŶed populatioŶ of ϭ.ϳ ďillioŶ people aƌe ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ 
ǁateƌ stƌessed ;ƌiĐh aŶd pooƌ eĐoŶoŵies ƌeŵaiŶiŶg ǁateƌ stƌessedͿ aŶd Ϯϴ to ϯϯ ĐouŶtƌies eǆpeĐted to 
ďe iŶ the ϮϬϱϬs, depeŶdiŶg oŶ the sĐeŶaƌio ĐoŶsideƌed. CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, a populatioŶ of ϯ.ϲ aŶd ϰ.ϲ 
ďillioŶ ;ϰϯ to ϰϳ% of the Woƌld͛s total populatioŶͿ ǁill ďe iŶ the tǁo ǁateƌ stƌess Đategoƌies iŶ the ϮϬϱϬs. 
ϵϭ to ϵϲ% of the affeĐted populatioŶ ǁill liǀe iŶ Asia ;ŵaiŶlǇ “outheƌŶ aŶd EasteƌŶ AsiaͿ aŶd ϰ to ϵ% iŶ 
AfƌiĐa ;ŵaiŶlǇ NoƌtheƌŶ AfƌiĐaͿ. Ouƌ aŶalǇsis ƌeǀeals that “oŵalia, Eƌitƌea, Nigeƌ, BuƌkiŶa Faso, “eŶegal, 
YeŵeŶ, AfghaŶistaŶ aŶd PakistaŶ ǁill ďe the ŵost ǀulŶeƌaďle ĐouŶtƌies gloďallǇ, as theǇ ǁill ďe highlǇ 
stƌessed ǁith loǁ adaptiǀe ĐapaĐitǇ uŶdeƌ ŵost of the sĐeŶaƌios. 
 
The results indicate that the World currently faces multiple and complex water challenges that are 
expected to intensify in the future. This will likely hinder economic development, threaten food and 
energy security, and damage valuable ecosystems. Improved water policies and governance 
structures, and the adoption of a more innovative technological interventions will offer some 
solutions. However, managing the water sector alone is no longer sufficient, since water integrates 
across scales and sectors, which all use and influence increasingly scarce water resources. Consistent 
solution portfolios need to be identified to work across economic sectors and scales of management. 
Since we cannot manage what we cannot measure, information gathering, generation, and sharing 
must also be improved. This report provides essential information to inform and guide policymakers 
in the design and implementation of water solutions portfolios. The information provided includes 
estimates of water supply by source, water variability, water demand, and hydro-economic 
classification under various up-to-date socio-economic and climate scenarios. To improve water, 
energy, and food security, sustain human wellbeing, and ensure sustainable development, the 
identification of portfolios of options that work together synergistically in different regions will be the 
focus of continuing work within the WFaS initiative and future reports. 
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 IŶtroduĐtioŶ 
Changing and growing global water demand: 
The world population is expected around the middle of 21st century to range from 8.4 to 9.8 billion 
depending on the scenario. GDP is expected to grow globally three to six times till 2050 compared to 
2010, although there are and will be large differences among countries. The drastic socio-economic 
changes will increase pressure on food, energy, and water resources. 
There is also increasing evidence that the global water cycle is changing due to global warming. The 
hydrological cycle is intensifying with wetter regions generally becoming wetter and drier regions 
becoming even drier. These supply side changes in the hydrological cycle can have large impacts on 
future water availability and quality. Analysis of these aspects of global change helps understanding 
the urgent need for swift planning and execution of strategic, reasonable and effective management 
and countermeasures against deteriorating water security. 
Global water assessment within the Water Future and Solutions Initiative (WFaS): 
It is now universally accepted that sustainable management of food, energy, ecosystem and water are 
central parts of the 21st century development challenge and that they are deeply connected with each 
other. An assessment relevant to water should cover all of these components and consider their 
linkages, utilizing consistent assumptions across sectors. 
For the sake of providing scientific input to support stakeholder dialog and decision making, the Water 
Future and Solutions Initiative (WFaS) develops consistent multi-model global water scenarios, 
consistent with scenarios for other sectors, with the aim to analyze the water-food-energy-climate 
nexus and identify future hotspots of water insecurity and related impacts on human wellbeing. This 
current study investigates future climatic change developments in three main water use sectors, the 
industrial, domestic and agricultural sectors, focusing on how the developments in those sectors affect 
water supply and demand balances, and the related water security, into the future. 
 
1.1 Purpose of this report 
The purpose of this report is to assess and depict possible global water futures, applying the latest 
climate and socio-economic change scenarios based on multiple-model analysis. Multi-model analysis 
is used to better understand uncertainty, and provide an indication of the scientific confidence we can 
provide with respect to some of the important conclusions. Better understanding of the current and 
future availability of water resources is essential for sound development in a changing world. To cope 
with expected global changes, we need to identify options and find appropriate pathways for 
achieving the development goals, including Agenda 2030, in an effective, efficient and robust manner. 
This report discusses where, when, how much and why water resource will be endangered in different 
regions of the World under expected climate and socio-economic change. 
 
1.2 WFa“ sĐeŶario approaĐh 
One of the primary tasks of WFaS has been to develop global scenarios of water potentials and 
stressors, their interdependencies across the different sectors, the climate-water-food-energy-
ecosystem nexus, and the impacts on human wellbeing and earth ecosystems and the services they 
provide. In the quantitative analysis WFaS develops consistent, multi-model global water scenarios 
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with the aim to analyze the water-food-energy-climate-environment nexus and identify future 
hotspots of water insecurity and related impacts on human well-being, in particular food and energy 
security. Water insecurity is an imbalance between water supply and demand, combined with risks of 
extremes and the coping capacities of social systems, WFaS has projected these components and 
assessed global water scarcity and security both at present and under possible futures. How will socio-
hydrological condition change in next 50 years? Where will be hot-spots of water insecurities? How 
serious will it be? 
 
1.3 RegioŶal Đategories used iŶ this aŶalǇsis 
This report uses the composition of regions by the United Nations Statistics Division1, consisting of six 
continental regions (Africa, North and Middle America, South America, Asia, Oceania, Europe) and 19 
geographical sub-regions listed in Figure 1-1. 
 
Continent Subregions   Continent Subregions  
Africa Northern Africa  America and 
Central America 
Northern America  
Western Africa  Central America  
Middle Africa  Caribbean  
Eastern Africa  South America South America  
Southern Africa  Europe Western Europe  
Asia Western Asia  Southern Europe  
Southern Asia  Northern Europe  
Central Asia  Eastern Europe  
Eastern Asia  Oceania Oceania  
 South-Eastern Asia   
Figure 1-1: Regional categories 
 
Assessments at five levels of spatial scale are provided in this report; global, continental, sub-regional, 
country and sub-country scale (i.e. the grid scale of models). Some small islands are not reflected in 
the result, because the minimum spatial resolution of the utilized models is 0.5ox 0.5o global 
(approximately 50km x 50km at equator). 
We put special emphasis on some of the countries which are the key and priority countries of the 
Austrian Development Cooperation which are: Albania, Armenia, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, 
Moldavia, Mozambique, Uganda and for comparison Austria. 
                                                          
1
 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm 
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 The IŵportaŶĐe of a Neǆus ApproaĐh 
The water, food, and energy resource systems are inextricably linked. These resources are crucial input 
into economic production and they provide valuable ecosystem services to humans. Secure, reliable, 
and affordable access to all these resources is critical to basic survival, as well as ongoing economic 
development, at all scales and in every region of the world. The energy sector needs significant 
amounts of water withdrawals for power generation, primarily for cooling thermal power plants and 
running hydropower turbines; for fuel extraction, processing, and transportation; and increasingly for 
growing biofuels. Similarly, energy is essential for water extraction from both surface and subsurface 
sources, conveyance and delivery to users, and treatment. Furthermore, energy is used in the agro-
forestry sector for fertilizer production, irrigation, cultivating and harvesting crops, and drying and 
processing products. The agricultural sector is the largest user of water worldwide, mainly for 
irrigation purposes. Finally, land resources are required for the agriculture, energy and water-related 
activities, primarily for the cultivation of food, feed, fiber, and bioenergy, but also for setting up water 
and energy facilities. Choices made in one sector can translate to increased risks and harmful effects 
in another, but they can also generate co-benefits. This linked relationship is commonly known as the 
water-food-energy nexus. 
The next few decades will see an intensification of multiple challenges at the nexus of water, food, 
and energy. These challenges include growing demands for water, food, and energy, driven by several 
socio-economic changes. At the same time, water, food, and energy systems in many countries will be 
put under growing pressure by increasingly complex interactions, the exhaustion of low cost supply 
options, and the impacts of climate change. These challenges can jointly compromise the reliability of 
existing operations and hinder future development. The challenges will be most acute in countries 
undergoing accelerated transformation and rapid economic growth, or those in which a large 
proportion of the population lacks access to modern services such as in many countries (WWAP 2014). 
The projected future increase of energy demand, coupled with the relative change in the mix of energy 
production technologies will likely substantially increase water demand and impair water quality. 
Global water withdrawals for energy are projected to rise by one-fifth through 2035, with 
consumption escalating dramatically by 85%, driven by the shift towards higher efficiency power 
plants with more advanced cooling systems (that reduce water withdrawals but increase 
consumption) and increased production of biofuels. These changes will be more pronounced in Asia, 
with withdrawals and consumption increasing by about 50% and 100%, respectively (International 
Energy Agency 2012). Moreover, future water demands of irrigation, municipal, industrial and 
environmental uses are also expected to increase (Wada et al. 2016). This is likely to worsen water 
scarcity condition already prevalent in many regions and to enhance competition for water across 
sectors and regions. 
At the same time, climate change impacts portend a more constrained future in many regions around 
the world. Climate change will likely increase temperature and evapotranspiration, and modify 
precipitation patterns. Many regions around the world will suffer a decrease of water resources 
availability and an increase of the occurrence and intensity of extreme events such as droughts and 
heatwaves. Hydropower and thermal power, the dominant electricity-generating technologies in the 
world, are especially vulnerable to increased water temperature, diminished water availability and 
extreme events (Van Vliet et al. 2012). These changes in energy supply can subsequently rise energy 
prices and limit access to energy. 
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Energy demand for water supply and treatment is also expected to increase, as a consequence of the 
growing demand for water, driven by population and wealth growth, and the shrinking water 
availability because of climate change impacts. Some of the proposed solutions to address water 
scarcity embrace water transfer and trading between distant regions, groundwater pumping from 
deeper aquifers, the use of unconventional water resources such as treated wastewater and 
desalination, and the shift towards more-efficient irrigation technologies such as sprinkle and drip 
systems. All these solutions require considerable amounts of energy with consequences for 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate change (WWAP 2014). For example, desalination uses 
10-12 times more energy than standard drinking-water treatment (King et al. 2008). Meanwhile, 
hydropower projects can improve both energy and water security, but have implications for both 
terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems through flow alteration and habitat loss (Vörösmarty et al. 2010). 
Bioenergy production can help mitigate climate change and alleviate energy security concerns, but 
can have negative impacts on food production and prices, water use, and biodiversity, if not restricted 
to non-irrigated marginal or abandoned cropland (Chaturvedi et al. 2013). Food production can be 
expanded through cropland expansion and intensification (Schmitz et al. 2014), but these strategies 
will have impacts on natural ecosystems and result in greater water and energy use, and impaired 
water quality. 
Despite these interdependencies, water, food, and energy policies are rarely integrated, and have 
been so far addressed in isolation within sectoral boundaries. Decision makers often remain ill-
informed about the importance of integration and nexus thinking. The lack of integration in resource 
assessments and policy-making leads to inconsistent strategies and inefficient use of resources. Part 
of the reason for this is the geographic scales of concern to water, food, and energy supply managers 
are usually quite different. Energy providers are rarely focused on regions as small as a city, or town, 
or basin that water utility managers and farmers are responsible for. Water utility managers of local 
municipalities and farmers are not likely to feel they need to take into account the production of 
electricity or gasoline hundreds of kilometers away that they may eventually use (Cosgrove and Loucks 
2015). 
Sustainable management of water, food and energy resource systems should be conducted using 
integrated approaches that are based on a broader systems perspective (Liu et al. 2015). These 
approaches strive to identify the linkages and interactions among sectors to better understand the 
synergies and trade-offs involved in meeting future resource demands of both human and natural 
systems in a sustainable way. The ultimate objective is to identify solutions that capitalize on potential 
synergies and co-benefits, minimize counterproductive policies and investments, and ensure that 
humanity remains within planetary boundaries. Although a fully integrated model and assessment of 
nexus feedbacks is beyond the scope of this assessment the question of how water constraints will 
affect food production, energy production, access to water, and ecosystem health is of particular 
interest. 
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 Future sĐeŶarios - WFa“ Futures AŶalǇsis ApproaĐh 
3.1 BuildiŶg ǁater sĐeŶarios 
Alternative scenarios are an important method for exploring uncertainty in future dimensions of 
environmental conditions which are intrinsically interlinked socio-economic developments. WFaS 
employs globally consistent scenario analysis as a strategic planning method for exploring consistent 
and coherent alternative hypothetical futures ultimately aimed at developing robust pathways 
towards water security. Different perspectives of integrative future developments support decision-
making by providing rational information as a sound basis for action. Good scenarios are ones that 
explore the possible, not just the probably – providing a relevant challenge to the conventional 
wisdom of their users, and helping them prepare for the major changes ahead (Magnuszewski et al. 
2015). 
Water domain futures are determined by a wide range of specific dimensions of nature (climate 
change, land use, water resources, ecosystems), society (demography, governance, value & lifestyles), 
and economy (water use for agriculture, households, energy, and manufacturing, with extents driven 
by a combination of economic development and technology). 
A key element of this study is to develop consistent qualitative global scenarios across sectors, 
embedded in global narratives. To the extent possible they quantify future water resource potentials 
vis à vis water demand and use. To aid in developing indicators for water security we develop and 
include in the scenario analysis a hydro-economic classification of water challenges (see section 2.3). 
We ďƌoadlǇ defiŶe ǁateƌ seĐuƌitǇ as the people͛s aďilitǇ to Đope ǁith ǁateƌ ƌelated ƌisks that 
potentially threaten their well-being. 
In a quantitative analysis, based on 
the scenarios, WFaS employs an 
ensemble of three state of the art 
Global Water Models (Wada et al. 
2016) for which information about 
both climate and socioeconomic 
change is required to project future 
water supply and demand. For the 
sake of a consistent set of new 
global water scenarios the WFaS 
initiative coordinates its work with 
other on-going scenario efforts in 
the context of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) 5th 
Assessment Report (Moss et al. 
2010). This includes the emission 
scenarios of the Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCPs) 
(van Vuuren et al. 2011), completed 
in 2012 to provide input that is essential for climate modelers. The spatial and seasonal patterns of 
future climate change estimated by climate models must be complemented by socioeconomic and 
ecological data that the other climate change research groups, namely the integrated assessment 
 
Figure 3-1: The shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs) representing different 
combinations of challenges to climate mitigation and adaptation.  
Source: (O'Neill, et al., 2015) 
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modelers (IAM), and the impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability community need. In response to this 
the climate change research community converged on new projections, termed Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), illustrated in Figure 3-1 (O'Neill et al. 2014, O'Neill et al. 2015). The 
SSP storylines, already the result of a multi-year community effort across sectors, have in WFaS been 
extended with relevant critical dimensions affecting water availability and use. Despite the potential 
offered by globally consistent, integrated scenario analysis, very few assessments have yet used the 
SSPs to assess the impacts of global change on water resources, e.g. Hanasaki et al. 2013, Arnell and 
Lloyd-Hughes 2014. 
A fiƌst WFa“ ͞fast-tƌaĐk͟ assessŵeŶt ďuilds oŶ eǆistiŶg ƋuaŶtifiĐatioŶs of Đliŵate sĐeŶaƌios2 based on 
the RCPs from the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISI-MIP) (Warszawski et al. 
2014, Frieler et al. 2012). The rate of climate change is characterized by four RCPs. They define 
pathways of different amounts of radiative forcing until 2100 ranging from RCP 2.6 to RCP 8.5 (see 
Box 1). General Global Circulation Models (GCM) experiments investigate the climate response to the 
RCPs. ISI-MIP applied climate change from five3 GCMs (Table 2-4) for the calculation of diverse climate 
change impacts including results such as daily runoff from Global Hydrological Models (GHM). 
For the IPCC 5th assessment report the research community has agreed on a new parallel process 
(Moss et al. 2010) building on the concept that the four RCPs can be achieved by a diverse range of 
socio-economic and technological development scenarios outlined in the five SSPs. This results in a 
new scenario matrix architecture (van Vuuren et al. 2014) combining RCPs and SSPs. The research 
community4 is currently performing Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) to explore conditions for 
potential combinations of RCPs and SSPs that could develop in the real world. 
In consultation with researchers studying feasible RCP-SSP combinations during the WFaS project 
group meeting in October 2013 (WFaS 2013) and thereafter WFaS employs the following combinations 
foƌ its ͞fast-tƌaĐk͟ sĐeŶaƌio assessŵeŶt:   ͞SustainaďilitǇ͟ ;ďuildiŶg oŶ ““Pϭ togetheƌ ǁith ‘CP ϰ.ϱͿ  ͞Middle of the ‘oad͟ ;““PϮ-‘CP ϲ.ϬͿ  ͞‘egional ‘iǀalrǇ͟ ;““Pϯ-‘CP ϲ.ϬͿ 
 
Another rational for selection of the specific SSP-RCP combinations was that those represent the 
higher bound of climate change impacts assuming continuation of current mitigation policies. In 
December 2015 the international community 5  decided that the global goal will be less than a 
temperature increase of 2˚C, ǁhiĐh ĐoƌƌespoŶds ĐloselǇ to aŶ ‘CP of Ϯ.ϱ. If this taƌget is ƌeaĐhed, soŵe 
of the climate change impacts could be less than described in this paper. Other scenario studies to 
date have used the combinations SSP1-RCP 2.6, SSP3-RCP 6.0 and SSP5-RCP 8.56 (Veldkamp et al. 2016 
following Winsemius et al. 2015). 
 
                                                          
2 Distributed by the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), see  http://cmip-pcmdi.llnl.gov/cmip5/  
3 The GCMs were selected because their results are bias-corrected and reported globally for a 0.5 by 0.5 decimal 
degree grid (about 50x50 km grids) 
4 See https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about  
5
  http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf 
6 Current insight suggests that RCP 8.5, i.e. the most extensive radiative forcing, is only feasible in combination 
with SSP5. The two studies explored this combination as their third scenario.    
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3.2 Water eǆteŶded “hared “oĐio-EĐoŶoŵiĐ PathǁaǇs ;““PsͿ 
SSPs include both a qualitative component in the form of a narrative on global development and a 
quantitative component that includes numerical pathways for certain variables that are particularly 
useful to have in quantitative form for use in other studies. Box 2 provides an excerpt of the summary 
SSP storylines. They include demography, economic development, human development, technology, 
lifestyles, environment and natural resources, and policy and institutions. For a subset of SSP 
elements, tables of qualitative assumptions were developed to describe the relative direction and 
magnitude of changes in these elements. 
Quantifications of individual variables for each SSP are an ongoing effort of the research community 
with results available at the IIASA SSP database portal7. At present final projections for population and 
economic development including demography (population by age, sex, and education), urbanization 
and economic development (GDP) are available for all scenarios. 
SSPs were developed by the climate change community with a focus of the key elements of climate 
policy. However, the five SSPs were developed to offer the possibility for experimentation by a wide 
ƌaŶge of ƌeseaƌĐheƌs foƌ eǆteŶdiŶg the ͞oƌigiŶal͟ ““P iŶ ǀaƌious diŵeŶsioŶs (O'Neill et al. 2015). WFaS 
has responded to this by extending the SSP storylines (Appendix A) with water narratives for water 
use developed in collaboration with a group of water planners from around the world and the 
scientific consortia of WFaS. The qualitative assessment of water narratives for each SSP (Appendix B) 
provided the basis for the quantification of selected variables required for the global water models 
(see section 3.5). 
 
 
                                                          
7
 https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about#intro 
Box 1: Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) 
The Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) are named according to the target level of radiative forcing1 for the year 
2100 (2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5 W/m2, respectively). 
The radiative forcing estimates are based on the forcing of greenhouse gases and other forcing agents, and the forcing levels 
are relative to pre-industrial values [(Moss et al. 2010), (van Vuuren et al. 2011)]. 
The RCPs include:  A ŵitigatioŶ sĐeŶaƌio leadiŶg to a ǀeƌǇ loǁ foƌĐiŶg leǀel ;‘CP Ϯ.ϲͿ, ǁhiĐh aiŵs to liŵit the iŶĐƌease of gloďal ŵeaŶ 
teŵpeƌatuƌe to less thaŶ Ϯ °C ďǇ ϮϭϬϬ.  A staďilizatioŶ sĐeŶaƌio ;‘CP ϰ.ϱͿ iŶ ǁhiĐh total ƌadiatiǀe foƌĐiŶg is staďilized ďefoƌe ϮϭϬϬ ďǇ eŵploǇŵeŶt of 
teĐhŶologies aŶd stƌategies foƌ ƌeduĐiŶg gƌeeŶhouse gas eŵissioŶs.  AŶotheƌ staďilizatioŶ sĐeŶaƌio ;‘CP ϲ.ϬͿ iŶ ǁhiĐh total ƌadiatiǀe foƌĐiŶg is staďilized afteƌ ϮϭϬϬ. Both ‘CP ϰ.ϱ aŶd ϲ.Ϭ 
aiŵ to liŵit the iŶĐƌease of gloďal ŵeaŶ teŵpeƌatuƌe to less thaŶ ϰ °C ďǇ ϮϭϬϬ.  A ǀeƌǇ high eŵissioŶ sĐeŶaƌio ;‘CP ϴ.ϱͿ ǁhiĐh is ĐhaƌaĐteƌized ďǇ soaƌiŶg gƌeeŶhouse gas eŵissioŶs oǀeƌ tiŵe, 
leadiŶg to high gƌeeŶhouse gas ĐoŶĐeŶtƌatioŶ leǀels. Gloďal ŵeaŶ teŵpeƌatuƌe iŶĐƌeases ŶeaƌlǇ ϲ °C ďǇ ϮϭϬϬ. 
 
1Radiative forcing is a measure of the influence a factor has in altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the 
Earth-atmosphere system and is an index of the importance of the factor as a potential climate change mechanism. In this 
report radiative forcing values are for changes relative to preindustrial conditions defined at 1750 and are expressed in 
Watts per square meter (W/m2) (IPCC 2007) 
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3.3 HǇdro-eĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐlassifiĐatioŶ 
The WFaS initiative develops global scenarios of water potentials and stressors, their 
interdependencies across different water sectors (climate-water-food-energy-ecosystem nexus) and 
across spatial scales. A global assessment is imperative owing to the increasing importance of global 
drivers such as climate change, population growth and rapid urbanization, economic globalization or 
safeguarding biodiversity, all of which interrelated with the water domain. Maintaining a global 
perspective while providing necessary regional detail, which recognizes the current spatial diversity of 
water-related challenges and possible future developments, is key for water scenario development. 
However, applying different scenario assumptions at every location would produce unjustifiable 
complexity and make results hard to interpret in a meaningful way. The quantitative scenario 
assessment here goes beyond globally uniform assumptions of important scenario drivers by 
developing a classification system for countries and watersheds describing different conditions 
pertaining to water security, or its reverse, water challenges (Fischer et al. 2015). Countries or 
watersheds facing similar water security challenges and capacities can then be assumed to experience 
similar rates of change in development, although each will still have its own unique path based on its 
own current development trends. 
Box 2: Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) 
SSP1: Sustainability – Taking the green road 
“The world shifts gradually, but pervasively, toward a more sustainable path, emphasizing more inclusive development 
that respects perceived environmental boundaries. Increasing evidence of and accounting for the social, cultural, and 
economic costs of environmental degradation and inequality drive this shift. Management of the global commons slowly 
improves, facilitated by increasingly effective and persistent cooperation and collaboration of local, national, and 
international organizations and institutions, the private sector, and civil soĐietǇ …͟ 
SSP2: Middle of the road 
“The world follows a path in which social, economic, and technological trends do not shift markedly from historical 
patterns. Development and income growth proceeds unevenly, with some countries making relatively good progress 
while others fall short of expectations. Most economies are politically stable. Globally connected markets function 
imperfectly. Global and national institutions work toward but make slow progress in achieving sustainable development 
goals, including improved living conditions and access to education, safe water, and health care. Technological 
development proceeds but without fundamental breakthroughs ...͟ 
SSP3: Regional rivalry – A rocky road 
“A resurgent nationalism, concerns about competitiveness and security, and regional conflicts push countries to 
increasingly focus on domestic or, at most, regional issues. This trend is reinforced by the limited number of 
comparatively weak global institutions, with uneven coordination and cooperation for addressing environmental and 
other global concerns. Policies shift over time to become increasingly oriented toward national and regional security 
issues, including barriers to trade, particularly in the energy resource and agricultural markets. Countries focus on 
achieving energy and food security goals within their own regions at the expense of broader-based development, and in 
several regions move toward more authoritarian forms of government with highly regulated economies. Investments in 
education and technological development decline ...͟ 
Source: O'Neill et al. 2015 
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This requires developing a system of classification 
for countries and watersheds describing different 
conditions pertaining to water security (or its 
reverse water challenges). The concept of water 
security is complex to define because it has 
different dimensions or facets. First, security needs 
to be understood as a relative concept, i.e., an 
iŵďalaŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͞supplǇ͟ aŶd ͞deŵaŶd͟ that 
varies according to local conditions. Second, water 
security and water scarcity are fundamentally 
dynamic. For example, water scarcity intensifies 
with increasing demand by users and with the 
decreasing quantity and quality of the resource. It 
can further decrease when the right response 
options are put in place. In this spirit, we follow 
recently adopted frameworks for a risk-science 
perspective, which define water security in terms 
of soĐieties͛ adaptatioŶ oƌ ĐopiŶg ĐapaĐitǇ (Grey et 
al. 2013) to water related challenges, for example 
freshwater variability (Hall et al. 2014). 
For this purpose we define a hydro-economic classification consisting of two broad dimensions 
representing 
1. eĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶd iŶstitutioŶal ĐapaĐitǇ to addƌess ǁateƌ ĐhalleŶges ;Ǉ-diŵeŶsioŶ iŶ Figuƌe ϯ-ϮͿ 
2. ŵagŶitude aŶd ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of ĐhalleŶges ƌelated to the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of aǀailaďle ǁateƌ ƌesouƌĐes; 
i.e. hǇdrologiĐ ĐhalleŶge/ĐoŵpleǆitǇ ;ǆ-diŵeŶsioŶ iŶ Figuƌe ϯ-ϮͿ 
 
As watersheds and their inherent water challenges extend beyond national boundaries the hydro-
economic classification should also be applicable to both the country level and the geographic entity 
of watersheds. To be useful in WFaS the classification approach must meet three basic principles: 
1. PƌoduĐe a sŵall Ŷuŵďeƌ of distiŶĐt Đlasses that diffeƌeŶtiate ĐouŶtƌies iŶ teƌŵs of ;ĐuƌƌeŶt aŶd 
futuƌeͿ ǁateƌ ĐhalleŶges aŶd the ŵeaŶs theǇ haǀe to aĐt aŶd the uƌgeŶĐǇ aŶd pƌioƌities theǇ aƌe 
likelǇ to assigŶ to fiŶdiŶg ǁateƌ solutioŶs; 
2. Use ǀaƌiaďles/iŶdiĐatoƌs that aƌe Ŷot oŶlǇ aǀailaďle foƌ past Ǉeaƌs ďut ĐaŶ also ďe Đoŵputed foƌ 
futuƌe peƌiods aŶd sĐeŶaƌios; 
3. ApplǇ aŶ appƌoaĐh that is fleǆiďle, tƌaŶspaƌeŶt aŶd ĐaŶ ďǇ ƌefiŶed/tailoƌed to ƌefleĐt stakeholdeƌ 
pƌioƌities aŶd Ŷeeds. 
 
For the classification, each major dimension is measured by a normalized composite index, computed 
from a set of relevant sub-indicators (see Fischer et al. 2015). In this way countries/regions will be 
located in a two-dimensional space representing different human-natural water development 
challenges and levels of water security. The selection of indicators for each dimension has been 
extensively discussed in the WFaS consortium including a stakeholder meeting in the context of the 
WFaS Scenario Focus Group (Pound et al. 2013, Magnuszewski et al. 2015). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Conceptual framework for allocation of hydro-
economic classification to four quadrants of water 
security 
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Hydrologic complexity 
For the X-dimension, hydrologic complexity, four indicators of water challenge are used: 
(i) Total reneǁaďle ǁater resourĐes per Đapita ;iŶ ŵϯ/peƌsoŶ/ǇeaƌͿ as a ŵeasuƌe foƌ ǁateƌ 
aǀailaďilitǇ, 
(ii) ‘unoff ǀariaďilitǇ eǆpƌessed ďǇ the ĐoeffiĐieŶt of ǀaƌiatioŶ of siŵulated ŵoŶthlǇ ƌuŶoff foƌ a 
ϯϬ-Ǉeaƌ peƌiod shoǁiŶg ďoth iŶteƌ- aŶd iŶtƌa-aŶŶual ǀaƌiaďilitǇ of ǁateƌ ƌesouƌĐes, 
(iii) The ƌatio of aŶŶual ǁateƌ ǁithdƌaǁal to total ƌeŶeǁaďle ǁateƌ ƌesouƌĐes ;sĐalaƌ fƌaĐtioŶͿ as a 
pƌoǆǇ foƌ ƌelatiǀe intensitǇ of ǁater use, 
(iv) The depeŶdeŶĐǇ ƌatio, oƌ the shaƌe of eǆteƌŶal ;fƌoŵ outside ŶatioŶal ďouŶdaƌiesͿ to total 
ƌeŶeǁaďle ǁateƌ ƌesouƌĐes as a ŵeasuƌe of the dependenĐǇ of eǆternal ǁater resourĐes. 
Data souƌĐes used iŶ the ͞ Fast-tƌaĐk͟ aŶalǇsis iŶĐlude the AQUA“TAT dataďase of the UN FAO ;ǀaƌiaďle 
i, iii and iv) and a model-ensemble of six hydrological models calculated from ISI-MIP (Warszawski et 
al. 2014). All variables can be computed for future periods using hydrological models based on 
selected climate change scenarios. 
Economic / institutional coping capacity 
For the y-diŵeŶsioŶ, ǁe͛ǀe seleĐted oŶe iŶdiĐatoƌ, ŶaŵelǇ GDP peƌ Đaput (in constant PPP dollars per 
caput) as a measure of economic strength and financial resources available for investing in risk 
management. Country level GDP per capita is readily available for future periods in the SSP database. 
Several additional indicators have been discussed and were explored for potential inclusion in a 
compound indicator to proxy economic-institutional coping capacity. 
The World Bank publishes annual data in the context of The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
project 8  of the World Bank reports annually on six broad dimensions of governance including 
composite indicators for:  VoiĐe aŶd aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ  PolitiĐal staďilitǇ aŶd aďseŶĐe of ǀioleŶĐe  GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt effeĐtiǀeŶess  ‘egulatoƌǇ ƋualitǇ  ‘ule of laǁ  CoŶtƌol of ĐoƌƌuptioŶ 
The WGI relies exclusively on perception-based governance data sources drawing on data sources 
from the private sector (e.g. Gallup World Poll, Global Competitiveness Report), non-governmental 
organizations (e.g. Global Integrity, Reporters Without Borders), and selected public sector 
organizations (e.g. CPIA9 of the World Bank, EBRD10 Transition Report). 
Other potential indicators include: 
i) the HuŵaŶ DeǀelopŵeŶt IŶdiĐatoƌ ;HDIͿ fƌoŵ the UŶited NatioŶs DeǀelopŵeŶt Pƌogƌaŵ aŶd 
its ƌeĐeŶt eǆteŶsioŶ the IŶeƋualitǇ-adjusted HDI 
ii) the CoƌƌuptioŶ PeƌĐeptioŶ iŶdeǆ ;CPIͿ fƌoŵ ͞TƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ IŶteƌŶatioŶal ,͟ a ŶoŶ-pƌofit, ŶoŶ-
goǀeƌŶŵeŶtal oƌgaŶizatioŶ 
iii) the UŶiǀeƌsitǇ of Notƌe Daŵe Gloďal AdaptatioŶ IŶdeǆ ;ND-GAIN11Ϳ suŵŵaƌizes a ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s 
ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ to Đliŵate ĐhaŶge aŶd otheƌ gloďal ĐhalleŶges iŶ ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ ǁith its ƌeadiŶess 
to iŵpƌoǀe ƌesilieŶĐe. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ the latteƌ iŶĐludes a feǁ iŶdiĐatoƌs ƌelated to eĐoŶoŵiĐ-
iŶstitutioŶal ĐopiŶg ĐapaĐitǇ 
iv) the Fƌagile “tate IŶdeǆ ;F“I12Ϳ ĐoŵpƌisiŶg of ϭϮ iŶdiĐatoƌs oƌ dƌiǀeƌs of state failuƌe puďlished 
siŶĐe ϮϬϬϱ ďǇ the UŶited “tates thiŶk taŶk ,the FuŶd foƌ PeaĐe aŶd the ŵagaziŶe Foreign PoliĐǇ. 
                                                          
8 See www.govindicators.org  
9 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment  
10 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
11 See index.gain.org  
12 See http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ 
 11 
 
The level of education is a more general indicator that has been suggested to proxy socio-economic 
coping capacity, for example in the context of climate change (Lutz et al. 2014) and natural disasters 
(Butz et al. 2014). 
The reservoir capacity per capita proxies mitigation potential to a key element of water challenges, 
climatic variability causing both floods and droughts. The Global Reservoirs and Dams Database 
(GRanD13) records data for 6862 reservoirs (Lehner et al. 2011). 
In the context of scenario analysis it is important to note that only for GDP per capita and education 
future projections have been calculated in the SSP database. For all other potential indicators expert 
driven assumptions depending on scenario narrative would be required for future estimates. 
The WFaS core group (including experienced experts on governance) initially selected CPI together 
with GDP per capita for representation of economic-institutional coping capacity. However we were 
aware that as the other indicators discussed above there is generally a strong correlation between 
GDP per capita and the CPI. Thus CPI would hardly impact scenario outcomes. 
A high-level stakeholder meeting in the WFaS Scenario Focus Group recommended to simplify the Y-
Axes to the indicator per capita GDP only. GDP was felt to be most recognizable and understandable, 
representative of economic strength and the financial resources available for investing in risk 
management. The CPI was perceived as not adding any additional value, its meaning may be 
ambiguous across nations, and data sources are criticized as perception-based and subjective only. 
The stakeholders further recommended, while selecting only GDP per capita for the Y-Axes, it was 
encouraged to explore the potential of adding a third dimension to the 2-dimensional space of the 
Hydro-Economic Classification scheme. 
AgaiŶst this ďaĐkgƌouŶd WFa“ seleĐted foƌ its ͞fast-tƌaĐk͟ ďased oŶ the folloǁiŶg ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs. GDP 
per capita has been projected into the future in the SSP scenarios. Globally for all countries there is a 
strong positive correlation between GDP per capita and many of the other potential indicators 
potentially contributing to institutional capacity (e.g. education, CPI, reservoir capacity per capita, 
WGI). WFaS thus by using per capita GDP as proxy for a broader socio-economic perspective (i.e. 
economic and institutional coping capacity) remains using an existing and well-known path. We argue 
changing the indicator is not justified at this point in time because: First, the theoretical underpinning 
and narrative to explain the other indicators in terms of positive or negative effects on institutional 
effectiveness and potential to cope with risks is weak. Second, there are major differences of opinion 
among experts on the definition of many of the above discussed indicators, e.g. corruption, fragile 
state, regulatory quality. Finally, there is a lack of broad stakeholder agreement on the usefulness and 
importance of other possible indicators, and on the relative weightings that they should be given if 
combined in an index. 
In conclusion, the WFaS consortium including the stakeholders perceived the selected variables for 
the X-dimension as proxy for hydrologic complexity as generally comprehensive and useful. They also 
recognized the importance of an appropriate indicator on the Y-diŵeŶsioŶ to pƌoǆǇ a ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s / 
ǁateƌshed͛s eĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶd iŶstitutioŶal ĐopiŶg ĐapaĐitǇ to iŶĐƌease ƌesilieŶĐe agaiŶst ĐhalleŶges 
arising from high levels of hydrological complexity. When hydrology is complex undoubtedly access to 
investments is a prerequisite for building resilience. Depending on location-specific circumstances a 
combination of infrastructure (e.g. reservoirs), insurance (e.g. against drought losses), technology (e.g. 
desalination, improved irrigation schemes) and monitoring (e.g. for flood warning), all require initial 
investments. Yet, institutions, management and governance are crucial for making resilience effective 
                                                          
13 See http://www.gwsp.org/products/grand-database.html  
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or prioritize often scarce financial resources. For example, even when reservoirs and monitoring are 
in place, optimal governance of up-stream and down-stream management is essential in case of 
flooding. Other inherently governance dependent resilience options include transparency and data 
sharing (both ground- and surface water), monitoring of human water use across sectors (agriculture, 
households and industry), legal aspects of access to water, and establishing supra-national watershed 
commissions. 
 
3.4 “uŵŵarǇ of sĐeŶario assuŵptioŶs for WFa“ ͞fast-traĐk͟ 
Following the procedures described above the water scenario assessment framework extends the SSP 
storylines with water narratives developed in collaboration with a group of water planners from 
around the world and the scientific consortia of WFaS. The framework makes use of available results 
of climate projections14 based on the RCPs and socio-economic developments based on the SSPs to 
develop a set of quantitative water projections. These climate and socio-economic pathways are being 
analyzed in a coordinated multi-model assessment process involving sector and integrated 
assessment models, water demand models and different global hydrological models. 
While the socio-economic variables of the SSPs can be best quantified at spatial scale of countries, 
climate change variables including runoff require calculations at the grid-cell level. We employ 
estimates of monthly runoff using a model ensemble of six hydrological models developed in the ISI-
MIP project. Consistent with first estimates of Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) community the 
WFa“ ͚fast-tƌaĐk͛ ǁateƌ sĐeŶaƌios ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ ďuild oŶ thƌee ‘CP-SSP combinations (SSP1 and RCP4.5, 
SSP2 and RCP6.0, SSP3 and RCP6.0) (see above 2.1). These scenarios cover the diagonal in SSP scenario 
matrix in Figure 3-1, and are therefore a reasonably good representation of the scenario space. 
Table 3-1 presents a comprehensive overview of the important quantitative scenario assumptions and 
uŶdeƌlǇiŶg data souƌĐes applied iŶ the ͞fast-tƌaĐk͟ ŵulti-model water assessment. Scenario 
assumptions are generally deployed at the country level for each scenario. Assumptions for 
technological and structural changes consider, in addition to the respective SSP scenario narrative, 
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 Distributed by the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), see http://cmip-pcmdi.llnl.gov/cmip5/  
Table 3-1: AssuŵptioŶs applied iŶ the WFa“ ͚fast-tƌaĐk͛ sĐeŶaƌio ƌuŶs, deploǇed at ĐouŶtƌǇ leǀel 
WFaS ͚fast traĐk͛ SĐeŶario SSP1 
Sustainability 
SSP2 
Middle of the Road 
SSP3 
Regional Rivalry 
Population SSP1 (IIASA-VIC v9) SSP2 (IIASA-VIC v9) SSP3 (IIASA-VIC v9) 
Urban population SSP1 (NCAR) SSP2 (NCAR) SSP3 (NCAR) 
GDP SSP1 (OECD1 v9) SSP2 (OECD v9) SSP3 (OECD v9) 
Value added in manufacturing2 scenario 
related to GEO-4 
SSP1 & UNEP-GEO4 
͞“ustaiŶaďilitǇ Fiƌst͟  
SSP2 & UNEP-GEO4 
͞Maƌkets Fiƌst͟ 
SSP3 & UNEP-GEO4 
͞“eĐuƌitǇ Fiƌst͟ 
Energy consumption (KTOE)3 SSP1-RCP4.5 
(Message) 
SSP2-RCP6.0 
(Message) 
SSP1-RCP6.0 
(Message) 
Electricity production (GWh)3 SSP1-RCP4.5 
(Message) 
SSP2-RCP6.0 
(Message) 
SSP3-RCP6.0 
(Message) 
1 OECD Env-Growth Model. 2 This is only required for WaterGAP. The share of manufacturing gross value added in total GDP is taken from 
the UNEP GEO4 Driver Scenarios distributed by International Futures (pardee.du.edu). 3 Preliminary results (October 2013) from IIASA – 
MESSAGE-MACRO model consistent with population and GDP projections for each SSP. The MESSAGE model (Model for Energy Supply 
Strategy Alternatives and their General Environmental Impact) generated results for 23 regions, which were disaggregated to country level 
using the distribution of population and GDP from the SSP database hosted at IIASA 
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ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s eǆposuƌe to hydrological challenges and economic-institutional coping capacity, i.e. its 
position in the above described HE-classification (Table 3-2). 
 
Thus scenario assumptions, such as rates of technological and structural change rates, have then been 
made for countries, or basins, within the same H-E class. The Industrial sector comprises energy and 
manufacturing. Positive technological change improves water use efficiency and thereby decreases 
water use intensity in the industrial and domestic water use sectors. Annual water use efficiency 
change rates are estimated for each combination of scenario and H-E class, using a range of historically 
Table 3-2: Scenario assumptions for technology and structural change in the industry and domestic sector 
 
1 The HE classification calculates for each country a compound indicator (values 0–1) for socioeconomic capacity to cope with water-
related risks (economic-institutional capacity) and their exposure to hydrologic challenges and complexity (hydrological complexity). In 
this way each country was located in a two-dimensional space and grouped into four HE classes termed HE-1 to HE-4. 2 When economies 
have sufficient investment potential (HE-2 and HE-3) or the societal paradigm strives for resource-efficient economies (SSP1) we assume 
power plants to be replaced after a service life of 40 years by plants with modern water-saving tower-cooled technologies.3 Only in SSP1 
(Sustainability Scenario), we assume by 2050 a 20% reduction in domestic water use intensity due to behavioral change 
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observed technological change rates (Flörke et al. 2013). Technological change rates are assumed to 
be similar between the industrial and domestic sectors. 
Structural changes in manufacturing lead to water use changes according to the structure of a 
ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s eĐoŶoŵǇ. Although the WFa“ ͚fast-tƌaĐk͛ does Ŷot eǆpliĐitlǇ ĐoŶsideƌ stƌuĐtuƌal ĐhaŶge iŶ 
the manufacturing sector due to a lack of information on sector-specific GDP (i.e. share in agriculture, 
manufacturing, service), it is at least partly reflected in the results because Gross Value Added (GVA) 
in the manufacturing sector is an input variable for one of the employed water models, namely 
WaterGAP (Table 3.5). Structural change in the electricity sector is represented by the replacement 
rates of power plants with more efficient systems, since the vast majority of water use in this sector 
is for cooling at thermal power plants. Change in the domestic water use sector is indicated by the 
number of people and behavior changes. Structural change in the domestic sector is indicated by a 
20% reduction in domestic water use intensity by 2050 for SSP1 due to behavioral changes. 
Consistent spatial land use and agricultural scenarios, indicating areas of new or increased irrigation 
and reflecting socio-economic change are now being developed using the FAO/ IIASA Global-Agro-
Ecological Zones (GAEZ) modeling system (Fischer et al. 2007, Fischer et al. 2012). They provide future 
crop area distribution and improvement of irrigation efficiency. More details on the entire process of 
scenario development is presented elsewhere (Tramberend et al. 2015). 
3.5 Multi-ŵodel assessŵeŶt 
This initiative has developed a spatial-temporal quantitative assessment of future water resources 
availability based on a multi-model assessment framework. The multi-model approach is becoming 
widely used in future assessments because ensemble averages provide more robust projections than 
individual models and avoid drawing conclusions from potential individual outliers (Dankers et al. 
2014, Schewe et al. 2014). The approach is used to better understand the uncertainty and limitations 
of the modeling, while providing a degree of confidence in the results, where many models are in 
agreement. The set of models used provides estimates of water supply and demand with selected 
combinations of future scenarios globally at 0.5°x 0.5° spatial resolution (approx. 50km x 50km at the 
equator). The emission scenarios of the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (van Vuuren 
et al. 2011) are applied as climate scenarios, and the socio-economic assumptions are designed to be 
consistent with the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (O'Neill et al. 2014). Associated 
quantifications of developments in other sectors, such as energy and agriculture, are provided by 
sector models and integrated assessment models working with the same SSPs. 
Results presented in this report are based primarily on three leading global hydrological models 
(GHMs) [H08 (Hanasaki et al. 2013), WaterGAP (Flörke et al. 2013, Schmied et al. 2014), and PCR-
GLOBWB (Van Beek et al. 2011, Wada et al. 2014)] which can estimate both water supply and demand 
for the agricultural, industrial (including energy) and domestic sectors. Table 3.3 below details the 
models used in this quantification of available water supply and demand. These GHMs were forced 
with five general circulation models (GCMs) which provide meteorological conditions (Table 3.4). The 
atmospheric forcing data set was compiled and made available by the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model 
Intercomparison Project (Warszawski et al. 2014). In total, this study made use of 15 ensemble 
members (five GCMs x three GHMs) of projections. 
Although all GHMs use the same input data for the natural hydrological part (i.e. water supply 
estimation), they require different input for their estimation of water demand because of the diversity 
of methods applied to reflect such a diverse socio-economic development process. Table 3.5 and 
Table 3.6 present drivers and parameters for estimation of industrial and domestic water demand, 
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respectively, in the models used. Each of the three applies different parameterizations and uses 
different input data for the future period. One major difference among GHMs, for example, is the 
representation of water use in the industrial sector. H08 and PCR-GLOBWB determine water use for 
an aggregate industry sector, but WaterGAP separates water use for thermal electricity production 
and the manufacturing industry. Furthermore, while H08 downscales national-level representative 
values into grid-scale according to population distributions, PCR-GLOBWB and WaterGAP downscale 
with urban area data. In this analysis, for the purpose of consistency, water demands estimated by 
H08 were re-downscaled using the same urban area information as the other models. 
Table 3-3: Global Hydrological Models (GHM) used in this study 
GHM Resolution Institute Nation 
WaterGAP 0.5°x0.5° University of Kassel Germany 
H08 0.5°x0.5° NIES Japan 
PCR-GLOBWB 0.5°x0.5° University of Utrecht The Netherlands 
 
Table 3-4: General Circulation Models (GCM) used in this study 
GCM Resolution Institute Nation 
HadGem2-ES 192 x 145 Met Office Hadley Centre UK 
IPSL-CM5A-LR 96 x 96° Institut Pierre-Simon Laplace France 
GFDL-ESM2M 144 x 90 NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory United States 
MIROC-ESM-CHEM Gaussian 128 x 64 JAMSTEC, AORI, University of Tokyo, NIES Japan 
NorESM1-M 144 x 96 Norwegian Climate Centre Norway 
 
Table 3-5: Drivers and parameter for estimation of industrial water demand 
 Manufacture water demand Thermal electricity production water demand 
GHM Drivers Parameter Drivers Parameter 
WaterGAP Manufacturing gross 
value added (GVA) 
Manufacturing 
structural WU 
intensity1 
Thermal electricity production WW intensity1 
 Industrial water demand   
H08 Electricity production Industrial water intensity2   
PCR-GLOBWB GDP 
Electricity production 
Energy consumption 
Household consumption 
Industrial water consumption2   
1 Data from national statistics 
2 Data from AQUASTAT 
Base year: 2005 
 
Table 3-6: Drivers and parameter for estimation of domestic water demand 
 Domestic water demand 
GHM Drivers Parameter  
WaterGAP National population 
GDP per capita 
Population density 
Domestic water intensity1 1 Data from national statistics 
2 Data from AQUASTAT 
Base year: 2005 
H08 Population Municipal water intensity2  
PCR-GLOBWB GDP 
Electricity production 
Energy consumption 
Household consumption 
Population density 
Per capita domestic water use  
 
 
 
WaterGAP:  
   Industrial WD = Manufacture WD +   
  Thermal electricity production WD 
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3.6 Food aŶd agriĐulture ŵodelliŶg fraŵeǁork 
In the long run, the increase of demand for agricultural products is largely driven by population and 
economic growth, both foremost occurring in developing countries. It has become increasingly 
complex and challenging to achieve food security under the impact of rapidly rising population 
numbers, fast economic growth, changing consumption patterns, volatile international trade, growing 
demand for non-food uses such as biofuels, and the impacts of climate variability and changes. 
Resources needed to meet future food demand will also depend on future food preferences, in 
particular the future levels of meat consumption. Increasing pressures on land in the last decades have 
been the consequence and must be mitigated, where possible, through increased land use intensity 
and more efficient land management. 
Economic growth and food security have been mutually reinforcing factors throughout the history of 
development. Rising per capita incomes and functioning markets foster improved household food 
security, which can enhance economic growth through better social stability and a better health status 
of the labor force. However, earlier experiences suggest that food insecurity cannot be fully eradicated 
by economic growth alone. In the recent decades, strong growth played a crucial role in the decline of 
poverty and undernourishment, but food insecurity still persists in many countries and regions around 
the world. This means that for achieving food security raising food production is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. In addition to enhancing the resource base and increasing land productivity, 
achieving food security also entails ensuring equitable distribution of food, particularly to food-deficit 
countries and people, reducing distortions and barriers in global food markets, and avoiding 
unnecessary wastage of food at all levels from field to fork. 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Framework for ecological-economic world food system analysis 
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3.6.1 The ŵodeliŶg fraŵeǁork 
The analysis is based on a state-of-the-art ecological-economic modeling approach. The scenario-
based quantified findings of the study rely on a modeling framework which includes as components, 
the FAO/IIASA Agro-ecological zone model (AEZ) and the IIASA world food system model (WFS). The 
modeling framework encompasses climate scenarios, agro-ecological zoning information (Fischer et 
al. 2012), demographic and socio-economic drivers, as well as production, consumption and world 
food trade dynamics (Fischer 2011, Fischer et al. 2009, Fischer et al. 2007). 
This modeling framework comprises six main elements, as sketched in Figure 3-3: 
1. A stoƌǇliŶe aŶd ƋuaŶtified ŵaĐƌo-dƌiǀeƌs of deǀelopŵeŶt, heƌe ĐhoseŶ fƌoŵ aŵoŶg the “haƌed 
“oĐio-eĐoŶoŵiĐ PathǁaǇs ;see ďeloǁͿ, is seleĐted to iŶfoƌŵ the ǁoƌld food sǇsteŵ ŵodel of 
deŵogƌaphiĐ ĐhaŶges iŶ eaĐh ƌegioŶ aŶd of pƌojeĐted eĐoŶoŵiĐ gƌoǁth iŶ the ŶoŶ-agƌiĐultuƌal 
seĐtoƌs. It also pƌoǀides stoƌǇliŶe assuŵptioŶs ĐhaƌaĐteƌiziŶg iŶ ďƌoad teƌŵs the iŶteƌŶatioŶal 
settiŶg ;e.g. tƌade liďeƌalizatioŶ; iŶteƌŶatioŶal ŵigƌatioŶͿ, ƌegaƌdiŶg teĐhŶologiĐal pƌogƌess, aŶd 
the pƌioƌities of laŶd use ƌegulatioŶ. IŶ additioŶ, a set of ‘epƌeseŶtatiǀe CoŶĐeŶtƌatioŶ PathǁaǇs 
ƋuaŶtifies seleĐted eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal ǀaƌiaďles, e.g. gƌeeŶhouse gas eŵissioŶs aŶd atŵospheƌiĐ 
ĐoŶĐeŶtƌatioŶs of COϮ. 
2. The eŵissioŶs pathǁaǇ assoĐiated ǁith the ĐhoseŶ deǀelopŵeŶt sĐeŶaƌio is used to seleĐt aŵoŶg 
aǀailaďle puďlished outputs of siŵulatioŶ eǆpeƌiŵeŶts ǁith geŶeƌal ĐiƌĐulatioŶ ŵodels ;GCMsͿ to 
defiŶe futuƌe Đliŵate sĐeŶaƌios foƌ ŵodeliŶg of agƌiĐultuƌe pƌoduĐtioŶ sǇsteŵs aŶd ǁateƌ 
ƌesouƌĐes. 
3. The agƌo-eĐologiĐal zoŶes ŵethod takes as iŶput a Đliŵate sĐeŶaƌio aŶd estiŵates oŶ a spatial gƌid 
of ϱ′ ďǇ ϱ′ latitude/loŶgitude the likelǇ agƌoŶoŵiĐ iŵpaĐts of Đliŵate ĐhaŶge iŶ teƌŵs of soil 
ŵoistuƌe ĐoŶditioŶs, attaiŶaďle ƌaiŶ-fed aŶd iƌƌigated Đƌops Ǉields, aŶd iƌƌigatioŶ ǁateƌ 
ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts of Đƌops. 
4. Estiŵated spatial Đliŵate ĐhaŶge iŵpaĐts oŶ Ǉields aƌe iŶĐoƌpoƌated iŶto the paƌaŵeteƌizatioŶ of 
the ŶatioŶal Đƌop pƌoduĐtioŶ ŵodules of the ǁoƌld food sǇsteŵ ŵodel. 
5. The gloďal geŶeƌal eƋuiliďƌiuŵ ǁoƌld food sǇsteŵ ŵodel is used – iŶfoƌŵed ďǇ the deǀelopŵeŶt 
stoƌǇliŶe aŶd estiŵated Đliŵate ĐhaŶge Ǉield iŵpaĐts – to pƌoduĐe iŶteƌŶallǇ ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁoƌld food 
sǇsteŵ sĐeŶaƌios poƌtƌaǇiŶg eaĐh ƌespeĐtiǀe deǀelopŵeŶt pathǁaǇ. The siŵulatioŶs ǁeƌe Đaƌƌied 
out oŶ a ǇeaƌlǇ ďasis fƌoŵ ϭϵϵϬ to ϮϬϴϬ. 
6. IŶ a fiŶal step, the ƌesults of the ǁoƌld food sǇsteŵ siŵulatioŶs aƌe ͚doǁŶsĐaled͛ to the spatial 
grid of the resource database for spatial attribution of physical resource use, quantification of 
land cover changes and spatial cropping patterns. 
 
3.6.2 ““P sĐeŶario iŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ 
In the analysis presented here, we make use of a new set of scenarios that was developed by the 
research community to harmonize and provide a common context for climate change impact, 
mitigation and adaptation assessments (Moss et al. 2010). A range of possible future socio-economic 
conditions are described in the Shared-Socio-economic Pathways (SSP) (O'Neill et al. 2015). On the 
most fundamental level, each SSP is described by a narrative. The SSP storylines describe socio-
economic developments without the assumption of climate policies and climate change. However, in 
parallel possible future levels of climate change were explored through the development of different 
representative concentration pathways (van Vuuren et al. 2011). For implementation in this study, the 
deǀelopŵeŶt pathǁaǇs ““PϮ ;͞Middle of the road͟Ϳ aŶd ““Pϯ ;͞Regional rivalry͟Ϳ ǁeƌe assuŵed to ďe 
consistent with emission trajectories and climate outcomes of the RCP 6.0, and the SSP1 scenario 
;͞Sustainability͟Ϳ applies the atŵospheƌiĐ ĐoŶditioŶs of ‘CP ϰ.ϱ. 
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Here we provide a brief summary of the salient features that characterize different SSPs and we 
indicate some implications this may have for the food and agricultural sector, the land use and for 
associated irrigation water withdrawal (Figure 3-3). 
SSP1 –Sustainability scenario: The world shifts gradually toward a more sustainable path that respects 
perceived environmental boundaries. This development pathway envisages: Relatively low population 
growth and an emphasis on education; effective institutions; rapid technological change and improved 
resource use efficiency; liberalization of markets; risk reduction and sharing mechanisms. 
For scenario implementation, these general tendencies of development in the SSP1 storyline were 
interpreted to have the following specific agriculture/irrigation related implications: 
 Iŵpƌoǀed agƌiĐultuƌal pƌoduĐtiǀitǇ thƌough ŵoƌe ƌapid ƌeduĐtioŶ ;Đoŵpaƌed to ƌefeƌeŶĐe 
teĐhŶologiĐal assuŵptioŶs oŶ ǇieldsͿ of pƌeǀailiŶg Ǉield gaps toǁaƌd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtallǇ sustaiŶaďle aŶd 
adǀaŶĐed teĐhŶologǇ Ǉield leǀels  Pƌogƌessiǀe eliŵiŶatioŶ of ďaƌƌieƌs aŶd distoƌtioŶs iŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal tƌade of agƌiĐultuƌal pƌoduĐts  Pƌogƌess toǁaƌds effeĐtiǀe laŶd use ƌegulatioŶ espeĐiallǇ foƌ pƌeǀeŶtiŶg defoƌestatioŶ Đaused ďǇ 
eǆpaŶsioŶ of ĐƌoplaŶd  EŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt of legallǇ pƌoteĐted ĐoŶseƌǀatioŶ aƌeas  Laƌge iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶts of iƌƌigatioŶ ǁateƌ use effiĐieŶĐǇ ǁheƌe possiďle  ‘eliaďle ǁateƌ iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe aŶd ǁateƌ supplǇ  IŵpƌoǀiŶg ŶutƌitioŶ ǁith eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtallǇ ďeŶigŶ diets ǁith loǁeƌ peƌ Đapita ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ of 
liǀestoĐk pƌoduĐts ;this last assuŵptioŶ ǁas Ŷot iŶĐluded iŶ the ““Pϭ ƌefeƌeŶĐe iŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ ďut 
ǁill ďe assessed iŶ a sepaƌate sĐeŶaƌio ǀaƌiaŶtͿ. 
 
SSP2 - Middle of the Road scenario: In the SSP2 world the development is progressing along past trends 
and paradigms. Main characteristics of this pathway include: Population growth continues at slowing 
rates and levels off in second half of century; markets are globally connected but they function 
imperfectly; somewhat slow progress in achieving development goals of education, safe water, and 
health care; environmental systems experience further degradation; barriers to enter markets are 
reduced only slowly; significant heterogeneities exist within and across countries. The SSP2 World is 
characterized by dynamics similar to historical developments. For scenario implementation this means 
continuation of past agricultural growth paths and policies, continued protection of national 
agricultural sectors, and further environmental damages caused by agriculture, and includes: 
 Pƌogƌess of agƌiĐultuƌal pƌoduĐtiǀitǇ iŶ deǀelopiŶg ĐouŶtƌies as poƌtƌaǇed iŶ FAO peƌspeĐtiǀe studǇ 
͞Woƌld AgƌiĐultuƌe: Toǁaƌds ϮϬϯϬ/ϮϬϱϬ͟ ;FAO, ϮϬϭϮͿ  IŶĐƌeasiŶg peƌ Đapita ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ of liǀestoĐk pƌoduĐts ǁith gƌoǁiŶg peƌ Đapita iŶĐoŵes  Baƌƌieƌs aŶd distoƌtioŶs iŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal tƌade of agƌiĐultuƌal pƌoduĐts aƌe ƌeduĐed oŶlǇ sloǁlǇ  “oŵe iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶts of ǁateƌ use effiĐieŶĐǇ, ďut oŶlǇ liŵited adǀaŶĐes iŶ loǁ-iŶĐoŵe ĐouŶtƌies  “oŵe ƌeduĐtioŶ of food iŶseĐuƌitǇ due to tƌiĐkle doǁŶ of eĐoŶoŵiĐ deǀelopŵeŶt  Food aŶd ǁateƌ iŶseĐuƌitǇ ƌeŵaiŶ as pƌoďleŵs iŶ soŵe aƌeas of loǁ-iŶĐoŵe ĐouŶtƌies  No effeĐtiǀe ŵeasuƌes aŶd pƌoteĐtioŶ to pƌeǀeŶt defoƌestatioŶ due to ĐƌoplaŶd eǆpaŶsioŶ 
 
SSP3 - Regional Rivalry scenario: The SSP3 storyline portrays a pathway where the world development 
is stagnating. Some key characteristics of SSP3 include: Growing concerns about globalization and 
focus on national/regional issues and interests; population growth is low in developed countries, but 
continues at high rates in developing countries; overall a large increase of world population and slow 
economic growth combine to result in poor progress in achieving development goals of education, 
safe water, health care; global governance and institutions are weak; weak institutions contribute to 
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slow development; markets are protected and highly regulated; low priority is given for addressing 
environmental problems and serious degradation of environmental systems occurs in some regions; 
low investment in education and technology development; altogether this causes large disparities 
within and across countries. 
Development in the SSP3 World leads to manifold problems in food and agriculture, characterized by: 
 Pooƌ pƌogƌess ǁith agƌiĐultuƌal pƌoduĐtiǀitǇ iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶts iŶ loǁ-iŶĐoŵe ĐouŶtƌies due to laĐk 
of iŶǀestŵeŶt aŶd eduĐatioŶ foƌ Ǉield gap ƌeduĐtioŶ  GƌoǁiŶg pƌoteĐtioŶ of ŶatioŶal agƌiĐultuƌal seĐtoƌs aŶd iŶĐƌeasiŶg agƌiĐultuƌal tƌade ďaƌƌieƌs  Loǁ pƌioƌitǇ to halt eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal degƌadatioŶ Đaused ďǇ agƌiĐultuƌe ;eƌosioŶ, defoƌestatioŶ, 
pooƌ ŶutƌieŶt ŵaŶageŵeŶt, ǁateƌ pollutioŶ aŶd eǆploitatioŶͿ  Pooƌ laŶd use ƌegulatioŶ aŶd ĐoŶtiŶued defoƌestatioŶ of tƌopiĐal ƌaiŶ-foƌests  OŶlǇ ŵodest iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶts of iƌƌigatioŶ ǁateƌ use effiĐieŶĐǇ  PeƌsisteŶt oǀeƌ-eǆploitatioŶ of gƌouŶdǁateƌ aƋuifeƌs  UŶƌeliaďle ǁateƌ aŶd eŶeƌgǇ supplǇ foƌ agƌiĐultuƌal pƌoduĐeƌs  Food aŶd ǁateƌ iŶseĐuƌitǇ peƌsist as ŵajoƌ pƌoďleŵs iŶ loǁ-iŶĐoŵe ĐouŶtƌies  High populatioŶ gƌoǁth aŶd iŶsuffiĐieŶt deǀelopŵeŶt leaǀe ďehiŶd highlǇ ǀulŶeƌaďle huŵaŶ 
aŶd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal sǇsteŵs 
The characteristics of the three development pathways and the main assumptions used in the 
implementation of the scenario simulations are summarized in Table 3-7. The sustainability scenario 
SSP1 achieves land productivity improvements exceeding those in SSP2. 
 
Table 3-7: Overview on assumptions for food and agriculture scenario simulations 
 SSP1 
Sustainability 
SSP2 
Middle of the road 
SSP3 
Regional rivalry 
Yield growth Faster than medium Medium Slower than medium 
Irrigation share Above medium Medium Below medium 
Trade liberalization Full Incomplete Constrained 
Land use change Strong regulation Some regulation Deforestation allowed 
Protected areas Fully enforced Fair enforcement Limited enforcement 
 
Lowest technology advances and productivity gains materialize in SSP3. These assumptions were 
implemented regarding crop yield increases, changes in cropping intensity (i.e. multi-cropping), and 
concerning the share of irrigated land in total cropland. 
As to institutional factors affecting the food and agriculture sector, it was assumed that agricultural 
protection measures would be fully eliminated by 2040 in SSP1 and would be reduced, but incomplete 
and at a slower pace, in SSP2. Protection measures persist in SSP3 with only small reductions. 
Concerning land use change regulation it was assumed that legally protected conservation areas 
would be fully enforced in SSP1 and some leakages of land conversion would be tolerated in SSP3. 
Also, there is strong regulation and concern to prevent deforestation by agricultural land conversion; 
yet, some deforestation still takes place due to urban development or lack of alternatives. In SSP3, 
land regulation is assumed to be weak and deforestation for cropland expansion notably in Africa and 
Latin America continues. 
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3.7 UŶĐertaiŶtǇ of ǁater supplǇ aŶd deŵaŶd 
Available surface water resource 
This analysis applies a multi-model 
approach with 5 GCMs and 3 GHMs, for a 
total of 15 ensemble members. Model 
biases are inevitable in meteorology and 
hydrology. Thus we use a multi-model 
approach for greater confidence in model 
results and to estimate uncertainty due to 
model bias. Figure 3-4 shows as example 
time series of precipitation for each region 
based on 5 GCMs (a.) and runoff simulated 
by 15 ensemble members (5 GCMs x 3 
GHMs) (b.). Light colors illustrate 
uncertainty ranges, and solid lines are 
ensemble means. Although showing the 
uncertainty complicates the message, it is 
informative to show that sometimes 
significant uncertainty exists compared to 
the trend from the whole ensemble. 
Water demand 
The results produced from our first global 
water use model intercomparison showed 
a remarkable difference among the three 
global water models (H08, PCR-GLOBWB, 
and WaterGAP) used iŶ the WFa“ ͚fast-
tƌaĐk͛ aŶalǇsis. Figure 3-5 shows three 
kinds of water demand (agricultural, 
industrial and domestic) for China. Each 
model presents three water scenarios, 
respectively. Although assumptions on 
socio-economic, technological and 
structural change were harmonized, 
ensemble projections of water use for the 
first half of the 21st century showed large 
variability among the models. The spread 
was much larger in the industrial sector 
compared to the domestic sector. Due to 
lack of consistent databases of the 
quantities, qualities, and locations of 
water demands over time and of the 
water-related technologies applied, the 
models use simplified approaches for 
estimating water demand of each sector. 
The approaches used vary as each model 
 
Figure 3-4: Long term trend under Middle of the Road scenario:  
a) precipitation b) runoff 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Multi-GHMs comparison of each water demand  
 example of India and China 
 
(a) (b) 
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tries to balance the relative unavailability of data with the need for reasonable scenario projections. 
Although there is a high degree of variability across models and scenarios, almost all projections 
indicate consistently increasing trends in future industrial and domestic water uses. Despite potential 
model and data limitations, the WFaS initiative advances an important step beyond earlier work by 
attempting to account more realistically for the nature of human water use behavior in the 21st 
century and identifying associated uncertainties. Results given in this report are ensemble means; 
using ensemble means works well to detect long term and relatively large trends. 
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 Gloďal Results 
4.1 “oĐio EĐoŶoŵiĐs 
Population and economic development are key drivers for the estimation of water demand presented 
in this study (section 4.5). Socio-economic development also bears an important effect on water 
availability (section 4.4) as they determine GHG emission scenarios, a major driver for climate change 
projections. 
4.1.1 PopulatioŶ  
Applying the methods of multi-dimensional mathematical demography (KC and Lutz 2014) projected 
national populations based on alternative assumptions on future fertility, mortality, migrations and 
educational transitions that correspond to the five SSPs. In terms of total world population size the 
trajectories resulting from the five SSPs stay very close to each other until around 2030. By the middle 
of the century already a visible differentiation appears resulting in a global population by 2100 
between 6.9 ďillioŶ iŶ the loǁest sĐeŶaƌio ““Pϭ ͚Sustainability͛ and 12.6 billion in the highest scenario 
““Pϯ ͚Regional ‘iǀalrǇ͛. Note that populatioŶ iŶ the ͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛ sĐeŶaƌios ďǇ ϮϭϬϬ is ďeloǁ the 
current level of 7.3 billioŶ people. IŶ the ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ scenario population peaks in the 2070s 
and then declines to just below 9 billion by 2100. The difference between the scenarios is primarily 
due to developments in Africa and Asia. In contrast population development in the Americas, Europe 
and Oceania are comparatively similar across the scenarios (Figure 4-1). 
 
Figure 4-1: Population development until 2100, by continent and scenario 
Sub-regional development for Africa, Asia and Europe are presented in Figure 4-Ϯ foƌ the ͚Middle of 
the ‘oad͛ scenario. The maps in Figure 4-3 highlight the change in population between 2010 and 2050 
on a country level. 
 
Figure 4-2: Population development iŶ the ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ scenario for the sub-regions of Africa, Asia, and Europe 
Africa: IŶ the ͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛ sĐeŶaƌio AfƌiĐa͛s populatioŶ douďles duƌiŶg less thaŶ tǁo geŶeƌatioŶs ;less thaŶ 
40 years) from 1.0 billion in 2010 reaching 2.0 billion in the beginning of the 2040s. By 2100 the current 
populatioŶ has alŵost Ƌuadƌupled ƌeaĐhiŶg ϯ.ϵ ďillioŶ oƌ ϯϭ% of gloďal populatioŶ. AfƌiĐa͛s high 
populatioŶ gƌoǁth iŶ ͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛ is ĐloselǇ liŶked to the laĐk of iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶts iŶ eduĐatioŶ oǀeƌ tiŵe, 
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especially the low percentage of female, aged 20-39, with secondary and tertiary education15. AfƌiĐa͛s 
population growth is also sigŶifiĐaŶt iŶ the ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ scenario with population doubling by 
2050 and reaching 2.6 billion in 2100 (Figure 4-2, left and Table 4-1, upper). In this scenario countries 
with a population over 100 million in 2050 include Nigeria (372 mio), followed by Ethiopia (159 mio), 
DR Congo (146 mio), Egypt (125 mio) and UR Tanzania (102 ŵioͿ. EǀeŶ iŶ the ͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛ sĐeŶaƌio 
AfriĐa͛s populatioŶ iŶĐƌeases ďǇ oǀeƌ ϳϬϬ ŵillioŶ people ;+ϳϮ%Ϳ uŶtil ϮϬϱϬ ǁheŶ gƌoǁth ƌates ďeĐoŵe 
more moderate and peak at 1.9 billion in 2080. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Population – Middle of the road scenario 
Top: population 2010. Middle: population 2050. Bottom: change rate of population [%] compared to 2010 
Asia: Asia today is home to 4.1 billion people, 60% of global population. A continuous population 
iŶĐƌease is oŶlǇ pƌojeĐted iŶ the ͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛ sĐeŶaƌio ƌeaĐhiŶg as much as 6.6 billion in 2100. In the 
͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛ aŶd ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ sĐeŶaƌio Asia͛s populatioŶ peaks iŶ the ϮϬϰϬs aŶd ϮϬϱϬs ǁith 
about 4.7 and 5.1 billion people respectively. Two thirds of population increase in Asia is due to 
developments iŶ IŶdia. Foƌ eǆaŵple the ͚ Middle of the ‘oad͛ scenario projects between 2010 and 2050 
                                                          
15
 For more information see KC and Lutz 2014 
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an additional 509 million people making India by far the largest nation of the world with a total 
population of 1.7 billion. Other countries with a significant amount of increasing population (> 50 mio 
until 2050) include Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Philippines. Countries in the Middle East and 
Western Asia also generally increase by between 44 million (Afghanistan) and 10 million (United Arab 
Emirates). On the other hand for many countries in Asia population is expected to grow moderately 
in the coming decades or even decline such as China and Japan. 
Europe: Euƌope͛s ĐuƌƌeŶt populatioŶ of ϳϯϱ ŵillioŶ ;Ǉeaƌ ϮϬϭϬͿ deĐliŶes iŶ the ͚Regional ‘iǀalrǇ͛ 
scenario to 670 in ϮϬϱϬ aŶd ϱϰϯ iŶ ϮϭϬϬ. IŶ the ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ aŶd ͚Sustainability͛ sĐeŶaƌio 
population increases moderately until the 2050s by about 26 and 33 million respectively. After 2050 
population further declines. 
 
4.1.2 EĐoŶoŵiĐ groǁth aŶd iŶĐoŵe 
The SSP population and human capital projections provided key input for the long-term economic 
growth projections. (Dellink et al. 2015) applied a methodology based on a convergence process with 
emphasis on the key drivers of economic growth in the long-term: population, total factor productivity 
(TFP), physical capital, employment and human capital, and energy and fossil fuel resources. TFP 
related drivers include the rate of change of the technological frontier, the speed of convergence 
between low and high income countries, and opeŶŶess of the eĐoŶoŵǇ. The authoƌs Ŷote that ͞the 
projections are subject to large uncertainties, particularly for the later decades, and disregard a wide 
range of country-specific drivers of economic growth that are outside the narrow economic framework, 
such as external shocks, governance barriers and feedbacks from environmental damage. Hence, they 
should be interpreted with sufficient care and not be treated as predictions.͟ GDP aŶd iŶĐoŵe leǀels 
are presented in 2005 USD using constant purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Gloďal GDP leǀels at the eŶd of this ĐeŶtuƌǇ aƌe loǁest iŶ the ͚Regional ‘iǀalƌǇ͛ sĐeŶaƌio ;ǁith loǁest 
levels of international co-operation and trade) amounting to around 220 trillion USD. In the 
͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛ aŶd ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ scenario this increases to 650 and 570 trillion USD. This 
pattern is similar for income (i.e. per capita GDP) levels. Owing to its large population Asia and Africa 
are the main drivers for differences across scenarios, especially in the second half of this century 
(Figure 4-4, Figure 4-5). This is also reflected in the relative increase in GDP, which is largest in these 
continents (Figure 4-6 bottom). 
The relative contribution of North and Central America, Europe and Oceania (i.e. including the majority 
of industrialized countries) to global GDP declines significantly in all scenarios. Currently half (51%) of 
GDP is generated in this region. By 2050 this declines to 33% iŶ ͚Regional ‘iǀalrǇ͛, followed by 32% in 
͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ and a low of 29% iŶ ͚Sustainability͛. Notwithstanding per capita GDP in these 
regions remains higher until 2050 (and thereafter) compared to the other major regions. 
 
Figure 4-4: For three scenarios GDP development till 2100 for the 6 continents 
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Figure 4-5: For the 3 scenarios population development till 2100 for subregions Africa, Asia and Europe 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Gross domestic product – Middle of the Road scenario 
Top: GDP 2010. Middle: GDP 2050. Bottom: change rate of GDP [%] compared to 2010 
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Figure 4-7 and the maps in Figure 4-8 
highlight per capita GDP on a regional 
and country scale and the changes 
between today and 2050. On a global 
level income (per capita GDP) by 2050 is 
highest iŶ the ͚ “ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛ sĐeŶaƌio, a 
3.5 increase of current levels and 
loǁest iŶ the ͚ ‘iǀalƌǇ͛ sĐeŶaƌio, oŶlǇ just 
above twice current levels. The closure 
in income gaps is highest in 
͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛ aŶd loǁest iŶ ͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛. 
Foƌ eǆaŵple Asia͛s peƌ Đapita GDP 
today is only 20% of those of North and 
Central America compared to 46% 
(Middle of the Road) by 2050. Although 
showing a high increase, Africa remains 
well below global average per capita 
GDP in all scenarios. Even in 
͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛, ďǇ ϮϬϱϬ, AfƌiĐa͛s peƌ 
capita GDP is only about 43% of the 
gloďal aǀeƌage. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast Asia͛s aŶd 
“outh AŵeƌiĐa͛s ĐatĐh-up to global 
average levels is more pronounced. 
Table 4-1 presents a comprehensive 
summary of the regional distribution of 
population, GDP and per capita GDP in 
2010 and 2050 for the ͚Middle of the 
Road͛ sĐeŶaƌio. As discussed above 
results highlight the remaining high 
levels of income (per capita GDP) in 
North and Central America, Oceania, 
and Europe in the coming decades. 
 
Figure 4-7: Per capita GDP in 2010 and 2050 for the three scenarios 
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Table 4-1: Population, GDP and GDP per capita comparison  
 Middle of the Road scenario 
 
           % of Woƌld: % of the Woƌld͛s aǀeƌage GDP/Đap 
 
 
Population Change rate
[ Mio of people ] 2010 Share 2050 Share (% of 2010)
Africa 1021 15% 2010 22% 197
Asia 4104 60% 5097 56% 124
North and Central A. 533 8% 692 8% 130
South America 392 6% 490 5% 125
Europe 739 11% 763 8% 103
Oceania 36 1% 57 1% 158
World 6825 9110 133
GDP Change rate
[ Mio US$2005/year ] 2010 Share 2050 Share (% of 2010)
Africa 2753 4% 19176 8% 697
Asia 25550 38% 123096 54% 482
North and Central A. 16197 24% 36076 16% 223
South America 3965 6% 12989 6% 328
Europe 17048 26% 34758 15% 204
Oceania 937 1% 2576 1% 275
World 66450 228671 344
GDP per capita Change rate
[ US$2005/year/cap ] 2010 % of 2050 % of (% of 2010)
Africa 2696 28% 9541 38% 354
Asia 6226 64% 24148 96% 388
North and Central A. 30411 312% 52126 208% 171
South America 10106 104% 26504 106% 262
Europe 23076 237% 45555 181% 197
Oceania 23076 237% 45290 180% 196
World 9736 25102 258
Mio US$2005/year
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At the same time their share in global GDP declines from a current 51% to 29-33%  (depending on the 
scenario) while population remains fairly constant. Asia exhibits an increasing share in global economy 
with a contribution of 38% in 2010 and of ϱϭ% ďǇ ϮϬϱϬ. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast AfƌiĐa͛s GDP gƌoǁth (from 4% in 
2010 to 8-9% in 2050), although impressive in its growth rates, is apparently insufficient to 
compensate for a strong population growth. The continent therefore lags behind in income even in 
2050 when AfƌiĐa͛s GDP per capita will be only 33-43% of global average. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-8: Gross domestic product per capita – Middle of the Road scenario 
Top: GDP/cap 2010. Middle: GDP/cap 2050. Bottom: change rate of GDP/cap [%] compared to 2010 
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Austria and priority countries of the Austrian Development Agency 
Figure 4-9 presents socio-economic development pathways along the storylines of the three scenarios 
for Austria and the priority countries of the Austrian Development Agency. Table 4-2 summarizes the 
socio-eĐoŶoŵiĐ ǀaƌiaďles foƌ the ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ scenario by country in 2010 and 2050. 
 
Figure 4-9: Changes in Gross domestic per capita and population for ADA priority countries 
  ;ďlue ͚Sustainability͛, Ǉelloǁ ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛, ƌed ͚Regional ‘iǀalrǇ͛ scenario) 
 
Austria: Like other high-iŶĐoŵe EuƌopeaŶ ĐouŶtƌies Austƌia͛s populatioŶ deĐliŶes iŶ the ͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛ 
scenario after an early peak in the 2020s. By 2050 population is 11% below and by 2100 as much as 
47% lower compared to current 8.4 million people. An explanation for this decline are the assumptions 
for fertility (low), mortality (High) and migration (none) for OECD countries of the SSP3 scenario 
(Rivalry - Fragmented World – storyline see (O'Neill et al. 2015) and Appendix A). Further description 
of the assuŵptioŶs of the ““P͛s is giǀeŶ as a suppleŵeŶt to the IIA“A ““P dataďase16. The projection 
for all the other ADA priority countries show the opposite trend, assuming an increasing population 
foƌ the ͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛ sĐeŶaƌio ďeĐause of a high fertility assumption for Non-OECD countries. 
Nevertheless because of the rather extreme impact of the SSP3 scenario till 2100 we only consider the 
period till 2050. PopulatioŶ deǀelopŵeŶt iŶ the ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ aŶd ͚Sustainability͛ sĐeŶaƌio is 
significantly different when population increases until about the middle of the century, followed by a 
moderate decline until 2100. Economic development and income (GDP per capita) is fairly similar in 
the ͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛ aŶd ͚Middle of the ‘oad͛ sĐeŶaƌios, ďut sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ loǁeƌ iŶ the ͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛ sĐeŶaƌio. 
 
Albania, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia: Population development trends across the three scenarios are 
diffeƌeŶt iŶ Euƌope͛s aŶd CeŶtƌal Asia͛s loǁ iŶĐoŵe ĐouŶtƌies Đoŵpaƌed to high-income countries. 
Population reŵaiŶs faiƌlǇ staďle iŶ ͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛ ďut deĐliŶes ǀigoƌouslǇ iŶ 'Middle of the ‘oad͛ and even 
ŵoƌe iŶ ͚Sustainability͛. IŶĐoŵe gƌoǁth is stƌoŶgest iŶ ͚Sustainability͛. Nevertheless GDP per capita in 
2050 reaches just about the global average and is only about half the European average. Across the 
four countries the strongest economic growth occurs in Moldova where GDP per capita increases 
between 2010 and 2050 by a factor of between 5 ;͚Regional ‘iǀalrǇ͛) and 9 ;͚SustainaďilitǇ͛). 
                                                          
16
 https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/static/download/ssp_suplementary%20text.pdf 
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Bhutan: Bhutan stands out in its strong 
economic development compared to the 
other ADA target countries. Starting at 
the same income level as Armenia and 
Georgia, GDP per capita is projected to 
increase by 2050 between 6-fold in 
͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛ aŶd 11-fold iŶ ͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛. 
BhutaŶ͛s iŶcome level is thus by the 
middle of the century well above global 
average reaching almost the European 
average. 
BhutaŶ͛s populatioŶ gƌoǁs iŶ all thƌee 
scenarios continuously until 2050 and 
thereafter only declines in 
͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛. The ƌelatiǀelǇ loǁ 
population of 0.7 million in 2010 has 
increased to between 1.1 in 
͚“ustaiŶaďilitǇ͛ aŶd ϭ.ϯ iŶ ͚‘iǀalƌǇ͛ ďǇ 
2050. 
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Uganda: In the African ADA target 
countries population increase 
significantly until the mid of the century 
when growth flattens or decreases only 
moderately. Growth is much stronger in 
͚Regional ‘iǀalrǇ͛ compared to 
͚Sustainability͛ because of the high 
fertility and no migration assumption in 
the ͚Regional Rivalry͛ sĐeŶaƌio. ͚Middle of 
the ‘oad͛ takes an intermediate position 
with the following rates of increase 
between 2010 and 2050 and population 
numbers in 2050: Mozambique (1.8-fold 
increase, 42 million in 2050), Ethiopia 
(1.9-fold, 158 million), Burkina Faso (2.3-
fold, 37 million), Uganda (2.8-fold, 
93 million). Across the four countries 
population growth is projected to be strongest in Uganda, a trend continuing until 2100 (Figure 4-10). 
Although economy grows strongly, for example by a factor of 10 to 20 between 2010 and 2050, income 
levels remain throughout the century well below most other countries of the world17. However there 
is some gap closure over time. By 2050 per capita GDP in all four countries has increased from a current 
3-4% of global average to 9%. The four countries also remain on the lower end of income within Africa. 
                                                          
17
 Chateau et al. 2012 explains the methodology for the long-term economic growth modeling  
Table 4-2: Population, GDP and GDP per capita comparison  
ADA priority countries – Middle of the Road scenario 
 
       % of Woƌld: % of the Woƌld͛s aǀeƌage GDP/Đap 
 
Population Change rate
[ Mio of people ] 2010 2050 (% of 2010)
Austria 8.4 9.2 110
Albania 3.2 3.2 100
Armenia 3.1 2.6 84
Georgia 4.4 3.2 74
Moldova 3.6 2.2 61
Bhutan 0.7 1.2 171
Burkina Faso 16.5 38.6 234
Ethiopia 82.9 158.8 191
Uganda 33.4 93.3 279
Mozambique 23.4 42.3 181
GDP Change rate
[ Mio US$2005/year ] 2010 2050 (% of 2010)
Austria 297 561 189
Albania 25 58 237
Armenia 15 44 288
Georgia 20 76 374
Moldova 10 41 408
Bhutan 3 51 1471
Burkina Faso 19 221 1181
Ethiopia 77 896 1158
Uganda 38 555 1445
Mozambique 19 236 1226
GDP per capita Change rate
[ US$2005/year/cap ] 2010 % of 2050 % of (% of 2010)
Austria 35366 363% 60919 243% 172
Albania 7660 79% 18181 72% 237
Armenia 4901 50% 16821 67% 343
Georgia 4651 48% 23448 93% 504
Moldova 2785 29% 18622 74% 669
Bhutan 4780 49% 41202 164% 862
Burkina Faso 1136 12% 5725 23% 504
Ethiopia 932 10% 5639 22% 605
Uganda 1149 12% 5954 24% 518
Mozambique 823 8% 5579 22% 678
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By 2050, the per capita GDP in these countries is between 5580 and 5950 (constant 2005 U$ PPP). This 
compares to 9540 and 25100 foƌ AfƌiĐa͛s aŶd gloďal aǀeƌage ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ.  
   
Figure 4-10: Population in detail at the example of Eastern Africa. Source: Jones 2014 
 
4.2 EŶergǇ sǇsteŵ deǀelopŵeŶt aŶd sĐeŶarios 
Water and energy resource systems are tightly linked. Secure and reliable access to both resources is 
critical to basic survival, as well as ongoing economic development, at all scales and in every region of 
the world. Water is needed for nearly all production and conversion processes throughout the energy 
sector. It is used for fuel extraction and processing; for electricity generation; and increasingly for 
growing biofuels. Similarly, energy is essential for water extraction from both surface and subsurface 
sources, treatment, conveyance, and delivery to users. Choices made in one sector have direct and 
indirect impacts on the other. Energy production technology choice determines the amount of water 
required to produce energy. At the same time, the availability of freshwater resources, management 
policies, and allocation rules determine how much water can be secured for energy production. This 
linkage carries significant implications for managing water and energy security challenges. 
 
4.2.1 EŶergǇ deŵaŶd ĐhaŶge aŶd iŵpliĐatioŶs oŶ ǁater use 
In this section, we present results from the 2015 World Energy Outlook (WEO-2015) and the related 
reports (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2015). In these reports, three possible future scenarios for 
energy system development are considered: Current Policies Scenario, New Policies Scenario, and 450 
Scenario. The Current Policies Scenario takes into account only policies affecting energy markets that 
had been enacted as of mid-2015. The New Policies Scenario, the central scenario in WEO-2015, takes 
into account the policies adopted as of mid-2015, together with relevant declared policy intentions, 
even though specific measures needed to put them into effect may not have been adopted. The 450 
Scenario depicts a pathway to the 2°C climate goal that can be achieved by fostering technologies that 
are close to becoming available at commercial scale. 
Between 1990 and 2010, world primary energy demand increased by 55%, from about 8800 to 13600 
million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe). This demand is projected to further increase in the next few 
Uganda 
Population 2010: 
33 Mio 
Mozambique 
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Population 2050: 
93 Mio 
Mozambique 
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decades. However, future energy and climate policies play a powerful role in determining the pace at 
which energy demand grows and the choice of energy technology mix. According to WEO-2015, world 
primary energy demand will increase by 12 to 45% between 2010 and 2040, to reach between 15200 
and 19700 Mtoe, depending on the scenario considered (Figure 4-11). This increase will be driven 
mainly by demand growth in India, China, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Non-OECD 
countries account together for all the increase in global energy demand, as demographic and 
structural economic changes, together with greater efficiency, reduce collective demand in OECD 
countries from the peak reached in 2007. 
Declines are led by the European Union, Japan, and the United States (International Energy Agency 
(IEA) 2015). 
World primary energy demand for all fuels, except for fossil fuels under the 450 Scenario, grows 
through to 2040. In all scenarios, fossil fuels remain the dominant source of energy supply to 2040, 
but their share of the energy mix falls, just slightly in the Current Policies Scenario but much more 
rapidly in the 450 Scenario. Renewables increase significantly, but their growth only just outpaces that 
of total energy demand, meaning that their share of the energy mix changes little. Similarly, nuclear 
sees little change. The outlook for all forms of low-carbon energy (renewables, nuclear power, and 
others) is more positive in the 450 Scenario and they collectively meet 46% of primary energy demand 
by 2040 (Figure 4-11). 
 
Figure 4-11: Global primary energy demand (upper-left) and electricity generation (down-left) under the different WEO-
2015 scenarios and changes in technology mix of global primary energy demand (upper-right) and electricity 
generation (down-right) between 2010 and 2040. Source: (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2015) 
 
The power sector is the major energy end-use sector. At present, the power sector accounts for over 
60% of coal demand, 40% of gas demand, 55% of the use of renewables, and 42% of global energy-
related CO2 emissions. The power sector must therefore be at the heart of any strategy that addresses 
economic growth, energy and water security, and climate change. Electricity demand is strongly 
correlated to economic growth, although the extent of the linkage depends on the level of economic 
5000
7000
9000
11000
13000
15000
17000
19000
21000
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
Mtoe
New Policies Scenario
Current Policies Scenario
450 Scenario
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2010 NP_2040 CP_2040 450_2040
Mtoe
Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydro Bioenergy Other renewables
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
TWh
New Policies Scenario
Current Policies Scenario
450 Scenario
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
2010 NP_2040 CP_2040 450_2040
TWh
Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydropower Bioenergy Wind Solar PV Others
 32 
 
development of each country, the structure of the economy, and the extent of access to electricity. In 
the New Policies Scenario, demand increases over 70% from about 20150 Terawatt hour (TWh) in 2010 
to almost 34500 TWh in 2040, with an average annual growth rate of 2%. Demand is even more robust 
in the Current Policies Scenario, to reach 37600 TWh in 2040, growing an average of 2.3% per year. 
However in the 450 Scenario, demand growth moderates to 1.5% per year as efficiency measures take 
hold, amounting to 30015 TWh in 2040. Non-OECD countries drive the growth in global demand, as 
they are, in general, undergoing rapid economic and population growth, and associated rising incomes 
and shifts from rural to urban areas. Major increases in electricity demand will take place in India, 
Southeast Asia, and Africa, with an annual growth rate of about 4% between 2010 and 2040 
(International Energy Agency (IEA) 2015). 
The growing demand for power engenders global electricity generation to increase. Global electricity 
generation is expected to increase significantly from 23318 TWh in 2010 to between 33900 and 43100 
TWh in 2040, depending on the policy scenario. The energy mix changes markedly over time. The 
contribution of fossil fuels to total electricity generation will decrease from 77% (15740 TWh) in 2010 
to between 64% (27660 TWh) and 29% (9850 TWh) in 2040, depending on the policy scenario. 
Generation from renewables grows the fastest, as their costs fall and government support continues, 
and it increases two to three and a half times, to reach between 11500 and 17800 TWh by 2040. 
Hydropower remains the largest source of renewables generation, while wind power and solar PV 
expand rapidly, but from a much lower base. Output from nuclear power plants increases up to 150%, 
to reach up to 6200 TWh by 2040 (Figure 4-11). 
The Growing demand for energy and the shifts in technology will have important implications on water 
demand and use. Global water withdrawals for energy production in 2010 is estimated at 583 km3, 
representing aďout ϭϱ% of the ǁoƌld͛s total ǁateƌ ǁithdƌaǁals. Poǁeƌ geŶeƌatioŶ is the ŵajoƌ ǁateƌ 
demand in the energy sector, requiring more than 90% of withdrawals. The largest users of water for 
eŶeƌgǇ pƌoduĐtioŶ aƌe the ǁoƌld͛s laƌgest eleĐtƌiĐitǇ geŶeƌatoƌs: the United States, the European 
Union, China and India. Global water consumption of the energy sector – the volume withdrawn but 
not returned to its source – amounts to 66 km3. (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2012). 
Projections of water demand to support future energy production vary by scenario. There is a general 
trend toward a substantial increase of water consumption by the energy sector in all scenarios over 
2010-2035, while the trend of withdrawals is more variable across the scenarios. The differences 
across the scenarios are largely a consequence of divergent trends related to energy demand, the 
changes in the generation technology mix and the cooling technologies used, and the growth rates of 
biofuels production.  
In the Current Policies Scenario (representing a pathway that assumes no change in existing energy-
related policies), global water withdrawals for energy production continue to rise throughout the 
projection period, climbing to 790 km3 in 2035, about 35% higher than in 2010. In the New Policies 
Scenario, global withdrawals reach 690 km3 in 2035, an increase of about 20% over 2010, with growth 
slowing noticeably after 2020. Water consumption grows significantly by about 85% in the New 
Policies Scenario and doubles in the Current Policies Scenario. 
Slower energy demand growth in the New Policies Scenario (averaging 1.2% per year, compared to 
1.5% in the Current Policies Scenario) plays a significant role in its comparatively lower water 
requirements. The share of coal-fired power plants (that withdraw large quantities of water) in each 
scenario also contributes to the difference in water requirements. In the New Policies Scenario, coal-
fired generation is reduced considerably, by 30% at the end of the Outlook period, and inefficient 
plants are retired more quickly compared to the Current Policies Scenario. Moreover, the power sector 
 33 
 
sees a continued change in the technologies for cooling thermal power plants. There is a trend toward 
wet cooling towers (that reduce withdrawals but increase consumption compared to once-through 
system) in both scenarios. This trend is more pronounced in the New Policies Scenario in which there 
is a shift from older coal plants based on traditional once-through systems. Additionally, the expanded 
role of renewables, such as wind and solar PV, also reduces water withdrawals in the New Policies 
Scenario, with their generation in 2035 is 25% and 60% higher, respectively, compared to the Current 
Policies Scenario.  
In the 450 Scenario, global water withdrawals reach about 600 km3 in 2035, only 4% higher than in 
2010, while consumption almost doubles. Compared with the other two scenarios, the 450 Scenario 
sees much more modest energy demand growth (averaging 0.6% per year) and a marked shift in the 
power sector away from coal-fired power plants and towards renewables. Water withdrawals and 
consumption for biofuels expand the most in the 450 Scenario, even though the increase after 2020 
is slowed somewhat by penetration of non-irrigated advanced biofuels. 
 
Figure 4-12: Global water withdrawals (rectangular bars) and consumption (black squares)  
for energy production by scenario. Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) 2012 
 
4.2.2 Cliŵate ĐhaŶge iŵpaĐts oŶ the eŶergǇ seĐtor 
Water is growing in importance as a criterion for assessing the technical, economic and environmental 
feasibility of energy projects (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2012). The vulnerability of the energy 
sector to water constraints is widely spread geographically and across types of energy production. 
Regions already experiencing water scarcity conditions face obvious risks; but, even regions with 
sufficient water resources can face constraints related to droughts, heat waves, seasonal variation, 
regulations, or combinations of these factors. Climate change is expected to decrease overall water 
availability in many parts of the world and to increase its temperature. These impacts will likely impact 
the reliability of existing energy operations and the viability of proposed projects, compromising 
future energy security and imposing additional costs for necessary adaptive measures. 
The electricity sector is especially vulnerable to water constraints because it strongly depends on the 
availability and temperature of water resources for cooling thermal power plants and running 
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hydropower turbines, which together generate the major share of global electricity. Several studies in 
the literature investigate the impacts of climate change on regional electricity generation. For 
example, (Lehner et al. 2005) assess the impacts of global change on hydropower potential in Europe. 
They find that this potential could be reduced by 6% for whole Europe and by 25% or more for 
southern and southeastern European countries by the 2070s compared to baseline setting. (Van Vliet 
et al. 2012) analyze the vulnerability of US and European electricity supply to climate change-induced 
lower summer river flows and higher river water temperatures. Their results show a summer average 
decrease in capacity of power plants of 6.3-19% in Europe and 4.4-16% in the United States depending 
on cooling system type and climate scenario for 2031–2060, with increased probability of extreme 
reductions in thermoelectric power production. This reduction of electricity generation potential 
could significantly raise electricity prices, impacting negatively both consumer and producer benefits 
(Van Vliet et al. 2013). 
A recent study completed within the Water Futures and Solutions Initiative (WFaS) investigates the 
global impacts of climate change on electricity generation (van Vliet et al. 2016). Results show that 
over the coming decades, some regions will experience higher streamflow and only moderate water 
temperature increases, while others, notably the USA, southern and central Europe, Southeast Asia 
and southern parts of South America, northern and southern Africa, and southern Australia, will 
experience decreases in streamflow over time. Furthermore, strong increases in water temperature 
are expected in eastern North America, Europe, Asia and areas of southern Africa. These changes will 
lead to average reductions in global annual hydropower capacities between 1 and 4% compared to 
observed conditions, depending on the time horizon and climate scenario. The effects of climate 
change on hydropower will likely be especially strong in South America and Australia. For 
thermoelectric power, results show average reductions in global annual thermoelectric capacities 
between 5 and 12% compared to observed conditions, depending on the time horizon and climate 
scenario, due to the combined effects of streamflow reductions and temperature increases. Parts of 
North America, Europe, Africa, and Australia will likely face the most severe impacts (Figure 4-13). 
Several adaptation options are available to address climate change-related water impacts on the 
energy sector. In the power sector, these include an increased diversification in the electricity sector, 
with greater reliance on renewable energy technologies that are independent from water availability 
and water temperature (e.g. solar PV, wind power); improving the efficiency of power plants; for 
instance by replacing fuel sources in thermoelectric power plants; deployment of more advanced 
cooling systems, including wet closed-loop system, and dry and hybrid systems; and switching to 
seawater cooling for thermoelectric power plants along the coast. In biofuels production, some 
solutions could be implemented to reduce water use of biofuel crops such as growing less-water 
intensive crops, growing crops in rainfed conditions where possible, and growing crops in 
multifunctional plantings. More generally, the energy sector can look to exploit unconventional water 
resources such as saline water, treated wastewater, and storm water (International Energy Agency 
2012). 
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Figure 4-13: Impacts of climate and water resources change on annual mean usable capacity of current hydropower and 
thermoelectric power plants. 
Relative changes in annual mean usable capacity of hydropower plants (a) and thermoelectric power plants (b) for 
RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 for 2010–2039 (2020s) and 2040–2069 (2050s) relative to the control period 1971–2000. 
Global trends of changes in annual mean hydropower and thermoelectric power usable capacity for 1971–2099 
based on the GCM-ensemble mean results (thick lines) and for the five individual GCMs separately (thin dotted 
lines) for both RCP2.6 (orange) and RCP8.5 (red) (c). Source: (van Vliet et al. 2016) 
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4.3 Food aŶd agriĐulture deǀelopŵeŶt 
As in the past decades, the growing wealth and population numbers will be driving a rising food 
demand for better nutrition and more protein-rich diets. Based on the demographic and economic 
macro-drivers outlined above, scenario simulations with IIA“A͛s Woƌld Food “Ǉsteŵ ;WF“Ϳ ŵodel ;e.g. 
(Fischer 2011), (Fischer et al. 2009)) and the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) model ((Fischer et 
al. 2012), (Fischer et al. 2007) were undertaken to explore possible future directions of the food and 
agriculture systems and to quantify for each development pathway the attainable nutrition levels and 
associated resource use. 
 
4.3.1 Food deŵaŶd 
Globally, average food energy intake in the WFS model is estimated at 2860 kCal/cap/day in 2010, 
with regions ranging from less than 2300 kCal/cap/day in Africa, on average about 2780 kCal/cap/day 
in Asia and Latin America, to more than 3500 kCal/cap/day in Northern America, Europe and Oceania. 
The projected per capita food energy intake in 2050 reaches levels between 2950 kCal/cap/day 
(Regional Rivalry scenario) and 3360 kCal/cap/day (Sustainability scenario), and in 2080 respectively 
3000 to 3700 kCal/cap/day (Figure 4-14). 
 
Figure 4-14: Selected indicators of global food system development under the different SSP scenarios 
Global cereal food use in 2010 as simulated in the WFS model amounts to 1145 Million tons and global 
cereal feed use is estimated in the model at 927 Million tons. In 2050 scenario results for cereal food 
use fall in the range of 1540 Million tons (Sustainability scenario SSP1) to 1610 Million tons (Regional 
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Rivalry scenario SSP3). In 2080, the range of scenario results for cereal food use widens, from a low of 
1560 Million tons of cereals (Sustainability scenario) to a high estimate of 1890 Million tons in the 
population-rich Regional rivalry scenario (Figure 4-14).  
The total number of people, their wealth and dietary preferences are principle drivers of future global 
food demand. Section 4.1 shows the range of projected global population development and economic 
growth in the three development pathways over the period 2010 to 2080 analyzed in this study. 
Starting from 6.9 billion people in 2010, the world population in SSP1 reaches 8.0 billion in 2030 and 
its peak of about 8.5 billion around 2050. Beyond mid-century global population decreases in scenario 
SSP1 and by 2080 amounts to 7.9 billion people. Global population also peaks in scenario SSP2, but 
later (about 2070) and at a higher level of 9.4 billion. In scenario SSP3 population growth continues 
until the end of this century, resulting in a global population of 8.5 billion people in 2030, nearly 10.0 
billion in 2050 (45% more than in 2010) and a total of 11.6 billion in 2080, about 70% higher than in 
2010. 
From the diagram it can be seen that population in 2050 in the Regional Rivalry scenario is 18% higher 
than in the Sustainability scenario, and 47% higher in 2080. Furthermore, global cereal food demand 
in the Regional Rivalry scenario is 4% higher than in the Sustainability scenario in 2050, and 21% higher 
in 2080. As a result, per caput cereal food consumption is highest in the Sustainability scenario and 
least in the Regional Rivalry scenario. Just as one would intuitively expect in a scenario with less but 
better endowed people, the per caput nutritional status and per caput cereal food demand is superior 
in the Sustainability scenario compared to the other two scenarios analyzed here. 
Yet, despite this clearly higher average per caput cereal food consumption in the Sustainability 
scenario, the absolute amount of global total cereal food consumption is less than in the Regional 
Rivalry scenario due to much higher population numbers under Regional Rivalry. 
This compares to a cereal feed use in 2050 of between 1500 Million tons (scenario SSP1) and 1380 
Million tons (scenario SSP3). Note that cereal feed use in scenario SSP3 is lower than in the other two 
development scenarios. This can be explained by the fact that population numbers in developed 
countries is lowest in the Regional rivalry scenario SSP3, e.g. 1.15 billion people in 2080 compared to 
1.49 billion people in the Sustainability scenario SSP1. As a consequence, demand for livestock 
products in developed countries in SSP3 is lower than in the other scenarios and with it livestock 
production and feed use. 
 
4.3.2 People at risk of huŶger 
The number of people at risk of hunger estimated for 2010 amounts to 920 Million, some 13.5% of 
global population. This number is rapidly decreasing in two development pathways and the share of 
people at risk of hunger is below 2% of global population by 2080, i.e. 1.8% in scenario SSP2 and 0.6% 
in scenario SSP1. Only in the Regional Rivalry scenario the demographic growth is too substantial and 
economic development is insufficient to end hunger and the estimated number of people at risk of 
hunger stagnates at about 800 Million or some 8.5% of the global population in 2080 (Figure 4-14). 
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Figure 4-15: Selected indicators of food system development in Asia under the different SSP scenarios 
Selected food system indicators for the Asia region are presented in Figure 4-15. Cereal food demand 
up to 2050 among the three scenarios falls within a relatively narrow range between 950 Million tons 
(scenario SSP1) to 985 Million tons (scenario SSP3) compared to 765 Million tons in 2010. Driven by 
the respective population development, cereal food demand in Asia beyond 2050 decreases in the 
Sustainability scenario to 870 Million tons in 2080, remains at 960 Million tons in the Middle of the 
Road scenario, and increases to 1100 Million tons by 2080 in response to population growth in the 
Regional rivalry scenario. 
The cereal self-sufficiency ratios for the Asia region is also shown in Figure 4-15 indicating that the 
high level of regional self-reliance (about 90 percent as simulated in 2010) may initially fall slightly 
until 2030. In the longer term the cereal self-reliance ratio of the Asia region is projected to recover 
and increase in the Sustainability scenario SSP1 to 95%, well beyond the 2010 level, would remain 
close to 90% in the Middle of the Road scenario SSP2, and would gradually decline to about 80% in the 
Regional Rivalry scenario SSP3. 
The estimated number of people at risk of hunger in the Asia region in 2010 amounts to 550 Million. 
This number is rapidly declining in two development pathways and hunger is practically eliminated by 
2080. Only under the Regional Rivalry scenario the economic development is insufficient and the 
estimated number of people at risk of hunger stagnates at about 10.6% of the Asian population, i.e. 
580 Million in 2080 (Figure 4-15). 
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Figure 4-16: Selected indicators of food system development in Africa under the different SSP scenarios 
Food system development indicators for the Africa region are summarized in Figure 4-16. Driven by 
population growth and substantial income gains, cereal food demand in the Africa region is rapidly 
increasing, from 128 Million tons in 2010 to between 290 Million tons (scenario SSP1) and 340 Million 
tons (scenario SSP3) in 2050, and between 375 Million tons (scenario SSP1) and 510 Million tons 
(scenario SSP3) in 2080. The assumed swift economic growth in Africa, especially as portrayed in the 
storylines of scenario SSP1 and SSP2 (see Figure 4), results in greatly improved diets and food energy 
intake, exceeding even in the worst case an average 2800 kCal/cap/day. By 2080, hunger is almost 
completely eliminated in the SSP1 and SSP2 scenarios. In the Regional Rivalry scenario, though 
gradually improving, the estimated number of people at risk of hunger amounts to 155 Million (or 
9.5%) in 2050 and to 120 Million (or 5.6%) in 2080. 
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Figure 4-17: Evolution of cultivated land, area equipped with irrigation and total irrigation water requirement in Asia under 
the different SSPs 
 
4.3.3 EǀolutioŶ of Đultiǀated laŶd 
The strong rise in global food and feed demand is putting additional pressures on land, water, energy 
resources and the environment. Results of the WFS and GAEZ model simulations indicate a further 
increase in the global use of cultivated land (i.e. arable land and land under permanent crops) from a 
total of 1540 Million hectares in 2010 to reach under the different development scenarios between 
1620 and 1775 Million hectares by 2050, and between 1555 and 1910 Million hectares in 2080 (Figure 
4-17). In the Sustainability scenario the peak of global cultivated land use, about 1620 Million hectares, 
is reached around 2050 and use of cultivated land subsequently decreases. Global cultivated land use 
steadily increases in the Middle of the Road scenario, reaching about 1700 Million hectares in 2050 
and some 1725 Million hectares in 2080, i.e. around 12% higher than in 2010. In the Regional Rivalry 
scenario, due to continued population growth and slower economic development, the use of arable 
land continues to increase until the end of the simulation period in 2080, approaching a level of about 
1910 Million hectares (Figure 4-17), i.e. some 370 Million hectares (or nearly 25%) higher than in 2010. 
For the land equipped with irrigation the projected extents increase from 321 Million hectares in 2010 
to between 356 Million hectares (scenario SSP1) and 376 Million hectares (scenario SSP3) in 2050, and 
between 350 Million hectares (scenario SSP1) and 400 Million hectares (scenario SSP3)in 2080 (Figure 
4-17). This means that the aggregate global irrigation share, i.e. the share of cultivated land equipped 
with irrigation in total cultivated land, remains almost constant at about 21% in the Regional Rivalry 
scenario (SSP3) and increases somewhat in the Sustainability scenario (SSP1) (from 21% in 2010 to 
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22% in 2050 and 22.5% in 2080) and the Middle of the Road scenario (SSP2) (21.5% in 2050 and 22% 
in 2080). Note that about 70% of the land equipped with irrigation is located in the Asia region, with 
an irrigation share of 42% in 2010 increasing to about 46% in 2050 and 48% in 2080. 
Furthermore, we have estimated future global irrigation water requirements based on changes in 
irrigated areas projected in the WFS scenario simulations and the multi-model ensemble mean of 
irrigation requirements per unit area derived from the outputs of six major hydrological models 
participating in the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISI-MIP; (Warszawski et al. 
2014). For the year 2010 we obtained an estimate of global irrigation water use amounting to 2340 
km3/year. Keeping the irrigation system efficiency parameters at base year level, the irrigation water 
requirements calculated for 2050 were in the range of 2875 km3/year (Sustainability scenario) to 3310 
km3/year (Regional Rivalry scenario), and in 2080 ranging from 2975 km3/year to 3945 km3/year. 
Hence, the estimated increases of global crop irrigation water requirements come in 2050 to 23% to 
42% above the level in 2010 and reach 27% to 69% in 2080 (Figure 4-17). 
Climate change and the increase of irrigated land combine in the scenario projections to increase crop 
irrigation water requirements as detailed in Table 4-3. The results indicate an aggregate impact of 
climate change on irrigation water requirements due to warming and changes in precipitation in 2030 
of 2.2% (in the Sustainability scenario based on RCP4p5) to 2.8% (in RCP6p0). In 2050, using as weights 
for aggregation the areas equipped with irrigation in the base year, the climate change induced 
impacts on crop irrigation requirements fall into a range of 4.5% to 5.6%, and in 2080 the range 
becomes 7.8% to 9.8%. Cultivated land equipped with irrigation in 2050 is 10.7% (scenario SSP1) to 
16.9% (scenario SSP3) above the level in 2010, and by 9.0% to 24.1% in 2080. Also, the specific 
geographic distribution of the expanding new irrigated areas results in some regions in an increase of 
the average irrigation requirement per unit area in addition to climate induced changes, i.e. the newly 
developed irrigated areas tend to require more water input than previously existing irrigated land. 
Table 4-3: Climate and land use components of increased irrigation requirements 
 Climate change induced 
(% change relative to 2010) 
Irrigated area increase 
(% change relative to 2010) 
Irrigation requirements 
(% change relative to 2010) 
 Sustain-
ability 
Middle 
of the 
Road 
Regional 
Rivalry 
Sustain-
ability 
Middle 
of the 
Road 
Regional 
Rivalry 
Sustain-
ability 
Middle 
of the 
Road 
Regional 
Rivalry 
2030 2.2 2.8 2.8 7.0 8.5 10.1 13.4 18.5 23.3 
2050 4.5 5.6 5.6 10.7 13.8 16.9 22.9 32.6 41.6 
2080 7.8 9.8 9.8 9.0 17.2 24.1 27.2 47.7 68.7 
Note: To account for climate change, RCP4p5 climate model results were used in the Sustainability scenario and 
RCP 6p0 results were used in the Middle of the Road and Regional Rivalry simulations. 
 
When combining climate change and land use change impacts, the estimated increase of global 
irrigation water demand becomes 22.9% to 41.6% in 2050, and 27.2% to 68.7% in 2080. As noted 
before, these estimates are calculated assuming an overall irrigation system efficiency as in the base 
year 2010. For instance, meeting a 33% increase of crop irrigation demand (as shown for 2050 in the 
Middle of the Road scenario) with current water withdrawals would require the irrigation system 
efficiency to improve on average by 0.7% per annum between 2010 and 2050. 
Model estimates and data on crop water requirements and irrigation water withdrawal provided in 
FAO (2012) indicate an overall global system efficiency expressed as a water requirement ratio (i.e. 
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the ratio of estimated crop irrigation water requirements over irrigation water withdrawal) of 56 
percent, with large gains possible in many developing countries. 
Due to the spatial pattern of global warming, climate change impacts on irrigation requirements are 
more pronounced in higher latitude regions such as in East Asia, Europe and Northern America. In the 
Africa and Latin America regions the projected changes of irrigated land dominate the increase of 
irrigation water requirements. A summary of regional factors contributing to the increase of irrigation 
water demand in the analyzed scenarios is presented in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4: Regional climate and land use components of increased irrigation demand in 2050 
 Climate change induced 
(% change relative to 2010) 
Irrigated area increase 
(% change relative to 2010) 
Irrigation requirements 
(% change relative to 2010) 
 Sustain-
ability 
Middle 
of the 
Road 
Region
al 
Rivalry 
Sustain-
ability 
Middle 
of the 
Road 
Region
al 
Rivalry 
Sustain-
ability 
Middle 
of the 
Road 
Region
al 
Rivalry 
Africa 4.6 4.5 4.5 24.9 36.7 46.8 157.4 241.1 320.6 
Asia 4.1 5.4 5.4 9.6 12.2 14.7 13.8 18.3 20.2 
Northern America 5.8 6.5 6.5 7.0 7.5 7.7 12.5 13.9 14.0 
Latin America 4.6 5.1 5.1 17.6 24.9 34.7 61.5 102.5 171.0 
Europe 9.2 10.1 10.1 9.9 11.6 14.4 23.3 26.5 31.6 
Oceania 4.5 4.7 4.7 7.8 9.7 10.9 11.4 16.3 18.6 
Note: To account for climate change, RCP4p5 climate model results were used in the Sustainability scenario and 
RCP 6p0 results were used in the Middle of the Road and Regional Rivalry simulations. 
 
The relatively large expansion of food production required in the different development pathways is 
achieved foremost by means of intensification, i.e. higher output per unit of cultivated land, through 
yield improvements, increased input use, and somewhat increased multi-cropping intensity and 
irrigation shares (Figure 4-18). In the Sustainability scenario about 90% of the crop output increases 
in 2050 (relative to 2010 crop production) can be attributed to intensification and only 10% are due 
to conversion of additional cropland. In 2080 an additional 60% of crop production is achieved from a 
cultivated land extent almost the same as in 2010, i.e. by then all simulated production increases come 
from higher yields. In the Middle of the Road scenario, the additional crop production in 2080 
(compared to crop production in 2010) is achieved with about 12% more cropland, i.e. on average 
85% of the production increases are derived from intensification. Only in the Regional Rivalry scenario, 
where technological improvements are somewhat slower and a larger share of the production 
increases occurs in developing regions, the arable land expansion, foremost in Africa and Latin 
America, is responsible for about a third of crop production increases. 
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Figure 4-18: Indicators of global food system intensification under the different SSPs.  
 
Even though the increases of global cultivated land are quite modest compared to simulated global 
production changes, some forest conversion due to cropland and urban land expansion takes place, 
albeit to a varying extent in the different scenarios. Cumulative deforestation caused by cropland 
expansion and built-up conversion up to 2080 is shown in Figure 4-19. 
 
Figure 4-19: Cumulative global forest loss under the different SSPs.  
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The smallest amount of global deforestation occurs in the Sustainability scenario, around 47 Million 
hectares by 2050, and 56 Million hectares by 2080. In the Middle of the Road scenario, accumulated 
forest conversion due to cropland expansion and urbanization is 80 Million hectares by 2050 and 
reaches 110 Million hectares by 2080. The largest forest conversion takes place in the Regional Rivalry 
scenario, accumulating to 117 Million hectares in 2050 and as much as 192 Million hectares by 2080. 
 
Figure 4-20: Evolution of cultivated land, area equipped with irrigation demand in Asia under the different SSPs.  
 
Since availability of additional land suitable for crop production is rather limited, especially in South 
and East Asia, the growth in food demand and production has strong implications for the intensity of 
production, both regarding required yield increases and enhanced multi-cropping. 
The increase of cultivated land in Asia is very small compared to simulated production changes. 
Projected cereal production in the three analyzed scenarios is up by 26 to 30 percent in 2050 
compared to 2010, and by 36 to 40 percent in 2080. Total crop production in the Asia region (at FAO 
I$2005 constant international prices of 2004-2006) increases by 31 to 37 percent in 2050 (relative to 
2010) and by about 50 percent in 2080 compared to 2010. For livestock production the projected 
increases in the Asia region are even higher, namely 58 to 67 percent in 2050, and 85 to 115 percent 
in 2080. 
As most of the production expansion is achieved through yield increases, this implies a further 
intensification of input use in terms of agro-chemicals, energy and water. Especially in the intensively 
farmed areas of South and East Asia this may increase the risks of environmental over-exploitation 
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and degradation. For instance in the Middle of the Road scenario, projected use of nitrogenous 
fertilizers in 2050 in the Asia region is 43 percent higher than in 2010 and 48 percent higher in 2080. 
For the land equipped with irrigation the projected extents increase from 227 Million hectares in 2010 
to between 249 to 261 Million hectares in 2050, and between 246 and 278 Million hectare in 2080 
(Figure 4-20). The aggregate regional irrigation share, i.e. the share of cultivated land equipped with 
irrigation in total cultivated land, increases from 42 percent in 2010 to about 46 percent in 2050, and 
48 percent in 2080. 
For the year 2010 we obtained an estimate of irrigation water demand in the Asia region amounting 
to 1852 km3/year. Keeping the irrigation system efficiency parameters at base year level, the irrigation 
water requirements calculated for 2050 were in the range of 2109 km3/year (Sustainability scenario) 
to 2226 km3/year (Regional Rivalry scenario), and in 2080 ranging from 2157 km3/year to 2425 
km3/year or 16% to 31% above the level in 2010 (Figure 4-20). 
Table 4-5: Climate and land use components of increased irrigation requirements in Asia 
 Climate change induced 
(% change relative to 2010) 
Irrigated area increase 
(% change relative to 2010) 
Irrigation requirements 
(% change relative to 2010) 
 
Sustain-
ability 
Middle 
of the 
Road 
Regional 
Rivalry 
Sustain-
ability 
Middle 
of the 
Road 
Regional 
Rivalry 
Sustain-
ability 
Middle 
of the 
Road 
Regional 
Rivalry 
2030 1.6 2.8 2.8 7.8 8.0 7.6 8.9 10.5 9.9 
2050 3.2 5.5 5.5 11.6 12.1 12.5 14.5 17.6 17.7 
2080 5.6 9.7 9.7 11.2 14.4 17.1 17.1 24.7 27.1 
Note: To account for climate change, RCP4p5 climate model results were used in the Sustainability scenario and 
RCP 6p0 results were used in the Middle of the Road and Regional Rivalry simulations. 
The results in Table 4-5 indicate an aggregate impact of climate change on irrigation water 
requirements due to warming in 2030 of 2.1% (in Sustainability scenario based on RCP 4p5) to 2.7% 
(in RCP6p0). In 2050, the climate change impacts on irrigation water demand range from 4.1% to 5.4%, 
and in 2080 the range becomes 7.2% to 9.4%. In comparison, cultivated land equipped with irrigation 
in 2050 is 9.6% to 14.7% above the level in 2010, and by 8.7% to 20.6% in 2080. 
Among all the major world regions distinguished in this analysis, Africa is envisaged to have the most 
dynamic development, with population numbers increasing up to 3.3 times and GDP growing up to 
30-fold in the period from 2010 to 2080. It does not come as a surprise that this macro-driver 
development is resulting in rather dynamic trajectories of agricultural production and resource use, 
as shown in Figure 4-21. 
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Figure 4-21: Evolution of cultivated land, area equipped with irrigation and cumulative deforestation in Africa under the 
different SSPs.  
 
African cultivated land use in 2010 is estimated at 264 Million hectares, increasing to extents between 
288 Million hectares (scenario SSP1) to 331 Million hectares in 2030, to a range of 302 to 387 Million 
hectares in 2050, and between 303 and 481 Million hectares in 2080. Only under the conditions of the 
Sustainability scenario (SSP1) cultivated land us is projected to stabilize at about 300 Million hectares, 
whereas land conversion for agricultural expansion continues throughout the simulation period in the 
other two development pathways.  
 
Figure 4-22: Evolution of irrigated land and irrigation water requirements in Africa under the Middle of the Road scenario.  
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Irrigation, although expanding swiftly as well, plays an important role only in two sub-regions, 
Northern Africa and Southern Africa. Cultivation in the other sub-regions remains foremost rain-fed 
with irrigation shares below 5%, albeit of a rapidly growing cultivated land base. Regional trajectories 
of irrigated land and associated irrigation water requirements are shown in Figure 4-22. 
 
Figure 4-23: Cumulative forest conversion due to cropland and urban land expansion in Africa under the Regional Rivalry 
scenario.  
 
As indicated earlier in Figure 4-19, African cropland expansion comes with significant deforestation, 
notably in the Regional Rivalry scenario, where the pressure to produce food results in cumulative 
forest conversion amounting to 54 Million hectares in 2050 and to nearly 100 Million hectares by 2080. 
Note that nearly half of total forest conversion occurs in Middle Africa and about one quarter each in 
the Western Africa and Eastern Africa regions. 
 
4.3.4 CoŶĐludiŶg reŵarks oŶ Food aŶd agriĐulture deǀelopŵeŶt 
The quantified scenarios presented in this report illustrate the magnitude of challenges facing the 
regional and global food and agricultural systems in the next decades. The analysis suggests that due 
to the dynamics of demographic and economic development the required production increases in the 
next two to three decades will fall within a relatively narrow range of outcomes if hunger is to be 
successfully eliminated by mid-century. Beyond 2050, the differences in population numbers and 
economic growth among scenarios become large and the scenarios portray vastly different demands 
for agricultural products and associated resource use and environmental risks. 
Production increases in all scenarios mainly rely on intensification, i.e. substantial increases of output 
per unit of cultivated land. While this is possible and achievable due to large prevailing yield gaps in 
Africa and developing Asia, it cannot be taken as given and will require major efforts by the countries 
and the international community. Even then, only in two of the three scenarios adequate nutrition 
levels are achieved in all regions and the risk of hunger is much reduced by 2050 and practically 
eliminated by 2080. In the Regional Rivalry scenario food production in Africa and parts of Asia cannot 
meet the demand of rapidly growing populations and the reduction of hunger stagnates at a relatively 
high absolute level, still decreasing somewhat in terms of the percentage of population at risk. 
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Figure 4-24: Cereal price index (2010=100) under the different SSP scenarios.  
 
In the world food system model the various national/regional components are linked together by 
means of a world market, where international clearing prices are computed to equalize global demand 
with supply. The index of cereal prices generated in each scenario are shown in Figure 4-24. The cereal 
price index can be interpreted as a stress indicator of the world food system. Under the Sustainability 
scenario, cereal prices remain initially quite stable. A clear downward trend occurs beyond mid-
century, coinciding with the decline of world population numbers in this scenario. Price development 
in the Regional Rivalry scenario signals that meeting food demand is becoming increasingly difficult in 
this scenario and adds to the risk of hunger in this SSP3 world. 
Cropland expansion and intensification, if not regulated and managed well, increase the risk of 
environmental damages. Intensification inevitably means intensified application of nutrients and 
other agro-chemicals, may results pollution and over-exploitation of water resources to meet 
irrigation requirements, and may cause excessive deforestation when yield improvements do not 
materialize as needed. Such specific assumptions can be tested in the modelling framework but have 
not been explored in the current analysis. Also, the scenario implementations of the analysis 
presented here have used empirical relationships of enriching diets with livestock products as per 
capita incomes rise, leading as well to increasing feed requirements. In follow-up work we will explore 
the differential impacts of widely adopting more healthy and less environmentally burdening diets 
involving less livestock products than currently. 
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4.4 Water “upplǇ 
Future projections of water availability over long time period at regional and country level, are 
presented in this section. Climate change results in alterations in hydrological cycle and affects spatial-
temporal distribution of water resources (Field et al. 2012). 
The severity of climate change is characterized here by using two different RCPs. The Sustainability 
scenario is combined with RCP 4.5 which assumes that the difference of energy from sunlight absorbed 
by the Earth and energy radiated back to space (radiative forcing) is stabilized before 2100 (see Box 1 
in section 3.1). Causes of change in radiative forcing include changes in the concentrations of 
greenhouse gases and aerosols. 
The Middle of the Road and Regional Rivalry scenarios are combined with RCP 6.0 which assumes that 
the radiative forcing is stabilized after 2100. Furthermore, population change is an important factor 
for water resources assessment that needs to be considered since the finite water resources need to 
be shared. Here, we analyze separately the three scenarios as their population projections are 
different. The population dataset used in this assessment is based on (Jones and O'Neill 2013) which 
downscaled and gridded the projected population based on the SSPs. 
The WFaS project provides estimations of both surface water and groundwater resources availability. 
The present analysis defines that surface water is composed of runoff within a region or country and 
inflow through river networks. 
4.4.1 Aǀailaďle surfaĐe ǁater 
An impact assessment of climate change at sub-regional and country levels is presented here. This 
macroscopic perspective provides highly valuable insights that are worth taking under consideration, 
although it may overlook some aspects related to the heterogeneity of water resources and local scale 
water issues.  
Figure 4-25: Projections of surface water availability for the different continents under two scenarios until 2100 
Available surface water resources at continent-level presented in Figure 4-25 shows a relatively 
constant development as opposed to the development of population, GDP, or water demand 
(presented in section 4.5). At sub-regional level the change will be small ranging from -5 to +5 per cent 
(Figure 4-26 bottom).The change of surface water availability will be more pronounced at country 
level as shown in Figure 4-26 which displays the spatial distribution of surface water resources 
averaged for a ten year time period of 2005-2014 (henceforth the 2010s) compared to the time period 
2045-2054 (henceforth the 2050s) for Middle of the Road and Rivalry scenarios. For instance, several 
countries undergoing already water scarcity conditions in the 2010s will have to cope with lower 
surface water resources availability in the 2050s. Figure 4-26 middle shows a band of decreasing water 
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resources availability from Spain and Morocco to Pakistan. Below this band there is a strip with 
increasing water resources availability from Mauritania to Sudan. These countries have to face a South 
(more water) - North (less water) difference. On the other hand, almost all African countries have to 
Đope ǁith a laƌge deĐadal ǀaƌiaďilitǇ ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ foƌ the Đase of Nigeƌ. Nigeƌ͛s ǁateƌ ƌesouƌĐes 
availability will increase but for the time period 2045-2054 all forcing climate models show in addition 
a peak in precipitation compared to the period 2035-2045 or 2055-2064. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-26: Available surface water – Middle of the Road scenario 
Top: Available surface water 2010.  
Middle: Available surface water 2050.  
Bottom: change rate of available surface water [%] compared to 2010 
 
4.4.2 Aǀailaďle surfaĐe ǁater per Đapita 
Available surface water resources per capita (the so-called the Falkenmark Indicator) is one of the 
most widely used measures of water stress, (Falkenmark 1989). Based on the per capita water 
availability, the water conditions in an area can be categorized as: 
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 Ŷo stƌess  > ϭϳϬϬ ŵϯ/Ǉeaƌ/Đap  stƌess ϭϬϬϬ-ϭϳϬϬ ŵϯ/Ǉeaƌ/Đap  sĐaƌĐitǇ ϱϬϬ-ϭϬϬϬ ŵϯ/Ǉeaƌ/Đap  aďsolute sĐaƌĐitǇ  < ϱϬϬ ŵϯ/Ǉeaƌ/Đap 
In some reports the range between 1700 and 2500 m3/year/cap is described as vulnerability range 
(WWAP 2015). In this study, the total renewable water resources are not restricted to the local (i.e. 
per country) available freshwater, but it includes also the water resources originating from upstream 
countries (more details can be found in section 4.4.4 on transboundary dependency). Therefore, some 
countries such as Egypt and Sudan (fed by the upper Nile) or India (fed by Indus, and Ganges-
Brahmaputra) does not appear in the water scarcity categories in contrast to other publications such 
as the 2015 World Water Development Report (WWAP 2015). 
 
According to Falkenmark indicator, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, the Arabic peninsula, Pakistan and China 
aƌe alƌeadǇ Đategoƌized iŶto ͞stƌess͟ iŶ the eaƌlǇ half of Ϯϭst century under all three scenarios. Table 
4-6 ranks the countries with the lowest water resources availability per capita across the world. 
Table 4-6: Available surface water per capita – ranking of the countries with lowest water per capita worldwide 
 
For countries from Morocco to Bangladesh water resources per capita will generally decrease 
triggered mainly by population growth, but also by declining water resources (see Figure 4-3 and 
Figure 4-27 For some African countries such as Burkina Faso, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, and 
Nigeria, the situation will worsen mainly because of the impact of population change. The opposite 
trend is projected for the cases of Poland which goes from vulnerable in the 2010s to no stress in the 
2050s, and China which is under water stress in the 2010s but will be in the category above 
1700 m3/year/cap in two out of three scenarios in the 2050s. 
Water per capita 2010
[ m
3
/year/cap ]
Qatar 130 60 - 110 46% - 85%
Yemen 430 140 - 290 33% - 67%
Bahrain 450 120 - 250 27% - 56%
Jordan 550 220 - 230 40% - 42%
Oman 720 570 - 720 79% - 100%
Israel 890 390 - 500 44% - 56%
Cape Verde 920 1230 - 2150 134% - 234%
Saudi Arabia 1020 400 - 690 39% - 68%
Djibouti 1070 280 - 470 26% - 44%
Algeria 1070 600 - 650 56% - 61%
Lebanon 1150 750 - 820 65% - 71%
Morocco 1220 640 - 840 52% - 69%
Pakistan 1250 600 - 860 48% - 69%
United Arab Emirates 1420 600 - 1220 42% - 86%
Tunisia 1570 980 - 1110 62% - 71%
Eritrea 1620 700 - 720 43% - 44%
Singapore 1680 1340 - 1400 80% - 83%
China 1690 1720 - 1920 102% - 114%
Belgium 1700 1420 - 1720 84% - 101%
2050
between 3 scenarios between 3 scenarios
2050 (% of 2010)
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Figure 4-27: Available surface water – Middle of the Road scenario 
Top: Available surface water per capita 2010. Available surface water per capita 2050. 
 Bottom: Sub-country scale of Available surface water per capita 2050 for three regions 
 
Despite the fact that Figure 4-27 shows countries with or without water stress, a detailed analysis at 
the sub-country scale is needed. USA and Mexico are categorized not water stressed countries but 
there are hotspots of absolute scarcity such as California, Baja California, and Central Mexico. Egypt is 
also not categorized as water stressed because the major part of population lives on the shore of the 
Nile, although large parts of the country suffer from absolute water scarcity. Furthermore, countries 
located in the tropics such as Indonesia with average water resources availability of around 
17,000 m3/year/cap has water scarce areas in Java where almost half of the population of Indonesia 
is living (140 million). 
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Austria and priority countries of the Austrian Development Agency 
Table 4-7 and Figure 4-28 present total and per capita available surface water resources in the 2010s 
and the 2050s for Austria and ADA priority countries. By the 2050s, the range of water availability per 
capita between the three scenarios is shown. Some countries such as Armenia, Ethiopia and Uganda 
are or will move into the category ͞ǀulŶeƌaďle͟. Although ǁateƌ aǀailaďilitǇ ǁill iŶĐƌease iŶ BuƌkiŶa 
Faso by around 1.5 times, this will be overtopped by population increase of around 2.3 times, pushing 
Burkina Faso into the water stress and water scarcity categories, depending on the scenario. 
Table 4-7: Available surface water per capita – ADA priority countries  
  
Available surface 
water 
  Avail. sur. water per cap 
  [km3/year]   [km3/year/cap] 
  2010 2050   2010 2050 
Austria 98 93 - 100   11600 9700 - 13000 
Albania 50 41 - 43   15400 11900 - 13500 
Moldova 22 20 - 22        6200 8200 - 10200 
Armenia 7 5 - 6   2200  2000 - 2300 
Georgia 69 60 - 64   15800 16500 - 19700 
Bhutan 51 45 - 50   69500 35000 - 44000 
Burkina Faso 28 39 - 43   1700   820 – 1300 
Ethiopia 413 413 - 453   5000 2200 - 3200 
Uganda 161 190 - 195   4800 1700 – 2500 
Mozambique 601 559 - 595   25600 12600 - 14800 
 
Figure 4-28: Available surface water per capita for ADA priority countries – three scenario comparison 
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4.4.3 GrouŶdǁater 
If suƌfaĐe ǁateƌ is iŶsufﬁĐieŶt to satisfǇ deŵaŶd duƌing the dry season or dry years, groundwater can 
serve as an alternative source of water for irrigation. Additionally, groundwater may be the main 
source for irrigation and drinking wherever access to surface water is limited. Globally, irrigated 
agriculture is the largest abstractor and predominant consumer of groundwater resources. 
Groundwater resources supply oŶe thiƌd of the ǁoƌld͛s iƌƌigated aƌea, aŶd appƌoǆiŵatelǇ ϲϬ% of theŵ 
are abstracted in Asia (Siebert et al. 2010).  
For this study PCR-GLOBWB is used to project groundwater abstraction. Projections for the Middle of 
the Road scenario are presented here using the ensemble of five GCM as meteorological forcing. Our 
results estimate 66% of groundwater is abstracted in Asia in 2010. 
Table 4-8: Groundwater abstraction – ranking of the countries with the highest abstraction in the world 
 
Figure 4-29 shows spatial distribution of groundwater abstraction in the 2010s and its increase until 
the 2050s. In total, 800 km3/year of groundwater is used globally in the 2010s and more than 1100 
km3/year will be used in the 2050s. This is an increase of 39% compared to the 2010s18. India, USA, 
China, Iran and Pakistan will remain the top five consumers of groundwater. Groundwater abstraction 
in China will even increase by 50% in the 2050s (see Table 4-8). Some countries such as Bulgaria and 
Georgia with an already high rate of groundwater abstraction will more than double their abstractions 
by the 2050s. 
                                                          
18 Note that this projection assumes constant irrigation area at year 2000. It is expected that groundwater 
abstraction will be larger due to expansion of irrigated area. 
Groundwater Abstraction Change rate
Ranking Countries 2010 Share 2050 Share (% of 2010)
1 India 201 25% 278 25% 139
2 USA 103 13% 118 11% 114
3 China 102 13% 152 14% 150
4 Iran 60 8% 73 7% 122
5 Pakistan 60 8% 70 6% 116
6 Mexico 25 3% 32 3% 127
7 Russian Federation 22 3% 37 3% 168
8 Saudi Arabia 22 3% 29 3% 135
9 Bangladesh 11 1% 13 1% 117
10 Japan 11 1% 12 1% 109
11 Turkey 11 1% 17 2% 162
12 Italy 9 1% 11 1% 115
13 Taiwan 9 1% 19 2% 202
14 Uzbekistan 9 1% 12 1% 132
15 Bulgaria 8 1% 23 2% 292
16 Brazil 8 1% 12 1% 154
17 Germany 7 1% 9 1% 137
18 France 6 1% 7 1% 125
19 Spain 5 1% 6 1% 116
20 Argentina 5 1% 8 1% 164
World 800 100% 1113 100% 139
[ km
3
/year ]
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Figure 4-29: Groundwater abstraction in the 2010s - Middle of the Road scenario 
Top: Groundwater abstraction in the 2010s. Bottom: Change (in Mio m3/year) till 2050 
Rapid aquifer depletion due to overexploitation (abstraction exceeds recharge) is a growing issue 
globally. It gives rise to many economic and environmental problems such as rising of pumping costs, 
desiccation of wetlands, decline of river 
flows, and increase of pollution risk. 
Figure 4-30 shows groundwater abstraction 
in India, China and Pakistan originating from 
both renewable and non-renewable 
resources. Abstraction from non-renewable 
resources in India, China, and Pakistan 
represents approximately 24%, 12%, and 
55% of their groundwater abstraction, 
respectively. Although the absolute amount 
of groundwater abstraction in Pakistan is 
the smallest, the share of abstraction 
originating from nonrenewable 
groundwater resources is the largest. 
 
 
   
Figure 4-30: Groundwater abstraction in India, China and Pakistan 
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Austria and priority countries of the Austrian Development Agency 
Table 4-9 shows groundwater abstraction in 
the 2010s and its increase until the 2050s for 
Austria and ADA priority countries. Results 
indicate that countries with a lower 
abstraction rate in the 2010s such as Uganda 
and Mozambique show a high increase rate. 
Georgia will be within the top twenty biggest 
groundwater users around the world in the 
2050s, with an increase rate of more than 
100%. In the next phase of its work WFaS will 
determine whether this level of groundwater 
use is sustainable or not, and what solutions 
can be implemented to prevent the 
overexploitation of groundwater. 
4.4.4 TraŶsďouŶdarǇ depeŶdeŶĐǇ of ǁater resourĐes 
Aďout ϰϬ% of the ǁoƌld͛s populatioŶ liǀes iŶ aŶd aƌouŶd ƌiǀeƌ aŶd lake ďasiŶs that Đoŵpƌise tǁo oƌ 
more countries and over 90% lives in countries that share basins. The existing 263 transboundary lake 
and river basins cover ŶeaƌlǇ oŶe half of the Eaƌth͛s laŶd suƌfaĐe aŶd aĐĐouŶt foƌ aŶ estiŵated ϲϬ% of 
global freshwater flows (UN-Water 2008). 
The water dependency ratio is defined by (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 2010) as the 
proportion of renewable water resources within a country that originates outside its borders therefore 
it is an indicator of the level of dependence of a country on its neighbors in terms of water resources. 
A country with a ratio of 1 receives all its renewable water from upstream countries. Figure 4-31 shows 
three examples of water dependency. Ethiopia has a low water dependency of 4%, Syria has a high 
dependency of 73%, and Egypt imports almost all its water (94% dependency rate). Results indicate 
also that water availability and the linked dependency ratio change during the year. 
 
Figure 4-31: Flow regime and water dependency in the 2010s (2005-2014) at the example of Ethiopia, Syria and Egypt 
In contrast to the historical ratio given by FAO AQUASTAT, the indicator is calculated using five 
different GCMs and 3 different GHMs. The water dependency ratio does not include groundwater use 
or possible allocation of water to downstream countries through water transfer. 
Figure 4-32 shows the percentage of total renewable water resources originating from outside a 
country and it depicts main areas of water dependency in Europe (Danube, Volga), in Asia (Syr Darya, 
Amu Darya, Indus, Ganges–Brahmaputra), Africa (Nile, Niger, Okavango, Zambezi, Congo) and in South 
America (Rio Paraguay, Rio Uruguay). The dependency ratio does not change significantly by 2050. 
The water dependency ratio does not take into account the total water demand. It is only based on 
the water supply and does not indicate if the local (by country) freshwater is sufficient to meet total 
water demand. 
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Table 4-9: Groundwater abstraction – ADA priority countries 
 
Groundwater Abstraction Change rate
[ Mio m
3
/year ] 2010 2050 (% of 2010)
Austria 1249 1571 126
Albania 460 569 124
Moldova 609 1724 283
Armenia 773 1337 173
Georgia 4260 10320 242
Bhutan 18 48 269
Burkina Faso 0.5 6 1190
Ethiopia 10 21 201
Uganda 3 17 559
Mozambique 33 71 212
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Figure 4-32: Dependency ratio 2010 (definition based on FAO AQUASTAT) 
Austria and priority countries of the Austrian Development Agency 
Figure 4-33 shows the water dependency ratio over the year (average for each month from 2005 to 
2014) for Austria and the ADA priority countries. The water dependency rate for Austria is quite high, 
mainly because of the inflow from the Upper Danube but the flow regime does not show pronounced 
dry and wet seasons. This is different for almost all the other countries where seasonal variations 
might lead to water shortage in some months and the need for inter-countries policy guidance to 
share the scarce water resources in these months. 
 
Figure 4-33: Dependency ratio of the ADA priority countries 
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Armenia - avg. dep. ratio: 25%
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Albania - avg. dep. ratio: 41%
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Georgia - avg. dep. ratio: 16%
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Bhutan - avg. dep. ratio: 26%
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4.5 Water deŵaŶd 
 
Figure 4-34: Surface water supply and demand for 2010 and 2050 – Middle of the Road scenario 
 
Figure 4-34 displays surface water availability and demand per year under Middle of the Road scenario 
for 2010 and 2050. Results show that at global level water demand represents a small part of the 
available surface water resources both in 2010 (9%) and 2050 (11%). Nevertheless, these results hide 
the fact that water is not always available for human uses in the quantities or at the quality, time and 
place required because of several biophysical and economic constraints. Detailed results presented 
subsequently show the different constraints faced by various continents, sub-regions, and countries. 
Water demand is calculated for the three scenarios considered, using ensembles of three global GHMs 
and five GCMs which have been described earlier36. Results shown in this section are the mean of the 
outcomes of these 15 ensembles mostly for Middle of the Road scenario which represents an 
intermediate future socio-economic pathway. It is important to mention that the projection of 
agricultural water demand presented in this report does not include future socio-economic change 
assumptions such as changes in technological and farming practices and changes of irrigated areas 
which will be part of the next phase of WFaS. As for now, irrigated area is fixed to that of year 2000. 
Yet, this estimate provides reasonable insights of future change under climate change. Future 
scenarios for the agricultural sector are still being developed, and WFaS project will release updated 
agricultural projections in the next phase. 
4.5.1 Total ǁater deŵaŶd 
Figure 4-35 and Figure 4-36 present water demand by scenario for the different continents and 
selected sub-regions through to 2050. Figure 4-37 presents water demand in 2010 and 2050 at 
country-level for the Middle of the Road scenario. Results indicate a consistent increase of global 
demand across scenarios through to 2050. Specifically, global demand increases between 2010 and 
2050 by 20% under Sustainability scenario from 4530 to 5440 km3, by 27% under Middle of the Road 
scenario from 4570 to 5800 km3, and by 33% under Rivalry scenario from 4590 to 6100 km3. These 
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considerable differences among water demand projections (ranging from 360 to 660 km3 per year) 
uŶdeƌ the ǀaƌious sĐeŶaƌios uŶdeƌliŶe the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of huŵaŶ soĐietǇ͛s ĐhoiĐe of Ŷowadays policies 
that will shape its future socio-economic and climatic conditions. 
During the next decades, the most intensive growth in water demand across the world is expected to 
occur in Africa, South America, and Asia, under all scenarios, and in Europe under Middle of the Road 
and Rivalry scenarios. Water demand in Africa will expand rapidly (up to 60% by 2050 compared to 
2010) compared to all other continents driven by the intensive growth of population and income, 
although its share from global demand remains small (about 6%). Water demand in South America 
will also rise significantly (up to 50% by 2050 compared to 2010) owing to both population and income 
growth, but its share from global demand is at present 4% and in 2050 it will be 5%. At present, 65% 
of global water demand takes place in Asia, where the major irrigated land of the world is located. By 
2050, water demand in Asia will grow by 30%, to represent about 70% of global demand, brought 
about primarily by income growth. The increase of water demand in Europe depends on the scenario 
considered. It increases slightly (by 9%) under the sustainability scenario due to the assumed 
technological improvement, but it escalates substantially under Middle of the Road and Rivalry 
scenarios (between 25 and 35%), driven mainly by the limited technological progress. Its share from 
global demand will amount to 10% by 2050. 
  
Figure 4-35: Total water demand by continent until 2050. 
 
Figure 4-36: Total water demand by sub-region in Africa, Asia and Europe until 2050 
 
The smallest changes of water demand across the world by 2050 compared to 2010 will be seen in 
Oceania, and North and Central America. Water demand in Oceania will moderately increase under 
all scenarios up to 18% owing to the slow growth of GDP compared to other continents. Oceania holds 
the lowest share of global demand (about 1%). 
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Figure 4-37: Water demand in 2010 and 2050 at country-level  – Middle of the Road scenario 
 
Water demand in North and Central America will increase very little under Middle of the Road and 
Rivalry scenarios and it will even decrease under sustainability scenario due to the limited growth of 
population and income. Its share from global demand will decrease from 15% in 2010 to 12% in 2050. 
Results of water demand projections for the selected sub-regions under Middle of the Road scenario 
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show significant differences among these sub-regions. In fact, water demands are very unevenly 
distributed by the sub-regions of the continents and do not generally coincide with the availability of 
water resources. For Africa, water demand in northern Africa remains the largest in the continent. 
It increases by 18% between 2010 and 2050, although its share in total African demand is falling from 
60 to 40% in the same period. By contrast, the share of western Africa sub-region of total African 
demand is rising markedly from 8 to 20% between 2010 and 2050, sustained by a rapid demand 
increase of more than three and a half times (about 51 km3). Water demand in Middle Africa will 
increase threefold, with its share from Africa total demand increasing from 2 to 4% between 2010 and 
2050. Water demand in eastern and southern Africa sub-regions will increase steadily, maintaining 
their shares in Africa total demand. 
For Asia, water demand in Southern Asia remains the largest by 2050 (40% of Asia total demand), 
although it increases slightly between 2010 and 2050. Water demand in eastern Asia will increase 
considerably between 2010 and 2050 (by 50% or 483 km3), to represent about 36% of Asia total 
demand by 2050. Water demand in the other sub-regions will increase steadily, maintaining their 
shares in Asia total demand. 
For Europe, water demand in Eastern Europe in 2010 is the largest across the continent, and it will 
remain so by 2050, with an increase of demand by 56% (or 119 km3) between 2010 and 2050. On the 
other hand, the shares of water demand in Western and Southern Europe of total European demand 
will fall as the demand will be almost the same in Western Europe and will decrease in Southern 
Europe by 2050 compared to 2010 because of the technological change assumptions to use water 
more efficiently (see sector 3.4 and table 3.2) and low population growth. Water demand in Northern 
Europe will increase steadily, due to a higher population growth compared to Western and Southern 
Europe. Northern Europe will maintaining its share in Europe total demand. 
Results at country-level indicate that water demands in China, India, United States, Russia, and 
Pakistan are at present the largest across the world and they will remain so in the 2050s. Major 
absolute increases of demand worldwide will take place in China (478 km3), India (203 km3), and Russia 
(66 km3). However, the major relative increases in water demand worldwide will be seen in many 
African countries such as Uganda, Rwanda, Liberia, DR Congo, Congo, Gambia, and Nigeria, with 
demands are expected to increase more than six fold by 2050 for the Middle of the Road scenario. In 
Asia, water demand will double by 2050 compared to 2010 in many countries including Armenia, 
Georgia, Papua New Guinea, and Mongolia. In Europe, water demand will rise in the Eastern part 
between 2010 and 2050, especially in Moldova, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Czech Republic. In South 
America, water demand will rise in all countries between 2010 and 2050, especially in Paraguay, 
Columbia, and Bolivia. In North and Central America, water demand will increase significantly between 
2010 and 2050 in some countries such as Panama, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. 
The present assessment does not analyze the impacts of demand change on water quality. However, 
it is expected that the growth of water demand, the increasing importance of domestic and industrial 
waste water discharges, and the potential increase of fertilizers utilization, due to the need to improve 
agricultural productivity, will impair water quality if no adequate abatement measures are 
implemented. 
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Figure 4-38: Share of agricultural water demand in 2010 and changes by 2050 
4.5.2 Water deŵaŶd ĐhaŶge ďǇ seĐtor 
Table 4-10 shows water demand in 2010 and 
2050 by continent and sector and Figure 4-38 
shows changes of the share of agricultural 
water demand by 2050 at country level under 
Middle of the Road scenario. It is important to 
analyze the contribution of each sector to 
total water demand in each continent, sub-
region, and country because it indicates in 
which sector water policy interventions 
should mostly be implemented to address 
water scarcity. 
Results indicate that agriculture currently 
represents the major water demand sector at 
global level and in all continents, except in 
Europe. The share of agricultural water 
demand represents about 70% of total global 
demand, about 80% of total demand in 
Africa, Asia, and Oceania, and about 50% in 
North, Central and South America. In Europe, 
industry represents the major water demand 
sector, with its share exceeding 50% of total 
demand. By 2050, the share of agricultural 
demand will decrease in all continents, 
except in North and Central America, due to 
the intensive expansion of other water uses, 
driven by population and income growth. 
Agriculture will remain the major demand 
sector at global level, representing 60% of 
total demand. The loss of the relative 
Table 4-10: Water demand by continent and sector under the 
Middle of the road scenario. 
 
Total water demand Change rate
[ km
3
/year ] 2010 Share 2050 Share (% of 2010)
Africa 231 100% 359 100% 155
Asia 3026 100% 3941 100% 130
North and Central Amer 659 100% 667 100% 101
South America 166 100% 229 100% 137
Europe 447 100% 558 100% 125
Oceania 37 100% 43 100% 115
World 4566 100% 5796 100% 127
Agr. water demand Change rate
[ km
3
/year ] 2010 Share 2050 Share (% of 2010)
Africa 187 81% 194 54% 103
Asia 2508 83% 2617 66% 104
North and Central Amer 348 53% 367 55% 106
South America 97 58% 99 44% 103
Europe 133 30% 139 25% 105
Oceania 30 80% 31 73% 105
World 3302 72% 3447 100% 104
Ind. water demand Change rate
[ km
3
/year ] 2010 Share 2050 Share
Africa 18 8% 64 18% 353
Asia 316 10% 760 19% 240
North and Central Amer 229 35% 182 27% 80
South America 31 19% 47 21% 153
Europe 241 54% 325 58% 135
Oceania 2 5% 3 7% 144
World 838 18% 1381 24% 165
Dom. water demand Change rate
[ km
3
/year ] 2010 Share 2050 Share
Africa 26 11% 101 28% 390
Asia 202 7% 565 14% 280
North and Central Amer 82 13% 118 18% 143
South America 39 23% 82 36% 211
Europe 72 16% 93 17% 128
Oceania 6 15% 9 21% 160
World 427 9% 967 17% 227
Amount
Amount
Amount
Amount
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importance of agricultural demand will be 
especially pronounced in Africa and Asia 
where most of global population and 
economic growth will take place. 
Agricultural water demand will change 
between 2010 and 2050 for all sub-regions. 
Major absolute increases will be seen in 
Southern Asia (61 km3), Eastern Asia (25 
km3), Western Asia (14 km3), and Northern 
America (14 km3). Agricultural demand will 
decrease slightly only in Northern Europe. 
In relative term, demand changes will 
range between -2% in northern Europe and 
+8% in Southern Africa. On the other hand, 
domestic water demand will increase 
significantly in all sub-regions, except in 
Western Europe where it stagnates. Major 
absolute increases will be seen in Eastern 
Asia (159 km3), Southern Asia (114 km3), 
South-eastern Asia (45 km3), and South 
America (43 km3). In relative term, 
domestic demand will rise by more than 
threefold in All African and Asian sub-
regions, and it will more than double in 
Central and South America. Industrial 
water demand will increase in all sub-
regions, except Northern America, and 
western and Southern Europe. Major 
absolute increases will be seen in Eastern 
Asia (300 km3), Eastern Europe (100 km3), 
and Southern Asia (77 km3). In relative 
term, industrial demand will grow up to 
eight times in Western, Middle, Eastern 
and Southern Africa, but from a much 
lower base compared to other sub-regions 
across the world. Industrial demand will 
also increase significantly in Southern, 
Central, and Eastern Asia up to two and a 
half times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-11: Water demand by sector in ADA priority countries 
under  
Middle of the road scenario 
 
Total water demand Change rate
[ km
3
/year ] 2010 Share 2050 Share (% of 2010)
Austria 3.4 100% 3.3 100% 94
Albania 1.9 100% 2.4 100% 124
Moldova 3.1 100% 7.6 100% 244
Armenia 3.4 100% 5.4 100% 157
Georgia 3.0 100% 8.3 100% 273
Bhutan 0.7 100% 0.9 100% 142
Burkina Faso 0.5 100% 2.1 100% 384
Ethiopia 3.0 100% 12.8 100% 420
Uganda 0.4 100% 5.8 100% 1350
Mozambique 1.0 100% 2.0 100% 192
Agr. water demand Change rate
[ km
3
/year ] 2010 Share 2050 Share (% of 2010)
Austria 0.17 5% 0.18 5% 103
Albania 1.20 62% 1.40 59% 117
Moldova 1.08 35% 1.10 15% 102
Armenia 1.54 45% 1.70 31% 110
Georgia 0.79 26% 0.91 11% 115
Bhutan 0.65 97% 0.66 69% 102
Burkina Faso 0.23 42% 0.23 11% 101
Ethiopia 1.93 63% 1.98 15% 102
Uganda 0.03 8% 0.03 1% 94
Mozambique 0.76 73% 0.8 42% 111
Ind. water demand Change rate
[ km
3
/year ] 2010 Share 2050 Share (% of 2010)
Austria 2.57 75% 2.33 72% 91
Albania 0.25 13% 0.36 15% 144
Moldova 1.81 58% 5.96 79% 329
Armenia 0.71 21% 1.24 23% 174
Georgia 1.40 46% 4.97 60% 356
Bhutan 0.01 0% 0.18 19% 2224
Burkina Faso 0.05 1% 0.35 17% 703
Ethiopia 0.22 7% 3.01 23% 1358
Uganda 0.10 23% 0.78 14% 792
Mozambique 0.03 3% 0.13 7% 469
Dom. water demand Change rate
[ km
3
/year ] 2010 Share 2050 Share (% of 2010)
Austria 0.70 20% 0.75 23% 106
Albania 0.48 25% 0.62 26% 129
Moldova 0.20 7% 0.50 7% 248
Armenia 1.19 35% 2.48 46% 208
Georgia 0.84 28% 2.40 29% 285
Bhutan 0.01 2% 0.11 11% 795
Burkina Faso 0.27 49% 1.51 72% 567
Ethiopia 0.89 29% 7.83 61% 875
Uganda 0.29 69% 4.94 86% 1677
Mozambique 0.25 24% 1.01 51% 402
Amount
Amount
Amount
Amount
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Austria and priority countries of the Austrian Development Agency 
Table 4-11 provides information on total and sectoral water demand for Austria and ADA priority 
countries in 2010 and 2050. Total water demand will decrease slightly in Austria, but is expected to 
increase in the other countries. The largest increases will be seen in Ethiopia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, 
Georgia, and Moldova. Agriculture is at present the largest water demand sector in the lower and 
middle income economies such as Bhutan, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, representing more than 60% 
of total demand. However, industry is the major water demand sector in high income economies 
such as Austria. By 2050, the share of agricultural water demand will decrease in all countries, 
except in Austria where it will not change. Industrial and domestic water demands and their shares 
will rise significantly in several countries including Bhutan, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Moldova, driven by 
strong demographic and economic growth. 
Results indicate that the changes of total and sectoral water demand in ADA priority countries depend 
strongly on the current level of development of each country. For instance, total water demand in 
Austria is expected to decrease. The reason is the decline of the already large industrial water demand 
driven by investments in water efficiency and less-water intensive technologies. In contrast owing to 
the huge increase of domestic water demand, total water demand in Uganda will increase rapidly, but 
from a much lower base. 
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4.6 Water seĐuritǇ 
As shown in the sections on population and GDP (section 4.1) and on water supply and demand 
(section 4.4 and 4.5), the increasing world population, rising demand for food production and 
economic development, and changing spatial and temporal pattern of water supply are the main 
causes for water becoming a more scarce resource. The World Economic Forum ranked water crises 
as the largest global risk for the next decade, as climate change and increasing demand for water are 
expected to worsen the World͛s water future (World Economic Forum 2015). 
4.6.1 Water sĐarĐitǇ - IŵďalaŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ supplǇ aŶd deŵaŶd 
The integrated WFaS modelling approach is to assess current and future imbalances between water 
supply and demand. We employ the water resources vulnerability index (Raskin et al. 1997) also 
known as Water Exploitation Index (WEI) (EEA 2005), defined as the ratio of total annual withdrawals 
for human use to total available renewable surface water resources. Regions are considered water 
scarce if annual withdrawals are between 20-40% of annual supply, and severely water scarce if 
withdrawals exceed 40%. 
 
 
Figure 4-39: Water scarcity - Middle of the Road Scenario for each grid cell (0.5o grid or ~ 50km by 50km) 
In the WFaS framework, we consider annual as well as seasonal variations of water demand and supply, 
as water scarcity often occurs in a certain time of the year. We also look into the most water scarce 
month to characterize the regional water scarcity. 
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Figure 4-39 top shows hotspots of water scarcity for the 2010s in Western South America and Mexico, 
North East Brazil, Chile, North Africa, Afghanistan - Pakistan – India and North-Eastern China, South-
Western Australia, and South Africa. By 2050 (Figure 4-39 bottom), additionally regions including 
Northern and Southern Africa, Middle East, Central and Eastern Asia are projected to experience 
severe water scarcity condition. Figure 4-39 highlights changes in water scarcity class between 2010 
and 2050 for the Middle of the Road scenario (SSP2) on annual basis. 
4.6.2 PoteŶtial populatioŶ eǆposed to future seǀere ǁater sĐarĐitǇ 
Combining the future projections of global population with the WFaS scenario analysis on water 
scarcity reveals an increasing number of people exposed to conditions of severe water scarcity by 
2050. In the 2010s on average 1.9 billion people (27% of the total global population) live in potential 
severe water scarce areas and in 2050 it will increase to 2.7 to 3.2 billion depending on the socio-
economic scenarios (see Figure 4-40) (32% for all scenarios). 
When considering monthly variability of supply and demand into account, currently 3.6 billion people 
worldwide (51%) are living in potential severe water scarcity areas and this figure will increase to 4.8 
to 5.7 billion by 2050 (57% to 58%). 73% of the affected people live in Asia in 2010 (69% in 2050). 
These numbers agree well with a recent study by (Mekonnen et al. 2015), who estimated about four 
billion people living currently under conditions of severe water scarcity at least for one month of the 
year. 
 
Figure 4-40: Potential Population under severe water scarcity for all three scenarios from 2010 to 2050. 
 Left: On annual basis. Right: On basis of the most water scarce month 
Figure 4-41 shows the potential population under severe water scarcity. Especially dense populated 
countries like India and China show the large fraction under severe water scarcity. The symbols in 
Fig 4-41 show the percentage of people in the sub-regions (i.e. Eastern Africa) under severe water 
scarcity. 
The bottom part of Figure 4-41 shows the difference between 2050 and 2010. In sub-Saharan Africa 
the absolute number but also the percentage of people living under severe water scare condition will 
increase up to two times (Western and Eastern Africa). In all the other sub regions the number of 
people under water scarcity will increase but the percentage of people will only slightly increase. In 
China in many areas the number of people and also the percentage will decline, but this will be 
superimposed by an increasing number of people in big cities under water scarcity conditions. Mainly 
in the belt from 10 to 40 northern latitude (South USA, Mexico and Morocco to India) the number 
and the percentage of people under severe water scarcity will increase. 
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Figure 4-41: Potential Population under severe water scarcity in 2050 – Middle of the Road Scenario 
 
Figure 4-42: Most water scare month in the period 2005-2014 – Middle of the Road Scenario 
While there are variations in precipitation during the year, it is important to look into the intra annual 
variability of water scarcity. Figure 4-42 shows the month at which the rate between total water 
demand and water supply is highest (most water scarce month). Figure 4-43 shows the percentage of 
 
 
 
Percentage of people 
under severe water scarcity (red) 
Size dependent on total population 
       36 million       1.6 billion 
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people under severe water scarcity for the most water scarce month in the 2010s and the 2050s for 
the Middle of the Road Scenario (SSP2) aggregated to country scale. It indicates an increase for a 
number of countries mainly in the belt from 10 to 40 northern latitude. The estimation of water 
scarcity in this study takes upstream discharge (exogenous runoff) from into account. For example, 
Egypt freshwater supply comes mainly from the Nile which flow across ten different countries before 
arriving in Egypt. Since half of the population in Egypt lives along the Nile, they are potentially not 
affected by water scarcity. This study does not include the aspect of water quality, inter-basin water 
transfer or water management. 
 
 
Figure 4-43: Potential Population under severe water scarcity in 2050 – Middle of the Road Scenario 
 
Austria and priority countries of the Austrian Development Agency 
Table 4-12 shows the possible 
affected percentage of people from 
severe water scarcity for Austria and 
the ADA priority countries. From This 
assessment Austria, Bhutan, 
Mozambique have no or a low 
percentage of people under water 
scarcity. But water scarcity will be an 
increasing problem for Albania, 
Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and 
Burkina Faso but also for Ethiopia and 
Uganda. 
 
Table 4-12: Potential Population under severe water scarcity in 2010 
and 2050 - ADA countries– Middle of the Road Scenario 
 
[% of population] Year Month Year Month
Austria 0 0 0 0
Albania 0 69 0 83
Moldova 34 49 47 47
Armenia 35 94 76 100
Georgia 5 6 42 49
Bhutan 0 4 0 4
Burkina Faso 0 37 6 44
Ethiopia 0 3 3 19
Uganda 0 0 5 13
Mozambique 0 0 0 2
2010 2050
Population under 
severe water scarcity
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4.7 HǇdro-eĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐlassifiĐatioŶ 
To facilitate presentation of results, we applied an integrated assessment, the Hydro-Economic (HE) 
classification, and have grouped 178 country results into four classes depending on their hydro-
climate complexity and economic-institutional coping capacity (Appendix C). The HE classification 
places countries or watersheds in a two-dimensional space where the x- and y-axes proxy water 
challenges and economic-institutional coping capacity 
respectively (Figure 4-44). The water challenges are 
composed of four indicators; renewable water resources per 
capita, water use intensity, variability in runoff and 
dependency of external water resources. The economic-
institutional coping capacity (Y-axis) is represented by GDP 
per capita. (See details in section 3.3 and section 4.1-4.6). For 
simplicity these are termed HE-1 Water secure and poor; HE-
2 Water secure and rich; HE-3 Water stress and rich, HE-4 
Water stress and poor (see Figure 4-33). For example, 
countries/watersheds classified into HE-4 face significant 
hydro-economic challenges as their hydrological-climatic 
conditions are complex while their economic-institutional 
coping capacity is low. 
Location of countries/watersheds move over time in the two-dimensional space of HE classes 
according to hydro-climatic and socioeconomic conditions. Each of the three scenarios 'Sustainability', 
'Middle of the Road' and 'Regional rivalry' presents different plausible future pathways.  All scenarios 
foresee significant levels of economic growth (i.e. increasing GDP) in all countries, and every country 
shows increase in their GDP per capita at least in the 2050s as well (except Angola under the Regional 
Rivalry scenario).  
Table 4-13: The number of countries in each Hydro-Economic classes. Country results are accumulated at subregional level 
 
 
Total HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4
Global 178 112 44 7 15 36 114 22 6 51 96 19 12 66 79 13 20
Northern Africa 5 3 1 0 1 0 1 4 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 3 2
Western  Africa 16 15 0 0 1 10 3 1 2 11 1 0 4 12 0 0 4
Middle Africa 9 8 1 0 0 5 4 0 0 5 4 0 0 7 2 0 0
Eastern Africa 17 16 0 0 1 15 1 1 0 14 1 0 2 13 1 0 3
Southern Africa 5 5 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 1 3 0 1 2 2 0 1
Western Asia 15 1 0 7 7 0 1 11 3 0 1 11 3 0 1 9 5
Southern Asia 7 5 0 0 2 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3 0 2
Central Asia 8 5 0 0 3 1 4 3 0 2 3 2 1 2 3 0 3
Eastern Asia 4 2 2 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 1 0
South-Eastern Asia 11 9 2 0 0 1 10 0 0 5 6 0 0 7 4 0 0
Northern America 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
Central America 7 7 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 5 0 0 4 3 0 0
Caribbean 10 6 4 0 0 1 9 0 0 2 8 0 0 4 6 0 0
South America 12 12 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 11 0 0 4 8 0 0
Western Europe 12 5 7 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 10 0 0
Southern Europe 8 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 0
Northern Europe 10 1 9 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 0 0
Eastern Europe 10 6 4 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 9 0 0
Oceania 10 6 4 0 0 0 10 0 0 6 4 0 0 6 4 0 0
Number of 
countries
2010 2050
Sustainability Middle of the Road Regional Rivalry
 
Figure 4-44: Hydro-Economic dimension 
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This results in an upward shift along the y-axes moving more countries into the classes HE-2 or HE-3. 
By the 2050s, the number of countries in HE-1 is therefore lower compared to 2010 while the number 
of countries in other classes increases (Table 4-13). Depending on the actual implementation of the 
potential of increased economic strength, this may increase the countries' coping capacity for 
adaptation and risk management related to water challenges. The class HE-1 has 112 countries and is 
dominant in the 2010s. However many of them will shift over time into the class HE-2, and by 2050, 
HE-2 will be dominant in the Sustainability (114 countries), Middle of the Road (96 countries) and the 
Regional Rivalry (79 countries) scenario (Figure 4-45). 
 
 
Figure 4-45: Country-level Hydro-economic class in 2010 and 2050 - Middle of the Road scenario 
 
The share of global population living in HE-3 and HE-4 countries will increase until 2050, slightly less 
than half (43-47%) of global population will live in these higher water challenge classes throughout all 
scenarios (Table 4-14). Concerning population living in class HE-4 countries, there is a significant 
difference between the Sustainability scenario and the other two scenarios. The Middle of the Road 
and Regional Rivalry scenario suggests a significant increase of population living in these countries 
with lower coping capacity and high hydrologic complexity. In 2010 one fourth of global population 
lives in countries classified into HE4 including Southern Asia (1.4 billion), followed by Western Asia 
(200 million). By 2050 population in the class HE-4 under the Sustainability scenario will decrease to 
470 million because some countries will shift to the class HE-3. But under the Middle of the Road and 
Regional Rivalry scenario, population in HE4 will be about 630 million and 3.0 billion, respectively. 
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Consistently, Southern Asia has the largest population in this class in the 2050s, too. Western Asia has 
the second largest population, followed by Western Africa and Northern Africa.   
GDP will have increased in every country by 2050 (Table 4-15). As a result, total GDP will be 4.3, 3.4 
and 2.7 times higher compared to current GDP (in 2010) under the Sustainability, the Middle of the 
Road and the Regional Rivalry scenario respectively. Nevertheless, the total share of GDP in the classes 
HE-1 and HE-4 (i.e. non-rich classes) is in reverse order among the three scenarios. It is about 35% in 
the 2010s and it will be 7% by 2050 under the Sustainability scenario, while it will be 9% and 25% in 
the Middle of the Road and Regional Rivalry scenario.   
Table 4-14: Population for each Hydro-Economic classes 
 
 
Table 4-15: GDP for each Hydro-Economic classes. Country results are accumulated at subregional level. 
 
 
Total HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 Total HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 Total HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 Total HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4
10
6
 cap 10
6
 cap 10
6
 cap 10
6
 cap
Global 6814 60 15 1 24 8398 16 41 37 6 9097 23 33 37 7 9875 30 23 17 30
Northern Africa 159 80 0 0 20 204 0 55 45 0 224 0 56 44 0 256 0 0 60 40
Western  Africa 304 100 0 0 0 588 28 63 0 9 678 79 5 0 17 801 82 0 0 18
Middle Africa 127 99 1 0 0 238 95 5 0 0 267 96 4 0 0 299 99 1 0 0
Eastern Africa 366 100 0 0 0 651 100 0 0 0 757 98 0 0 2 892 96 0 0 4
Southern Africa 58 100 0 0 0 72 4 96 0 0 73 4 94 0 2 72 9 89 0 2
Western Asia 316 23 0 16 61 483 0 18 48 34 544 0 18 46 37 617 0 18 34 49
Southern Asia 1599 13 0 0 87 2048 11 1 76 12 2298 11 1 75 13 2629 11 1 0 88
Central Asia 77 49 0 0 51 84 7 41 52 0 91 16 33 40 12 105 18 31 0 51
Eastern Asia 1519 88 12 0 0 1390 0 12 88 0 1422 0 11 89 0 1448 0 10 90 0
South-Eastern Asia 593 99 1 0 0 689 6 94 0 0 742 30 70 0 0 812 84 16 0 0
Northern America 344 0 100 0 0 460 0 100 0 0 450 0 100 0 0 372 0 100 0 0
Central America 148 100 0 0 0 177 0 100 0 0 199 16 84 0 0 239 21 79 0 0
Caribbean 40 86 14 0 0 40 30 70 0 0 43 36 64 0 0 51 58 42 0 0
South America 392 100 0 0 0 449 0 100 0 0 490 0 100 0 0 552 10 90 0 0
Western Europe 156 13 87 0 0 167 0 100 0 0 164 0 100 0 0 143 9 91 0 0
Southern Europe 189 0 100 0 0 213 0 100 0 0 206 0 100 0 0 175 0 100 0 0
Northern Europe 99 2 98 0 0 124 0 100 0 0 122 0 100 0 0 102 0 100 0 0
Eastern Europe 291 78 22 0 0 263 0 100 0 0 269 0 100 0 0 260 0 100 0 0
Oceania 36 24 76 0 0 56 0 100 0 0 57 25 75 0 0 50 32 68 0 0
2010
Sustainability
Population
2050
% %%%
Middle of the Road Regional Rivalry
Total HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 Total HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 Total HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 Total HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4
Billion 
US$2005/yr
Billion 
US$2005/yr
Billion 
US$2005/yr
Billion 
US$2005/yr
Global 66340 37 53 2 8 283008 5 51 42 2 228253 7 52 39 2 176105 11 48 27 14
Northern Africa 945 85 0 0 15 5814 0 57 43 0 4887 0 57 43 0 3787 0 0 66 34
Western  Africa 521 100 0 0 0 8145 20 73 0 7 5842 83 8 0 9 4006 91 0 0 9
Middle Africa 236 91 9 0 0 2454 86 14 0 0 1620 83 17 0 0 1112 91 9 0 0
Eastern Africa 429 100 0 0 0 6689 99 1 0 0 4523 98 1 0 1 3091 98 1 0 1
Southern Africa 522 100 0 0 0 2307 1 99 0 0 1925 1 98 0 1 1423 4 95 0 1
Western Asia 3524 26 0 40 34 14623 0 24 64 12 13525 0 24 65 11 12013 0 22 59 19
Southern Asia 4426 8 0 0 92 43805 7 2 84 7 32634 6 2 84 8 22499 6 2 0 92
Central Asia 435 60 0 0 40 2315 4 59 38 0 2006 8 56 28 8 1843 8 60 0 32
Eastern Asia 14352 64 36 0 0 78722 0 13 87 0 59828 0 15 85 0 45505 0 15 85 0
South-Eastern Asia 2813 90 10 0 0 19887 3 97 0 0 15104 16 84 0 0 11268 68 32 0 0
Northern America 14289 0 100 0 0 33687 0 100 0 0 29929 0 100 0 0 24750 0 100 0 0
Central America 1618 100 0 0 0 6122 0 100 0 0 5350 8 92 0 0 4543 9 91 0 0
Caribbean 290 62 38 0 0 964 15 85 0 0 797 17 83 0 0 663 32 68 0 0
South America 3965 100 0 0 0 15688 0 100 0 0 12989 0 100 0 0 10688 6 94 0 0
Western Europe 3679 4 96 0 0 6933 0 100 0 0 6189 0 100 0 0 4666 4 96 0 0
Southern Europe 6257 0 100 0 0 12263 0 100 0 0 11301 0 100 0 0 8751 0 100 0 0
Northern Europe 3183 1 99 0 0 7351 0 100 0 0 6692 0 100 0 0 5129 0 100 0 0
Eastern Europe 3919 70 30 0 0 12257 0 100 0 0 10535 0 100 0 0 8469 0 100 0 0
Oceania 937 2 98 0 0 2983 0 100 0 0 2576 6 94 0 0 1898 6 94 0 0
GDP
% % % %
2010 2050
Middle of the Road Regional RivalrySustainability
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The number of countries in the classes HE-3 and HE-4, which are subject to high hydro-climatic 
complexity and often thus suffer from larger water challenges, will increase in every scenario (Table 
4-13). All countries classified into HE-3 or HE-4 in the 2010s will remain in one of these classes. By 
2050s additional countries will have moved into these categories (Table 4-16), all of them countries in 
Asia or Africa. Especially the class HE-4 countries face significant water challenges because they have 
low levels of socio-economic coping capacity combined with large hydro-climatic complexity. Although 
the number of countries in class HE-4 will decrease under the Sustainability scenario from 15 to six 
and to 12 under the Middle of the Road scenario, HE-4 countries will increase under Regional Rivalry. 
The following seven countries remain consistently HE4 counties in all scenarios; Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Djibouti, Iraq, Pakistan, Senegal and Yemen.  
 
Table 4-16: Countries which is categorized into larger water challenge classes in the 2010s and in the 2050s under three 
future scenarios 
 
Note that these average values in the 2050s are categorized by the World Bank as a low level of income 
(< 10000 US$2005/cap/year). Furthermore, zero, two and four countries among HE-4 countries are 
classified as countries with very low level of income (<3000 US$2005/cap/year). For instance in the 
2050s in the Regional Rivalry scenario Afghanistan, Eritrea, Niger and Somalia still exhibit very low 
levels of per capita GDP.   
Subregion Country HE [US$2005/cap/yr] HE [US$2005/cap/yr] HE [US$2005/cap/yr] HE [US$2005/cap/yr]
Algeria 4
1 7564 3 22094 3 16835 4 11883
Egypt 1 5544 2 29449 2 22413 3 15092
Morocco 4 4297 3 29769 3 22291 4 13832
Tunisia 1 8564 3 39315 3 33630 3 26606
Cape Verde 4 3474 4 19441 4 13039 4 9172
Burkina Faso 1 1136 4 9620 4 5725 4 3060
Niger 1 650 1 5976 4 2867 4 1531
Senegal 1 1738 4 12404 4 7266 4 3861
Djibouti 4 2120 4 15194 4 11932 4 8302
Eritrea 4 490 4 3049 4 1348 4 697
Somalia 1 34 1 872 1 266 4 92
Southern Africa Swaziland 1 4754 2 16478 4 11456 4 7020
Afghanistan 4 1185 3 7526 3 4183 4 2891
Bahrain 3 21345 3 46425 3 42670 3 31657
Iran  (Islamic Republic of) 4 10954 3 26863 3 24054 3 20180
Iraq 4 3231 4 14696 4 11113 4 10656
Israel 3 26710 3 58059 3 53230 3 48597
Jordan 4 5131 3 25776 3 20353 4 14449
Kuwait 3 45623 3 93874 3 84044 3 91852
Lebanon 4 12619 3 41914 3 36289 3 27156
Oman 3 24559 3 64385 3 47995 3 35392
Qatar 3 69798 3 115901 3 118003 3 119605
Saudi Arabia 3 20534 3 44828 3 39642 3 38910
Syrian Arab Republic 4 4749 3 27961 4 20580 4 14119
United Arab Emirates 3 42353 3 79488 3 71008 3 66455
Yemen 4 2373 4 8585 4 6566 4 4280
India 4 2983 3 23798 3 15883 4 9587
Pakistan 4 2411 4 12427 4 8475 4 5070
Armenia 4 4901 3 23175 3 16821 4 12612
Azerbaijan 4 8783 3 17690 4 14131 4 11214
Uzbekistan 4 2866 3 20839 3 15717 4 10764
Eastern Asia China 1 6800 3 55893 3 40350 3 29410
1
 in 2010 Algeria is in HE1 in one scenario and in HE4 in two scenarios
2010
2050
Middle of the Road Regional Rivalry
Northern Africa
Western Africa
Eastern Africa
Western Asia
Southern Asia
Central Asia
Sustainability
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For HE4 countries, average per capita GDP will also increase over time but they are still low compared 
to the global average (Table 4-17). Between 2010 and 2050 per capita GDP in HE4 countries will 
increase from 3350 US$2005/cap/year (34% of the average global GDP per capita) to 7400-11500 
US$2005/cap/year (29-48% of the average GDP per capita) depending on the scenario.  
 
Table 4-17: Information about GDP per capita in HE4 
 
 
Austria and priority countries of the Austrian Development Agency 
With regard to the priority countries of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Mozambique, 
Ethiopia and Uganda will remain in the class HE-1, Albania, Moldova, Georgia and Bhutan will shift 
into the class HE-2, Armenia will move into HE-3 and Burkina Faso will move into HE-4 in the 2050s 
under the Middle of the Road scenario. Growth in per capita GDP in African countries tends to be 
smaller than in Asian and European countries (Table 4-15). Countries with lower coping capacity in the 
classes HE-1 and HE-4 show relatively larger deterioration in terms of hydro-climatic complexity, 
although every country improves its coping capacity. Burkina Faso moves into HE-4 in all scenarios and 
Armenia moves into the HE-4 class by 2050 in the Regional Rivalry scenario only.  
Figure 4-46: Change in Hydro-Economic classes for the priority countries of the Austrian Development Cooperation – 
Middle of the Road scenario 
 
 
Sustainability
Middle of the 
Road
Regional 
Rivalry
Average GDP per cap. [US$2005/cap/yr] 4714 11927 9542 7755
low level (<10,000$) 15 3 6 12
very low level (<3000$) 7 0 2 4
2010 2050
Number of countries
GDP per capita in HE4
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Using the HE classification, we have identified countries who have higher hydro-climate complexity 
from multiple perspectives in combination with coping capacity. Practical and specific coping methods 
to overcome hydro-climatic complexity are described in the next section. In the assessment 
framework presented per capita GDP is used as proxy for coping capacity. Increased levels of internal 
(own GDP growth) or external funding (donations) could thus help improve the situation. However it 
must be noted that external financial aid may not always be used efficiently. For example, some 
countries in the class HE-4 show high values in the Fragile State Index (FSI)19 (Messner et al. 2015). The 
FSI annually assesses countries based on 12 variables representing social, economic and political 
conditions. The higher the value, the more 'fragile' a state. Countries with high FSIs may indicate that 
central governments could be weak or ineffective in transforming external financial support into 
improving domestic conditions. In Table 4-16, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and 
Niger were in the top twenty countries of the FSI in 2015. Thus not only financial support but also 
improvements in governance and management will be required for tackling urgent water issues in 
many HE-4 countries. 
 
  
                                                          
19
 http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ 
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 Outlook - uŶĐoǀeriŶg ǁater solutioŶs 
5.1 PoliĐǇ respoŶses for ĐopiŶg ǁith groǁiŶg ǁater sĐarĐitǇ 
This section presents an assessment of the outcomes and tradeoffs of the different water policies 
available to policymakers and some of the policies already used in several countries, based on 
literature review. However, we do not provide here definitive recommendations on specific policies 
to address the growing water scarcity. This is the focus of continuing work within the WFaS initiative. 
Many countries worldwide face important water scarcity challenges, which will be aggravated in the 
coming decades, driven by economic and population growth (shown in section 4.1) and climate change 
impacts (shown in section 4.4). Therefore water allocation of the future will continue to become 
increasingly more and more complex as competition for limited resources intensifies, and will become 
more and more intertwined with other sectors like agriculture, energy, and the environment. Policy 
interventions are needed to address the multiple future water challenges. The objective of 
implementing water policies is to balance freshwater supplies with demands in a way that ensures 
water availability in both adequate quantity and quality. 
Policymakers possess a wide range of policy instruments to address the multiple future water 
challenges, but all of these instruments entail financial and social costs. Current evidence suggests 
that the benefits of many policy options validate their costs. For instance, practitioners of 
management of disasters, such as droughts and floods indicate that it is typically more cost-effective 
to invest in disaster risk reduction measures to reduce the impact of a disaster than to provide 
emergency relief measures once the disaster has occurred. The Stern Review has documented several 
examples of the economic feasibility of water policy interventions to address climate change impacts 
in a number of countries (Stern 2007). 
Water policies are typically divided into supply-side measures and demand-side measures. Supply-side 
measures aim at increasing water supply by using new sources of water to meet growing water 
demand. Historically, the focus for most countries worldwide in addressing water challenges has been 
to consider supply-side measures through the construction of large infrastructures for storing, moving, 
and treating water (Gleick 2003). These infrastructures played a key role in sustaining economic 
growth. (Sadoff et al. 2015). However, as these engineering solutions have become increasingly 
limited and expensive, demand-side measures have become more common. In addition, some supply-
side measures entail negative environmental impacts and they may also be inconsistent with climate 
change mitigation because they involve high energy consumption and greenhouse gases emission 
(Bates et al. 2008). Unlike supply expansion, demand management avoids water scarcity by promoting 
water efficiency and conservation. It relieves scarcity by making greater use of existing supplies, 
reducing demand or altering the timing of demands, all of which can avoid the need for new supplies. 
Demand management aims to squeeze more beneficial use out of existing supplies in several ways 
(Brooks 2003). 
Most of the solutions reported in the literature so far include planned measures, which require a 
deliberate policy decision and investment, on contrast to autonomous measures, which occur 
spontaneously among individuals triggered by natural and human changes. Water solutions can be 
both proactive and reactive. Proactive measures aim at avoiding damage due to water scarcity (e.g. 
avoiding restrictions in water supply and groundwater overexploitation). Reactive measures, on the 
other hand, help to deal with damage once it has occurred (e.g. regeneration of employment and 
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assistance to farmers after extreme events). Measures can be also classified as short-run or long-run 
interventions depending on the economic life of capital investment. 
Water resources management approaches around the world are changing significantly. These changes 
include a shift away from mainly dependence on finding new sources of supply to address perceived 
new demands, a growing emphasis on incorporating environmental values into water policy, a 
reemphasis on meeting basic human needs for water services, and a decoupling between economic 
growth and water use (Gleick 2000). It is recognized that the solution to such problems calls for an 
integrated approach. Integrated water resources management is formally defined by the Technical 
Advisory Committee of Global Water Partnership as the coordinated development and management 
of water, land, and related resources in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare 
in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of valuable ecosystems. From an 
economic stance, integrated management embraces the principle that water supplies and demands 
can be managed jointly in the search for the least-cost and sustainable mix of measures to avoid 
scarcity. With proper planning, it can be achieved at a lower cost than either demand management or 
supply expansion alone (Ward 2012). 
Most water experts agree that infrastructural modifications and supply and demand management 
form the core of the water sector strategy to confront climate change. However, less attention has 
been devoted to the institutional aspects of water management when designing water policy 
interventions, although these aspects play a crucial role in determining the adaptive capacity of basins. 
Water institutions are defined as encompassing all the water-related laws, organizations, networks, 
and coalitions that govern the whole range of water-related activities (Saleth and Dinar 2004). Water 
technologies and management capabilities play a direct role in climate change adaptation, water 
institutions will play an indirect but indispensable role in providing the economic incentives and 
organizational basis for the adoption of existing technologies and management options as well as the 
development of new ones. Moreover, water institutions can perform an important role in determining 
the overall social impacts of a change in water availability, as well as the distribution of gains and 
losses across different stakeholders. 
Tables 5-1 and Table 5-2 provide a summary of water policy intervention alternatives to address water 
scarcity problems including institutional measures based on literature review. The tables identify the 
stakeholders that should be involved in the decision making and implementation processes for each 
intervention, and present a further classification of the interventions that could guide policymakers in 
prioritizing between them. The next step (Phase 2 of WFaS) is to incorporate the water supply and 
demand-side measures into comprehensive portfolios of policy recommendations and to quantify 
their benefits and their trade-offs. 
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Table 5-1: Water supply-side interventions.  
Measures Purpose/Specific actions Involved Stakeholders Long-term Short-term Planned Autonomous Proactive Reactive 
Development of water 
storage and retention 
infrastructures 
Enhancing existing storage capacity and/or building new 
storage facilities (dams, pond and tanks, aquifers, soil 
moisture, natural wetlands) to increase water supply for 
downstream uses, reduce the risks of extreme events such 
as droughts and floods, and produce hydropower 
Government 
Development and funding 
agencies 
Experts 
Basin authority 
Industries 
Irrigation districts 
Environmental NGO's  
X  X  X  
Rainwater harvesting Collecting and storing rainwater for reuse 
Farmers and irrigation districts 
Households 
Government 
Water utilities 
 X X X X  
Groundwater development 
and use 
Increasing water availability in normal years and mitigate 
fluctuations in surface water supply in drought years, 
conjunctive use of surface and ground waters 
Farmers and irrigation districts 
Industries 
Basin authority 
Experts 
Government 
Environmental NGO's  
X X X X X X 
Treatment and use of 
wastewater 
Removing pollutants from wastewater and reuse it for 
different purposes depending on the treatment level 
Water utilities 
Industries 
Government 
Environmental NGO's 
Development and funding 
agencies 
Experts 
X  X  X X 
Desalination 
Removing salts from saline water in order to produce 
freshwater 
Government 
Development and funding 
agencies 
Environmental NGO's 
Experts 
Basin authority 
X  X  X X 
Inter-basin transfer 
Moving water from water-abundant regions to water-scarce 
regions through man-made conveyance schemes 
Government 
Basin authority 
Development and funding 
agencies 
Environmental NGO's 
Farmers and irrigation districts 
Industries 
Households 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
  
X 
 
 
 
 
 
  
X X 
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Table 5-2: Water demand-side interventions 
Measures Purpose/Specific actions Involved Stakeholders Long-term Short-term Planned Autonomous Proactive Reactive 
 
Demand-side measures 
The adoption of efficient 
water technologies 
Increasing water use efficiency and water productivity 
through the use of efficient irrigation technologies (sprinkler 
and drip) and retrofit of water devices in houses and the 
implementation of special public programs promoting their 
adoption  
Farmers and irrigation districts 
Households 
Government 
Basin authority 
Development and funding agencies 
Experts 
Media 
X  X X X X 
Land use planning and 
management 
Promoting water saving and best management practices 
such as crop residue management, conservation tillage, 
irrigation metering and scheduling, deficit irrigation, water 
recycling in fields, conversion to rainfed agriculture, change 
in crop pattern and cropping intensity, and use of drought-
tolerant and early-maturing varieties 
Farmers and irrigation districts 
Government 
Basin authority 
Development and funding agencies 
Experts 
 X X X  X 
River basin planning and 
management 
Setting limits on water extractions, efficient and fair 
allocation rules, clear property rights, adjustment of 
operation rules, extreme event management plans 
Basin authority 
Farmers and irrigation districts 
Industries 
Households 
Environmental NGO's 
Government 
Experts 
X X X  X X 
Awareness rising Information, education and communication 
Government 
Environmental NGO's 
Experts 
Media 
Development and funding agencies 
Civil society 
X X X X X X 
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5.2 DiffereŶt pathǁaǇs for ŵaŶagiŶg ǁater sĐarĐitǇ 
Countries around the world have opted for different pathways to address water scarcity and to achieve 
sustainable water use. We review subsequently the outcomes and tradeoffs of some of these pathways. 
Rising concerns in the European Union about water scarcity and droughts led the European Commission 
to propose in 2007 a set of policy measures to address these issues (European Commission 2007). The 
most important measures are enforcing the full recovery of the costs of water services, considering 
additional water supply infrastructure, and fostering the adoption of water efficient technologies and 
practices. The water pricing policy advocated by the European Water Framework Directive aims at 
recovering the full cost of water services including the resource and environmental costs, following the 
polluter pays principle (European Commission 2012). The objective of this policy is to encourage the 
efficient use of water resources and to assure the financial viability of water supply agencies, which could 
guarantee their operation without the need of public subsidies. 
Water pricing to achieve water conservation, has been the subject of debate since the 1990s. There is a 
strong consensus among experts that water pricing could achieve sizable gains in efficiency and welfare 
in urban and industrial water networks (Hanemann 1998). However, a string of the literature finds that 
irrigation water pricing has limited effects on water conservation and involves disproportionate costs to 
farmers (Cornish et al. 2004), (Kahil et al. 2016). In contrast, (Tsur et al. 2004) indicate that water pricing 
Đould aĐhieǀe aŶ effiĐieŶt alloĐatioŶ of iƌƌigatioŶ ǁateƌ ǁithout daŵagiŶg faƌŵeƌs͛ ďeŶefits, if the pƌiĐiŶg 
policy guarantees that all or part of the revenue collected by water agencies remains in the area and is 
reinvested in improving water use efficiency. 
Improving water use efficiency has become also a policy objective in the European Union and in many 
other countries around the world. Different technological options are available to improve water use 
efficiency such as the adoption of efficient irrigation systems, improving pipelines and lining canals, and 
the adoption of low flow showers and toilets in cities. Many studies analyze the adoption of efficient 
irrigation systems. They find that these efficient systems enable a reasonably uniform distribution of 
water across a field and good control on the depth of application compared to surface irrigation. 
Moreover, the use of efficient irrigation systems seems to be profitable because it reduces land 
abandonment, facilitates the adoption of diversified and high-value cropping patterns, and improves crop 
yield (Perry et al. 2014). However, contrary to widespread expectations, improving irrigation water use 
efficiency may increase water depletion at basin level through enhanced crop evapotranspiration and 
reduction of return flows. These flows contribute to instream flow and groundwater replenishment that 
could be essential for downstream consumptive and environmental uses (Huffaker 2008). Experts suggest 
that irrigation efficiency gains should be accompanied by a set of regulatory measures on water 
allocations or irrigation areas to prevent the unintended effects (Ward and Pulido-Velazquez 2008). 
In many basins around the world, the sharing of water is governed by administrative rules dictating who 
receives how much, depending on overall supply. These rules may not properly reflect the value of water 
across users and uses, and may be more damaging for certain water users than for others. In recent 
decades, the water market approach has been gaining ground in some parts of the world to allocate water 
such as in Australia and Chile. Water markets increase water use efficiency, avoid the development of new 
costly water resources, and achieve significant welfare gains by reallocating water from lower to higher 
value uses (Dinar et al. 1997). 
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The Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) in Australia is at present the most active water market in the world, and 
during the drought of 2002–2012, this market generated benefits in the range of several hundred million 
to 1 billion US dollars per year (Kirby et al. 2014). A challenge to water markets is the third party effects 
such as environmental impacts. Water markets reduce streamflows because previously unused water 
allocations are traded, and also because gains in irrigation efficiency at parcel level reduce drainage and 
return flows to the environment downstream (Howe et al. 1986), (Qureshi et al. 2010). Another worrying 
effect is the large surge in groundwater extractions, as shown in the last drought in the MDB. Groundwater 
extractions between 2002 and 2007 were seven times above the allowed limits placed on groundwater 
users (Blewett 2012). These environmental impacts reduce the benefits of trading and increase adaptation 
costs. For instance, water authorities in Australia are implementing very expensive public programs on 
infrastructure upgrading investments and environmental water buyback, in order to recover water for the 
environment in the MDB (Wheeler et al. 2013). 
Most developed countries invested heavily in infrastructure such as construction of reservoirs, 
desalinization of saline water, reusing treated wastewater, and groundwater development and use in 
order to ensure their water security, often starting early on their path to growth. These developed nations 
aƌe Ŷoǁ ƌelatiǀelǇ ǁateƌ seĐuƌe. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ŵost of the ǁoƌld͛s deǀelopiŶg ĐouŶtƌies still do not have 
enough water infrastructure and remain relatively water insecure (Vörösmarty et al. 2010). 
The option of building reservoirs is limited by silting and available runoff to fill the reservoirs. Most of the 
cost effective and viable sites for reservoirs in developed countries have been identified and used, and 
the remaining sites are not cost effective. Furthermore, environmental concerns and restrictions have 
strongly limited the potential for additional reservoir construction throughout the world (Gleick 2003). 
However, many developing countries lack enough water storage capacity such as Ethiopia, Senegal, 
Rwanda, Haiti, Bangladesh, Nepal, Vietnam, and Albania (Brown and Lall 2006). The future development 
of new water storage infrastructures should consider the full set of costs and benefits for different water 
users and uses including ecosystems needs. Drawing on lessons from previous failures to estimate the 
real costs of these projects could be useful in that regard. Considering more ecosystem-friendly forms of 
water storage, such as natural wetlands and soil moisture, could be more cost-effective and sustainable 
than traditional infrastructure such as dams in certain areas (OECD 2016). 
Desalination of saline water is an expensive and energy intensive option that is available to municipalities 
because the cost can be passed on to the consumer. This option is used in many settings such as Australia, 
Israel, United States, the Gulf countries, and some Mediterranean countries. The environmental concerns 
with desalination relate to the disposal of the brine and the energy used in the process. Desalination is 
generally not an available option for agriculture because of the high cost of water along with the volume 
of water required for production. Desalination costs have dropped significantly over the past decades due 
to technological advances (Ghaffour et al. 2013). This has increased the attractiveness of desalination to 
policymakers as a mean to address water supply shortages in all sectors including agriculture. 
Treated municipal wastewater has become a viable option for both municipal and agricultural uses in 
many countries in Europe and in the United States (Schwabe et al. 2013). Tertiary treated wastewater is 
being used for groundwater recharge and subsequently municipal water supply. Secondary, and in some 
cases tertiary (e.g., Spain), treated wastewater has become a source of water for irrigated agriculture 
adjacent to large municipalities. Secondary treated wastewater is also being used for groundwater 
recharge to replenish aquifer systems used for irrigated agriculture. Given the rate of urban population 
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growth in all countries, this source of water is likely to increase. In addition to managing the buildup of 
salts and nutrients in soils through reuse of water, there is a challenge of moving water from the source 
to the end use as the energy cost of pumping water can be excessive. 
Groundwater is an increasingly important water supply source globally, brought about by the adoption of 
pumping technologies with falling costs. However, significant negative impacts are already occurring in 
many basins worldwide with extraction rates well above recharge. An illustration is the finding that a third 
of the world biggest groundwater systems are in distress (Richey et al. 2015). Therefore, the use of 
groundwater resources during drought spells and under future climate change scenarios requires the 
design of adequate regulations that protect groundwater systems and assure their sustainable use. 
As a final remark, we suggest that it is necessary to select a portfolio of policies that integrates both supply 
and demand-side measures supported by well-functioning water institutions in order to achieve efficient, 
sustainable and equitable outcomes. Countries should prioritize between the different policies when 
outlining possible policy responses. Some policy interventions may be excessively costly, may not lead to 
the intended benefits, may result in harmful and perhaps unintended impacts upon people and the 
environment, or may close off more beneficial future investment opportunities. Selected policies should 
be tailored to the political, institutional, and financial contexts of countries. A successful policy in one 
setting do not necessarily work in other settings because water policies are driven by a complex 
interaction of multi-layer and path-dependent influences, with policy reforms building up on many 
previous waves of institutional reform. 
The future work of WFaS aims at identifying a portfolio of workable water solutions that should be 
considered in policy and investment decisions. This identification will be based on assessing the technical 
and environmental feasibility of these solutions, quantifying their costs and benefits, testing their 
robustness, and assessing the trade-offs and synergies among them, under alternative future scenarios 
based on the Shared Socio-Economic Pathways and the Representative Concentration Pathways. Their 
appropriateness will always depend on the context within which they are to be applied. Stakeholder 
consultations can inform decision-makers. 
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 CoŶĐlusioŶ 
The Water Futures and Solutions (WFaS) initiative has produced a consistent and comprehensive 
projection for global possible water futures. To carry out this assessment, new narratives of water use 
were established as an extension of the Shared Socio-economic Pathways20, giving three future scenarios; 
the Sustainability Scenario, the Middle of the Road Scenario and the Regional Rivalry Scenario. Focusing 
on the near future until the 2050s, WFaS assessed how water future changes over time, employing a multi-
model projection with 15 ensemble members (five General Circulation Models x three Global Hydrological 
Models). The impacts of socioeconomic and climatic changes on water security have been assessed 
through the development of a hydro-economic classification system that aggregates indicators of 
hydrological challenges and adaptation capacities. 
The assessment indicates that the impact of socioeconomic change on water resources is significant. It is 
expected that food and energy production will consistently increase in coming decades, driven by 
population growth and economic development. WFaS projects that water demand in agriculture, 
industrial and domestic sectors will increase between 20 and 33% in the next decades throughout three 
future scenarios considered. Industrial and domestic water demand will grow much more rapid than 
agricultural demand, though agriculture will remain the dominant water demand sector. At continental 
scale, Asia remains the largest water user in the world in all sectors especially for agricultural water use. 
Significant rises in total water demand are expected to occur in Western, Eastern and Southern Africa, as 
well as in Southern and Eastern Asia. At country level, India and China have the largest demand, followed 
by USA, Pakistan and Russia. Water availability per capita is expected to decrease in a belt around 10 to 
40 northern latitude from Morocco to India during the early half of the 21st century under all scenarios 
considered 
Groundwater abstraction covers an important share of water demand. The largest abstractions are in 
India, USA, China, Iran and Pakistan. They account for 67% of total groundwater abstraction worldwide. 
In many countries, there are areas where groundwater abstraction has already exceeded recharge, 
leading to the overexploitation and degradation of important aquifer systems. In the 2050s, groundwater 
abstraction will increase by 39% compared to current situation. For instance, in 2010 25% of total ground 
water abstraction in India, China and Pakistan is unsustainable groundwater i.e. the groundwater 
abstraction is bigger than rate of replenishment. 
Finally, this report assesses the imbalance between surface water supply and demand under the different 
scenarios. Results show that area of the planet which is already under severe water scarcity will further 
expand in the future. The three scenarios indicate an increase by 40% to 60% of the number of people 
living in severe water-scarce areas by 2050. 
A hydro-economic classification, which categorizes countries based on their hydro-climatic complexity 
and economic-institutional capacity, was performed. Results of this analysis show that 22 countries are in 
the water stress categories (rich and poor economies remaining water stressed) in 2010 and 28 to 33 
countries will be in the water stress categories in the 2050s, depending on the scenario considered. The 
consequence is that about 3.6 to 4.6 billion people (43-47% of total population who will produce 41-44% 
of total GDP) will be under the water stress category. 91 to 96% of the affected population will live in Asia 
                                                          
20
 Scenarios used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
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(mainly Southern and Eastern Asia). Our analysis reveals that Somalia, Eritrea, Niger, Burkina Faso, 
Senegal, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan will be the most vulnerable countries globally, as they will be 
highly stressed with low adaptive capacity under most of the scenarios. 
Results in this report indicate that the next few decades will see an increase in demand for water, food, 
and energy. At the same time, these resources will be put under growing pressure by complex 
interactions, the exhaustion of low cost supply options, and climate change impacts. The different sectors 
of the nexus are inextricably linked but water, food, and energy policies are typically addressed separately 
within sectoral boundaries. The results of this study which applies an integrated approach based on a 
broader systems perspective highlight that the sustainable management of water, food and energy 
systems should be conducted from a cross-cutting perspective. Although a fully integrated model and 
assessment of nexus feedbacks is beyond the scope of this assessment, this report underlines that 
understanding and managing the cross-sectoral impacts of socio-economic behavior, as well as climate 
changes, is crucial for water security; if not water constraints could affect all socio-economic 
development. 
Policymakers possess a wide range of policy instruments to address the multiple future water challenges. 
Water policies are typically divided into supply-side measures, which seek to increase water supply by 
finding new sources of water in space and time, and demand-side measures, which promote water 
efficiency and conservation. The adoption of best governance practices and well-functioning institutions 
can contribute to both improved supply and reduced demand. All of these instruments entail financial 
and social costs that need to be considered when designing future water adaptation strategies to socio-
economic and climatic changes. This report presents a review of some of the pathways chosen by different 
countries around the world to address water scarcity and achieve sustainable water use. These pathways 
include a careful investment in water infrastructures, an improvement of water use efficiency, the design 
of effective institutions, and the use of economic instruments for a better allocation of scarce water 
resources among competing uses. 
Consistent portfolios of solution that work across various sectors and scales of management will need to 
be identified. Regional and local options must be applied within context of global communications and 
markets, and development paths chosen in other countries and regions. To determine how these external 
factors may influence their choices, the robustness of solutions can be tested by modifying local scenarios 
to see if they produce improved results under all global scenarios. Identifying portfolios of solution that 
work together synergistically in different regions to improve water, energy, and food security, human 
wellbeing, and the sustainability of development projects is the focus of continuing work of the WFaS 
initiative and will be the focus of future reports. 
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AppeŶdiǆ 
AppeŶdiǆ A: ““P “torǇliŶes  
The SSP storylines served as the starting point for the development of the quantitative SSP elements. Each 
storyline provides   a brief narrative of the main characteristics of the future development path of an SSP. 
The storylines were identified at the joint IAV and IAM workshop in Boulder, November 2011. A brief 
summary of the storylines are provided here for comprehensiveness. For further details and extended 
desĐƌiptioŶs   of the stoƌǇliŶes, see O͛Neill et al. ;ϮϬϭϮͿ. 
 
SSP1 - Sustainability: 
This is a world making relatively good progress towards sustainability, with sustained efforts to achieve 
development goals, while reducing resource intensity and fossil fuel dependency. Elements that 
contribute to this are a rapid development of low-income countries, a reduction of inequality (globally 
and within economies), rapid technology development, and a high level of awareness regarding 
environmental degradation. Rapid economic growth in low-income countries reduces the number of 
people below the poverty line. The world is characterized by an open, globalized economy, with relatively 
rapid technological change directed toward environmentally friendly processes, including clean energy 
technologies and yield-enhancing technologies for land. Consumption is oriented towards low material 
growth and energy intensity, with a relatively low level of consumption of animal products. Investments 
in high levels of education coincide with low population growth. Concurrently, governance and institutions 
facilitate achieving development goals and problem solving. The Millennium Development Goals are 
achieved within the next decade or two, resulting in educated populations with access to safe water, 
improved sanitation and medical care. Other factors that reduce vulnerability to climate and other global 
changes include, for example, the successful implementation of stringent policies to control air pollutants 
and rapid shifts toward universal access to clean and modern energy in the developing world.  
 
SSP 2 - Middle of the Road (or Dynamics as Usual, or Current Trends Continue, or Continuation):  
In this world, trends typical of recent decades continue, with some progress towards achieving 
development goals, reductions in resource and energy intensity at historic rates, and slowly decreasing 
fossil fuel dependency. Development of low-income countries proceeds unevenly, with some countries 
making relatively good progress while others are left behind. Most economies are politically stable with 
partially functioning and globally connected markets. A limited number of comparatively weak global 
institutions exist. Per-capita income levels grow at a medium pace on the global average, with slowly 
converging income levels between developing and industrialized countries. Intra-regional income 
distributions improve slightly with increasing national income, but disparities remain high in some regions. 
Educational investments are not high enough to rapidly slow population growth, particularly in low-
income countries. Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is delayed by several decades, 
leaving populations without access to safe water, improved sanitation, medical care. Similarly, there is 
only intermediate success in addressing air pollution or improving energy access for the poor as well as 
other factors that reduce vulnerability to climate and other global changes. 
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SSP 3 - Fragmentation (or Fragmented World):  
The world is separated into regions characterized by extreme poverty, pockets of moderate wealth and a 
bulk of countries that struggle to maintain living standards for a strongly growing population. Regional 
blocks of countries have re-emerged with little coordination between them. This is a world failing to 
achieve global development goals, and with little progress in reducing resource intensity, fossil fuel 
dependency, or addressing local environmental concerns such as air pollution. Countries focus on 
achieving energy and food security goals within their own region. The world has de-globalized, and 
international trade, including energy resource and agricultural markets, is severely restricted. Little 
international cooperation and low investments in technology development and education slow down 
economic growth in high-, middle-, and low-income regions. Population growth in this scenario is high as 
a result of the education and economic trends. Growth in urban areas in low-income countries is often in 
unplanned settlements. Unmitigated emissions are relatively high, driven by high population growth, use 
of local energy resources and slow technological change in the energy sector. Governance and institutions 
show weakness and a lack of cooperation and consensus; effective leadership and capacities for problem 
solving are lacking. Investments in human capital are low and inequality is high. A regionalized world leads 
to reduced trade flows, and institutional development is unfavorable, leaving large numbers of people 
vulnerable to climate change and many parts of the world with low adaptive capacity. Policies are oriented 
towards security, including barriers to trade 
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AppeŶdiǆ B-ϭ: WFa“ ǁater storǇliŶes aŶd iŵpliĐatioŶs for iŶdustrial ǁater use 
SSP1: Sustainability – Taking the green road 
Elements of the SSP storyline relevant for the ELECTRICITY sector  Reduced overall energy demand over the longer term.  Lower energy intensity, with decreasing fossil fuel dependency.  Relatively rapid technological change is directed toward environmentally friendly processes, including energy efficiency, clean energy 
technologies; favorable outlook for renewables - increasingly attractive in the total energy mix.  Strong investment in new technologies and research improves energy access.  Advances alternative energy technologies. 
 
Implications for electricity water use intensity  Reduction in energy demand will decrease the demand for water from the energy sector substantially even if world population, primary 
energy production, and electricity generation were to increase.  A shift away from traditional biomass toward less consumptive energy carriers, as well as the changing energy mix in electricity generation 
could lead to water savings.  A favorable outlook for renewables will cause big structural and efficiency shifts in the choice of technology with variable consequences 
for water use intensity and efficiency, depending on the renewable type. For example, an expanding output of biofuels will lead to a rise in 
water consumption, whereas a shift towards photovoltaic solar power or wind energy will lead to a decrease in water use intensity.  Higher energy efficiency could translate into a relatively lower water demand, improvements in water quality, following high standards 
that commit industry to continually improving environmental performance.  Overall, structural & technological changes will result in decreasing water use intensities in the energy sector. For example the widespread 
application of water-saving technologies in the energy sector will significantly reduce the amount of water used not only for fuel 
extraction and processing but also for electricity generation as well. 
 
Elements of the SSP storyline relevant for the MANUFACTURING sector  Improved resource-use efficiency.  More stringent environmental regulations.  Rapid technological change is directed toward environmentally friendly processes.  Research & Technology development reduce the challenges of access to safe water.  Risk reduction & sharing mechanism. 
 
Implications for manufacturing water use  The importance of the manufacturing sector in the overall economy decreases further due to the increasing importance of the non-
resource using service sector.  Manufacturing industries with efficient water use and low environmental impacts are favored and increase their competitive position 
against water intensive industries.  Enhanced treatment, reuse of water, and water-saving technologies; widespread application of water-saving technologies in industry. 
 
SSP2: Middle of the road 
Elements of the SSP storyline relevant for the ELECTRICITY sector  Continued reliance on fossil fuels, including unconventional oil and gas resources.  Stabilization of overall energy demand over the long run.  Energy intensity declines, with slowly decreasing fossil fuel dependency.  Moderate pace of technological change in the energy sector.  Intermediate success in improving energy access for the poor. 
 
Implications for electricity water use intensity  Reliance on fossil fuels may lead to only minor structural and efficiency shifts in technology.  Stabilization of overall energy demand over the long run will lead to little or no change in water demand for fuel extraction, processing 
and electricity generation.  A decline in energy intensity will lower water demand.  A moderate pace in technological change will cause minor structural and efficiency shifts in technology and ultimately water use intensity 
will change only slightly.  Weak environmental regulation and enforcement trigger only slow technological progress in water use efficiencies.  Regional stress points will increase globally. Power generation in regional stress points will likely have to deploy more and more 
technologies fit for water-constrained conditions to manage water-related risks, though this can involve trade-offs in cost, energy output 
and project siting.  In general, if historic trends remain the same, water use intensities will continue to decrease in the most developed regions. However, 
there will be slow progress in Africa, Latin America and other emerging economics. 
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Elements of the SSP storyline relevant for the MANUFACTURING sector 
The SSP2 World is characterized by dynamics similar to historical developments.  Moderate awareness of environmental consequences from natural resource use.  Modest decline in resource-intensity.  Consumption oriented towards material-growth.  Technological progress but no major breakthrough.  Persistent income inequality (globally & within economies)  Implications for manufacturing water use.  Manufacturing GVA further declines in relative terms.  Moderate & regionally different decreases of manufacturing water use intensities.  Following historic trends water use intensities further decrease in the most developed regions but less progress in Africa, Latin America 
and other emerging economics.  Weak environmental regulation and enforcement trigger only slow technological progress in water use efficiencies. 
 
 
SSP3: Regional Rivalry – A rocky road 
Elements of the SSP storyline relevant for the ELECTRICITY sector  Growing resource intensity and fossil fuel dependency.  Focus on achieving energy and food security goals within their own region.  Barriers to trade, particularly in the energy resource and agricultural markets.  Use of domestic energy results in some regions increase heavy reliance on fossil fuels.  Increased energy demand driven by high population growth and little progress in efficiency. 
 
Implications for electricity water use intensity  Barriers in trade may trigger slow technological progress in water use efficiencies. A moderate pace in technological change will cause 
minor structural and efficiency shifts in technology and ultimately water use intensity will change only slightly.  Reliance on fossil fuels may lead to only minor structural and efficiency shifts in technology.  An increase in energy intensity will increase water demand where as little progress in efficiency would trigger increased water demand as 
energy use intensifies.  Weak environmental regulation and enforcement hamper technological progress in water use efficiencies, hence very low progress in 
water-saving technologies. 
 
Elements of the SSP storyline relevant for the MANUFACTURING sector  Low priority for addressing environmental problems.  Resource-use intensity is increasing.  Low investment in education and technological development.  Persistent income inequality (globally & within economies).  Weak institutions & global governance. 
 
Implications for manufacturing water use  Manufacturing GVA in relative terms (% of GDP) declines slower than historic trends.  Weak environmental regulation and enforcement hamper technological progress in water use efficiencies.  Very low progress in water-saving technologies.  Water use intensities increase only marginally, primarily in the most developed regions. 
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AppeŶdiǆ B-Ϯ: WFa“ ǁater storǇliŶes aŶd iŵpliĐatioŶs for doŵestiĐ ǁater use 
SSP1: Sustainability – Taking the green road 
Elements of the SSP storyline relevant for the DOMESTIC sector  Inequality reduction across and within economies.  Effective and persistent cooperation and collaboration across the local, national, regional and international scales and between public 
organizations, the private sector and civil society within and across all scales of governance.  Resource use efficiency optimization associated with urbanizing lifestyles.  Changing consumption and investment patterns.  Civil society helps drives the transition from increased environmental degradation to improved management of the local environment and 
the global commons.  Research and technology development reduce the challenges of access to safe water.  Emphasis on promoting higher education levels, gender equality, access to health care and to safe water, and sanitation improvements.  Investments in human capital and technology lead to a relatively low population.  Better-educated populations and high overall standards of living confer resilience to societal and environmental changes with enhanced 
access to safe water, improved sanitation, and medical care. 
 
Implications for domestic water use intensity  Management of the global commons will slowly improve if cooperation and collaboration of local, national, and international 
organizations and institutions, the private sector, and civil society is enhanced.  A demographic transition to lower population levels can be achieved if education and health investments are increased.  Inequality can be reduced both across and within countries if development goals are achieved.  Sustainability relies on increasing environmental awareness in societies around the world.  Industrialized countries support developing countries in their development goals by providing access to human and financial resources 
and new technologies. 
 
SSP2: Middle of the road 
Elements of the SSP storyline relevant for the DOMESTIC sector  Moderate awareness of the environmental consequences of choices when using natural resources.  There is relatively weak coordination and cooperation among national and international institutions, the private sector, and civil society 
for addressing environmental concerns.  Education investments are not high enough to rapidly slow population growth.  Access to health care and safe water and improved sanitation in low-income countries makes steady progress.  Gender equality and equity improve slowly.  Consumption is oriented towards material growth, with growing consumption of animal products.  Conflicts over environmental resources flare where and when there are high levels of food and/or water insecurity.  Growing energy demand lead to continuing environmental degradation. 
 
Implications for domestic water use intensity  Weak environmental awareness trigger slow water security and progress in water use efficiencies.  Global and national institutions lack of cooperation and collaboration make slow progress in achieving sustainable development goals.  Growing population and intensity of resource leads to environmental systems degradation.  Lower education investments do not promote slow population growth.  Access to health care, safe water, and sanitation services are affected by population growth and heterogeneities within countries.  Conflicts over natural resources access and corruption trigger the effectiveness of development policies. 
 
SSP3: Regional Rivalry – A rocky road 
Elements of the SSP storyline relevant for the DOMESTIC sector  Societies are becoming more skeptical about globalization.  Countries show a weak progress in achieving sustainable development goals.  Environmental policies have a very little importance. Serious degradation of the environment becomes more important.  Cooperation among organizations and institutions is weak. Their leadership is highly questionable.  Low investments in education and in technology increases socioeconomic vulnerability.  Growing population and limited access to health care, safe water and sanitation services challenge human and natural systems.  Gender equality and equity remain stable.  Consumption is material intensive and economic development remains stratified by socioeconomic inequalities. 
 
Implications for domestic water use intensity  Countries are pushed to focus on domestic issues.  National and regional security issues foster stronger national policies to secure water resources access and sanitation services.  Consumption is primarily material-intensive and water use important. 
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 A move towards sustainable development goals will lead to authoritarian forms of government and, consequently to a rise in social water 
awareness.  Water security and environmental systems health is trigger by high levels of water consumption and limited development on human 
capital.  National rivalries between the countries in a certain region weak progress toward development goals and increases competition for 
natural resources. 
 
AppeŶdiǆ B-ϯ: WFa“ ǁater storǇliŶes aŶd iŵpliĐatioŶs for agriĐultural ǁater use 
SSP1: Sustainability – Taking the green road 
In SSP1 the world is gradually moving toward sustainability.  Sustainability concerns; more stringent environmental regulation implemented.  Rapid technological change.  Energy efficiency and improved resource efficiency.  Relatively low population growth; emphasis on education.  Effective institutions.  Wide access to safe water.  Emphasis on regional production.  Some liberalization of agricultural markets.  Risk reduction and sharing mechanisms in place. 
 
The above general tendencies of development in the SSP1 World can be interpreted to have the following agriculture/irrigation related 
implications:  Improved agricultural productivity and resource use efficiency.  Quite rapid reduction of prevailing yield gaps toward environmentally sustainable and advanced technology yield levels.  Improving nutrition with environmentally benign diets with lower per capita consumption of livestock products.  Enforced limits to groundwater over-exploitation.  Large improvements of irrigation water use efficiency.  Reliable water infrastructure and water sources.  Enhanced treatment and reuse of water.  Concern for pollution reduction and water quality, implying widespread application of precision farming and nutrient management.  Risk management and related measures implemented to reduce and spread yield risks. 
 
SSP2: Middle of the road 
In SSP2 the world is the world is progressing along past trends and paradigms.  Most economies are politically stable.  Markets are globally connected but function imperfectly.  Slow progress in achieving development goals of education, safe water, health care.  Technological progress but no major breakthrough.  Modest decline in resource use intensity.  Population growth levels off in second half of century.  Urbanization proceeds according to historical trends.  Consumption is oriented towards material growth.  Environmental systems experience degradation.  Significant heterogeneities exist within and across countries.  Food and water insecurity remain in areas of low-income countries.  Barriers to enter agricultural markets are reduced only slowly.  Moderate corruption slows effectiveness of development policies 
 
The SSP2 World is characterized by dynamics similar to historical developments. This would imply continuation of agricultural growth paths and 
policies, continued protection of national agricultural sectors, and further environmental damages caused by agriculture:  Modest progress of agricultural productivity.  Slow reduction of yield gaps especially in low-income countries.  Increasing per capita consumption of livestock products with growing incomes.  Persistent barriers and distortions in international trade of agricultural products.  No effective halt to groundwater over-exploitation.  Some improvements of water use efficiency, but only limited advances in low-income countries.  Some reduction of food insecurity due to trickle down of economic development.  Food and water insecurity remain as problems in some areas of low-income countries.  No effective measures to prevent pollution and degradation by agricultural practices; environmental risks caused by intensive application 
of fertilizers and agro-chemicals, and intensive and concentrated livestock production systems.  Only moderate success in reducing climate risks and vulnerability. 
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SSP3: Regional rivalry 
In SSP3 the world development is stagnating.  Growing concerns about globalization and focus on national/regional issues and interests.  Markets (agriculture, energy) are protected and highly regulated.  Global governance and institutions are weak.  Low priority for addressing environmental problems.  Slow economic growth.  Low investment in education and technology development.  Poor progress in achieving development goals of education, safe water, health care.  Increase in resource use intensity.  Population growth low in developed, high in developing countries; overall large increase.  Urbanization proceeds slowly; disadvantaged continue to move to unplanned settlements.  Serious degradation of environmental systems in some regions.  Large disparities within and across countries.  Weak institutions contribute to slow development. 
 
 
Development in the SSP3 World will lead to manifold problems in food and agriculture, with implications for irrigation development and water 
challenges, characterized by:  Poor progress with agricultural productivity improvements in low-income countries due to lack of investment and education.  Widespread lack of sufficient investment and capacity for yield gap reduction in developing countries.  Growing protection of national agricultural sectors and increasing agricultural trade barriers. Low priority to halt environmental 
degradation caused by agriculture (erosion, deforestation, poor nutrient management, water pollution and exploitation).  Widespread pollution and deterioration of ecosystems.  Continued deforestation of tropical rain-forests.  Only modest improvements of irrigation water use efficiency.  Persistent over-exploitation of groundwater aquifers  Widespread lack of access to safe water and sanitation.  Unreliable water and energy supply for agricultural producers.  Food and water insecurity persist as major problems in low-income countries.  High population growth and insufficient development leave behind highly vulnerable human and environmental systems. 
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AppeŶdiǆ C: HǇdro EĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐlassifiĐatioŶ ďǇ suďregioŶs aŶd ĐouŶtries 
 
 
 
 
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Algeria 1 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
Egypt 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 4 3
Morocco 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Tunisia 1 1 3 3 3 1 4 3 3 3 1 4 3 3 3
Benin 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Burkina Faso 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 4
Cape Verde 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Cote d'Ivoire 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Gambia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ghana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Guinea 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Guinea-Bissau 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Liberia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mali 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mauritania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1
Niger 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 4
Nigeria 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Senegal 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 4
Sierra Leone 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Togo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Angola 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cameroon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Central African Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chad 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Congo 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Equatorial Guinea 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Gabon 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Sao Tome and Principe 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Burundi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Comoros 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Djibouti 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Eritrea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 4
Ethiopia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kenya 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Madagascar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Malawi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mauritius 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Mozambique 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Rwanda 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Somalia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4
Sudan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Uganda 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
United Republic of Tanzania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Zambia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Zimbabwe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Botswana 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Lesotho 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Namibia 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
South Africa 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
Swaziland 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 4
Regional Rivalry
Southern Africa
Eastern Africa
Middle Africa
Western  Africa
Northern Africa
Hydro-economic class
Sustainability Middle of the Road
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2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Afghanistan 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Bahrain 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Iran  (Islamic Republic of) 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3
Iraq 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Israel 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Jordan 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
Kuwait 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Lebanon 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3
Oman 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Qatar 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Saudi Arabia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Syrian Arab Republic 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
Turkey 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
United Arab Emirates 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Yemen 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Bangladesh 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bhutan 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
India 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
Maldives 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
Nepal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pakistan 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Sri Lanka 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
Armenia 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
Azerbaijan 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Georgia 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
Kazakhstan 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Kyrgyzstan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tajikistan 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Turkmenistan 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
Uzbekistan 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
China 1 1 3 2 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 3
Japan 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mongolia 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Republic of Korea 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Brunei Darussalam 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Cambodia 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Indonesia 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Lao People's Democratic Republic 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Malaysia 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Myanmar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Philippines 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Singapore 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Thailand 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
Timor-Leste 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Viet Nam 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Hydro-economic class
Sustainability Middle of the Road Regional Rivalry
Western Asia
Southern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
Eastern Asia
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2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Canada 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
United States of America 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belize 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Costa Rica 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
El Salvador 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Guatemala 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mexico 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Nicaragua 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Panama 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Bahamas 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Barbados 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Cuba 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Dominican Republic 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Haiti 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Jamaica 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Puerto Rico 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Saint Lucia 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
Trinidad and Tobago 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Argentina 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Bolivia 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Brazil 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
Chile 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Colombia 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
Ecuador 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Guyana 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Paraguay 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Peru 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
Suriname 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Uruguay 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Venezuela 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
Sustainability Middle of the Road Regional Rivalry
South America
Caribbean
Central America
Northern America
Hydro-economic class
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2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Albania 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Croatia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Cyprus 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Greece 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Italy 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Montenegro 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Portugal 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Serbia 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Slovenia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Spain 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
Austria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
France 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Germany 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Luxembourg 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Malta 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Netherlands 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Switzerland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Denmark 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Estonia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Finland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Iceland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Ireland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Latvia 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Lithuania 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Norway 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Sweden 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
U.K. of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belarus 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Bulgaria 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Czech Republic 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Hungary 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Poland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Romania 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
Russian Federation 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Slovakia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Ukraine 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Moldova Republic of 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Australia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Fiji 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
French Polynesia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
New Caledonia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
New Zealand 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Papua New Guinea 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Samoa 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Solomon Islands 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tonga 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vanuatu 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hydro-economic class
Sustainability Middle of the Road Regional Rivalry
Northern Europe
Southern Europe
Western Europe
Oceania
Eastern Europe
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AppeŶdiǆ D: AdditioŶal results for all sĐeŶarios  
Continent, subregional, country level 
Content of the supplement Excel file 
Level Name of the 
Excel-sheet 
Description Unit Scenario 
 CountryList List of countries   
Hydro-Economic 
classification 
HE-Summary Classification HE1-HE4 for 
each country for each 
scenario 
HE-class All 
SummaryADA.NC Number of countries in each 
HE-Class 
- All 
SummaryADA.POP Population in each HE-Class Million of people Middle of the Road 
SummaryADA.GDPpc GDP (PPP) and GDP(PPP) per 
capita in each HE-class 
Billion US$2005/yr 
& US$2005/yr/cap 
Regional Rivalry 
Population & GDP POP.ssp1  Population  Number of capita Sustainability 
POP.ssp2  Population Number of capita Middle of the Road 
POP.ssp3  Population  Number of capita Regional Rivalry 
GDP ssp1 GDP (PPP)  Billion US$2005/year Sustainability 
GDP ssp2 GDP (PPP)  Billion US$2005/year Middle of the Road 
GDP ssp3 GDP (PPP)  Billion US$2005/year Regional Rivalry 
GDPpc.ssp1 GDP (PPP) per capita  US$2005/year/cap Sustainability 
GDPpc.ssp2 GDP (PPP) per capita  US$2005/year/cap Middle of the Road 
GDPpc.ssp3 GDP (PPP) per capita  US$2005/year/cap Regional Rivalry 
Area Area Area  km2  
Water Supply TotASWR.rcp4p5 Total Available Surface 
Water Resouces 
m3/year Sustainability 
TotASWR.rcp6p0 Total Available Surface 
Water Resouces 
m3/year Middle of the Road & 
Regional Rivalry 
TotASWRpc.ssp1 Total Available Surface 
Water Resouces per cap 
m3/year/cap Sustainability 
TotASWRpc.ssp2 Total Available Surface 
Water Resouces per cap 
m3/year/cap Middle of the Road 
TotASWRpc.ssp3 Total Available Surface 
Water Resouces per cap 
m3/year/cap Regional Rivalry 
Water demand TotDem.ssp1.rcp4p5 Total Water Demand km3/year Sustainability 
TotDem.ssp2.rcp6p0 Total Water Demand km3/year Middle of the Road 
TotDem.ssp3.rcp6p0 Total Water Demand km3/year Regional Rivalry 
AgrDem.rcp4p5 Agricultural water demand  km3/year Sustainability 
AgrDem.rcp6p0 Agricultural water demand  km3/year Middle of the Road & 
Regional Rivalry 
IndDem.ssp1 Industrial Water Demand km3/year Sustainability 
IndDem.ssp2 Industrial Water Demand km3/year Middle of the Road 
IndDem.ssp3 Industrial Water Demand km3/year Regional Rivalry 
DomDem.ssp1 Domestic Water Demand km3/year Sustainability 
DomDem.ssp2 Domestic Water Demand km3/year Middle of the Road 
DomDem.ssp3 Domestic Water Demand km3/year Regional Rivalry 
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WATER FUTURES AND SOLUTIONS 
The Water Futures and Solutions Initiative (WFaS) is a 
cross-sector, collaborative global project. Its objective is 
to developing scientific evidence and applying systems 
analysis to help identify water-related policies and 
management practices that work together consistently 
across scales and sectors to improve human well-being 
through water security. 
 A stakeholder informed, scenario-based assessment of 
water resources and water demand, employing 
ensembles of state-of-the-art socio-economic and 
hydrological models, examines possible futures and tests 
the feasibility, sustainability and robustness of options 
that can be implemented today and can be sustainable 
and robust across a range of possible futures and 
associated uncertainties we face. 
The Water Futures and Solutions (WFaS) initiative has 
produced a consistent and comprehensive projection for 
global possible water futures. Focusing on the near future 
until the 2050s, WFaS assessed how water future changes 
over time, employing a multi-model projection.  
The impacts of socioeconomic and climatic changes on 
water security have been assessed through the 
development of a hydro-economic classification system 
that aggregates indicators of hydrological challenges and 
adaptation capacities. 
 
